


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**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia



Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-91-005

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Returning Gulf Workers Discuss Treatment, Conditions

91AE0095A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
6 Nov 90 pp 53-55

[Article: "Workers Fleeing Iraq and Kuwait Recount Their Tragedy to AL-MAJALLAH; We Went to Baghdad Empty-Handed and Returned From It in the Red; Saddam's Troops Burned My Truck, Fruit of My Life and My Children's Future; I Told My Wife Before My Departure 'I Will Return to You Loaded With Money' But Returned Covered With Dirt"]

[Text] Cairo—If the fate of 1,500 Egyptian workers has been death on the hands of the frenzied and the perverted in Iraq, then the condition of thousands, not to say millions, of other workers is gloomy and tragic. The only reason the overwhelming majority of them went to Kuwait and Iraq was to secure a livelihood for themselves and their families when it became impossible for them to secure this livelihood in their own countries. But after years of expatriation, struggle, and hard work, they have now returned empty-handed and not knowing how to confront their bitter reality, which has become even more bitter now that the social and economic conditions have worsened in more than one Arab country.

AL-MAJALLAH has sought out some of these families in Egypt, familiarized itself with their conditions, and witnessed their tragedy, which also applies to thousands of other families.

Saddam has killed the dream—the dream of simple men such as Muhammad, 'Abdallah, and Farghali.

Muhammad has five children. He sold his wife's jewelry to go to Kuwait.

'Abdallah sold his small workshop to go to Iraq.

Farghali sold the qirat of land he owned to seek his livelihood in the Gulf states.

Muhammad al-Hadi Mahmud is a peasant from a village in Egypt's delta. He sat sobbing. Perhaps his forlornness and his exile made his nostalgia for his country so tender that he cried and perhaps it was the horror of the voyage, during which he experienced the worst before he managed to escape Saddam's troops and return to his country, that made him cry.

"I wish I did not come. I wish I had died there before returning. The world is black in my eyes and it looks to me narrower than a needle's hole."

I asked him: Why all this? He answered: "My tragedy is my wife, my children, and my old mother. We possess nothing in this world. I swear to you that there was nothing in our home other than the wages that I brought at day's end and with which we fed ourselves."

He then recounted his tale: "I worked as a hired daily worker with labor groups. My daily wages amounted to nearly five pounds which I brought to my wife who spent the money on my five children and my mother. But then some friends advised me to go to Kuwait because it is a rich country and because there I could earn enough to support the family and save a large sum of money every year. I was convinced of their idea. But I did not possess a single penny and I could find nothing in this world other than my wife's gold jewelry which she considered her impregnable protection in this world. When I asked her to sell her jewelry, she refused, and we quarreled repeatedly. My friends came to convince her that Kuwait is a country abounding with riches and that I would return to her with much more than her jewelry in a matter of months. But she refused to be convinced and moved to the home of her father who also kept on trying to convince her for the sake of our children's future. Finally, she was convinced and sold the jewelry, and I borrowed 500 pounds to complete the price of the ticket and the cost of the contract to the man who brought me the 'travel contract.'

"I had hoped," said Muhammad al-Hadi Mahmud, "to save a large sum of money from this expatriation and then to return to my country and open a shop or a small project with which to secure the future of my five children. I entered Kuwait with utter joy and with a big smile on my face and slipped into a dream of things distant."

Muhammad Farghali [as published] added: "I started working for the company with which I concluded the contract in Kuwait. But the job lasted just six months. I worked as a security officer for the company. I sent my children a small part of my wages, saved another part at a bank, and kept the rest of my account with the company because I was afraid that if I sent all the money to the family, they would squander it before I returned home. But regrettably, the unexpected happened. The work came to a halt, and the guarantor fled, taking with him my passport and all my papers. I had only 150 dinars in my pocket. We began to hear about the acts the Iraqis were committing in Kuwait, including looting, plunder, thefts, and the forceful expulsion of citizens from their homes. The banks shut down, and starvation surfaced for the first time in that city which has never experienced anything but abundance, reassurance, and affluence.

"I had no option but to think of returning in any way possible. We despaired of resuming work, and I thought it was better to return to my family than to stay there. But as soon as I packed up my possessions in my suitcase and started leaving Kuwait, I started thinking hard of my home, my children, and my mother. What will I do when I return? Where will I work? I have sold my wife's jewelry, and we possess absolutely nothing. We may not even find the sustenance to keep us alive. I became distressed. Despite the enormity of what I had seen and despite the hardship of the hunger, pain, and sickness I experienced on the way—keeping in mind that I was

repeatedly exposed to death by the bullets of Saddam's troops—my main preoccupation and concern was my family and my children. I had left them expecting me to return prosperous. Should I bury myself in the sands alive so that I may not return? What use would it be? I don't know what to do. This is the worst day in my entire life."

Workshop and Problem

'Abdallah Hasan al-Na'im from al-Sharabiyah Quarter in Cairo found himself in the midst of the same hardship and repeated the above tale, but in a different way. He said:

"I owned a small workshop in Cairo. But its small capital was not enough to pay the workers' weekly wages. I considered going abroad. So I closed the workshop and agreed to sell it in order that I may go abroad and save a large sum of money with which to set up my project under better conditions. I did actually sell the workshop and go to Iraq. There, I found that the circumstances were extremely bad in every respect and discovered that the person who encouraged me to go had deceived me very badly. I regretted leaving my country because had I stayed, I would have been much better off. That day, I realized how mistaken I had been."

'Abdallah Hasan al-Na'im added: "Despite the bad circumstances, I considered working for one year after which I would return to my country. But barely had a few months passed when we were surprised by the attack on Kuwait. That day, they asked us to join the alleged 'holy war' [jihad]. But against whom? Against a Muslim country and a Muslim people! I was amazed. How could Iraq embark on a new war with Kuwait, the sisterly neighbor who had supported Iraq in bad and hard times!

"The Egyptians started resorting to various means to flee this fatal inferno where there is no work and no hope of a future in Iraq as long as it is ruled by Saddam. I headed with a number of companions to Baghdad. I walked on foot for more than 30 km along the Iraqi-Iranian borders. I started to think of returning, of my responsibility, and of my three little daughters and felt pained and sorrowful. I had sold my workshop, and I did not know whether I would or would not find an employment opportunity upon returning to Egypt. Concern for the future became greater and heavier than the concern of the reality in which I found myself while on my way across Iraq's territories and prior to crossing the Jordanian border and joining the caravan for a wait that lasted three days before the Jordanian authorities allowed us to transit through their territories. The stray bullets, the baseness of the Iraqi troops, the mistreatment by the Jordanians, hunger, disease, and the great escape—not to mention the fear that gripped every one of us in our life away from home or the darkness which dominated the future horizons—oppressed us."

'Abdallah cried and swore that he does not know what to do now. "Is it better to live or to die? The children, the family, food, worry, and pity for one's self and for the

hundreds of millions of poor and powerless people who are trampled and who have by fate encountered this man who knows nothing about the rights of Arabism or of the Islam that he alleges." He said these last words with a stunned face, with bulging eyes, and with his head shaking nervously.

Dream Turned Into Nightmare

Farghali Muhsib from Qina is another man who dreamt of a comfortable and prosperous life for his family. He owns nothing he can lose, so why not try to go abroad? Perhaps he, like his cousin Hamid, will be able to acquire a car. Or perhaps he may become like Hajj Hamidah, his neighbor, who went to Kuwait 15 years earlier and who has become a big merchant and landlord in Qina. Why shouldn't he be like so and so or such and such? All he has to do is to go to a country that will transform him from one condition to another.

His wife was the one who painted and embellished all these ambitions for him. She wanted to break out of her narrow life and to raise her children "expensively," as she assured him repeatedly every day and every night, every morning and every evening.

Farghali Muhsib said:

"We owned nothing other than a water buffalo and half a qirat of land which I inherited from my father. I planted other land on lease. My wife asked me to sell the half a qirat, to go abroad, and to return to her with millions. Deep in my heart, I said at the time: Perhaps she is right. I may become one of the chosen wealthy or one of those who go overseas and return with the precious catch."

Farghali added: "I sold the half qirat, rushed to complete my official documents, and went to Kuwait. I worked there in construction projects from 1986. While in Kuwait, I refused to remit my money and left it in a bank there. My balance was growing, and I did not wish to spend any part of the money for fear that it may diminish and collapse. I left it in the bank to grow and increase so that it may fill 'the bag and the basket' right in front of my eyes and far from the others.

"I stayed there for nearly four years during which I did not see or enjoy my children, not even Yahya who was born a few days before my departure and who is four years old now.

"The catastrophe then occurred. I had 50 dinars on me. The guarantor fled, the bank closed its doors, the catastrophe revolved, Farghali's money and land were lost and I now live exposed in the open.

"I am now exposed, and I own nothing. I did not have any money with which to buy food throughout the six days of the return trip. I took whatever services and help we were offered on the road. What will my children do now? I don't know. The concerns of the road are less burdensome than the concerns of the future. What is our

offense, we the poor, in what is happening? We own nothing other than that which preserves our life. Why has Saddam done this to us? Millions of people have been made homeless, have lost their way, and have been misled. We have homes, children, wives, and old women waiting for somebody to send them the cost of their sustenance. Saddam has ruined and destroyed us mercilessly."

Farghali went on to add:

"God be thanked. This is God's will and only God, may He be praised and exalted, knows the future. Somebody will inevitably come every now and then to ruin people's aspirations and to deny them their livelihood and their future."

Life's Harvest Burned in Moments

Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad (48), a husband and the father of three children and an employee of the Cinema, Theatre, and Music Organization, recounts the story of his expatriation, saying:

"I quit my job and went to Kuwait for the sake of a better life for my family and in order that I may be able to provide for my daughter's wedding. My story with expatriation started 10 years ago. Saudi Arabia was the first country to which I went. I then went to Libya and to Italy where I worked in Genoa and Milan as truck driver delivering heavy loads from Turkey to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Dubayy, the UAE, Bahrain, and Yemen. Finally, I settled in the past two years in Kuwait where I operated my own truck on the international Kuwait-Baghdad-Amman-Saudi Arabia route. I was one of those who transported Kuwait's abundance to Baghdad. A truckload was never less than 80 tons of provisions, foodstuffs, fodders, and other materials which were being transported from the ports of al-Shuwaykh, al-Ahmadi, and al-Shu'aybah 24 hours a day.

"With the escalation of the Iraqi invasion, my truck, worth 200,000 Egyptian pounds, suddenly disappeared. It later became evident that it was burned in Warid al-Barr, Kuwait, with thousands of other vehicles which the Iraqis burned because their loads were too heavy to plunder.

"I left Kuwait 16 days after the invasion, on 18 August specifically, by way of al-Jabal because if I had left by way of Iraq I would have lost the documents proving my ownership right to everything, especially since all my money, now frozen, was deposited with the Kuwaiti National Bank in al-Salilah. I sent my family enough money to meet their expenditures and saved the rest in the Kuwaiti National Bank for other circumstances. Here I am now with money, but with no access to this money."

Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad went on recounting his tale, saying:

"We started moving out of Kuwait at noon. At midday, the desert is harsh. Unable to withstand this weather, the

Iraqis could not harass us. We left in 35 vehicles, 30 of which got stuck in al-Jabal. So we left them there and drove on to the al-Rajih area on the Saudi border where we were received well by the Saudi people who offered us all kinds of services and things we needed, including medical services. They also gave each of us 500 riyals to use for what we needed. We then got to Hafr al-Batin, which is 95 km from al-Rajih. We were not subjected to any inspection because we departed through the al-Ghamidi area on the Jordanian border. A brigadier general from the Egyptian Ministry of Interior warned us not to reveal to the Jordanians the site from which we entered because the Jordanians tell the Iraqis about the areas from which the Egyptians leave. We left for al-'Aqabah in a convoy under guard from the Egyptian Ministry of Interior. When we got there, we took the ferry and headed for Egypt empty-handed.

"This was on 26 August 1990. On 27 August, I applied to the Ministry of Culture, appealing for reinstatement in my job. But I found out that a decision terminating my services had been issued in December 1988. At this point, I submitted another application to the Executive Board chairman. He approved the application. But its implementation was tied to convocation of the Personnel Affairs Commission to discuss the matter. I also requested that the two years [since 1988] be counted as leave without pay so that I may return to my job, considering that the issue now is not an issue of money lost but of a 10-year struggle which evaporated in five minutes. The fruit of the 10 years, meaning the truck which I bought as a means of earning a livelihood, has been completely burnt. The big problem now is how to get my daughter married and how to complete her trousseau. I don't know what I will do. I await relief from God, may He be praised and exalted."

A sad note accompanies the tale 'Ali Yusuf (35 years), a husband and the father of two children, tells of his voyage with hardship and of his return from Kuwait after the invasion.

Return to Naught

"Upon quitting my work at the radio and television building, I went to many Arab countries, ending up in Kuwait. Three years of work and sweat have gone to waste, considering that the Iraqis have looted all my money and property, have stolen my car, and have denied me realization of the dream for which I had been in a hurry to return to Egypt, namely to open a 'machinist workshop' for myself and my family. But since the Iraqi invasion, I believe that everything has been lost. My dreams have dissipated, and I have returned to Egypt to borrow from here and there. I am now indebted to numerous relatives and acquaintances. I have no alternative but to abandon the idea of a workshop and of buying a taxicab for hire. Where can I get money when Saddam and his troops have stolen everything from me?"

Rabi' Ahmad al-Najjar (28 years), a lathe operator and the eldest son of a family of seven who got engaged recently and who was about to get married, recounts with grief the story of his suffering in Kuwait and of the pains and tragedies he has encountered, saying:

"After four years of work in Iraq, I left Iraq with no savings at all because the Iraqis had reduced the amount of remittances permitted. So I went to Kuwait in 1988 and worked in a consumer cooperative there. Through my work, I was able to save some money at the Kuwaiti National Bank, and I had hoped to return to Egypt with all my savings so as to get married as soon as possible. Then the invasion took place, and all my dreams were scattered. I left Kuwait, fleeing across the desert where I could not find a drink of water or a piece of bread. I arrived in the Hafr al-Batin area in Saudi Arabia and was transported from there to Egypt by the Egyptian Air Force. I own nothing now. The marriage has been postponed indefinitely, and I have no choice but to look for any job, even as a machinist's boy learning the job from the beginning, in order to save my family from starvation."

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO Position on Arab League Relocation

91AE0098A Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH
in Arabic 4 Nov 90 pp 24-25

[Article by Tal'at Musa: "A House of the Arabs, Not a 'House of Obedience'"]

[Text] The five-nation Arab Maghreb Union has asked that the transfer (or return) of Arab League headquarters to Egypt be postponed until the latest deadline, set for July 1991. This request lies within the rights of membership and is intended to hold Arab disagreements in abeyance. Nevertheless, Cairo newspapers are continuing their campaign against Palestine.

As part of the base campaign that Egypt's central newspapers have directed against the Palestinian people and their leaders since the outbreak of the Gulf crisis early this August, AL-AHRAM exclusively published a planted and fabricated news item on the front page of its 26 October edition. No reader could fail to perceive the article's cheap significance and its shabby attempt to defame Palestinian Chairman Yasir 'Arafat at the Arab diplomatic level and call into question his positions and balanced efforts to reach a peaceful Arab solution to the Gulf crisis.

Under a bold headline reading, "Majority of Countries Reject 'Arafat's Suggestion To Create an Arab League in Tunis as Entrenching Division," the article said: "Gulf political circles are said to have learned that PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat is currently proposing that an Arab League be created in Tunis, comprising Iraq,

Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, the Sudan, and Palestine, but not the remaining Arab countries."

Given the context of such a news story and its divisive logic, we have no idea whether Yemen, for example, was dropped or overlooked intentionally or unintentionally.

The article goes on to say: "AL-AHRAM has learned that the majority of these countries have rejected this sham project, which would deepen and entrench the Arab world's division, fragmentation, and factionalization. In particular, there is not a single Arab country that supports Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The core of the disagreement centers on the method for getting Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait and for a return of the legitimate government. Any Arab disagreement, no matter how sharp, can in the end be circumscribed and contained out of concern for the higher Arab interest that is important to every Arab, whatever his orientation."

Having finished the article, we ask the following question: Since none of the Arabs, according to the article, support Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, does the article mean that Yasir 'Arafat alone, along with his organization and his people, support the invasion of Kuwait? Never I suspect has reader laid eyes on so inane and derogatory a story! I suspect that whoever hatched the plot of this article has no relation to Arabness or any concern for an Arab interest—higher or lower. If none of the Arabs supported the invasion of Kuwait, as the article would imply, why were there campaigns by the Egyptian media, especially its non-national newspapers, against countries like Jordan, the Sudan, and Yemen—countries which the Egyptian and Saudi regimes have continued to subject to strong political pressures? A press that exudes the frenzy of Anis Mansur and Ibrahim Sa'dah, with a green light or even on direct orders from a government that wants Arab league headquarters to return to its capital, is what desires to divide and factionalize the Arabs. Did Anis Mansur not announce his wish that Arab League headquarters in Cairo should be next to the Nile, so that he could toss it in and not see the faces of the Arabs and Palestinians returning to it?

The fact of the matter is that this wanton article expresses its creators' feverish fancies of being always able to stumble upon a victim for their quixotic battles—with apologies to Don Quixote and respect for his innocence and nobility of intention in his battles against windmills. The article appears amid an ongoing dispute within the Arab League about moving the headquarters from Tunis to Cairo. All it amounts to is that the five Arab Maghreb Union countries (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Libya) requested in a note delivered to the Arab League in Tunis shortly before the 94th session of the Arab Ministerial Council reconvened on 22 October that the transfer of league headquarters from Tunis to Cairo be postponed.

At an emergency meeting held in Cairo on 10 September by only 11 Arab countries of the 21 who are league

members, these countries decided that 31 October would be the deadline for moving the headquarters of the league to Cairo. The other Arab countries, with the exception of Iraq, do not object to moving the league's headquarters to Cairo; however, they oppose the new schedule for the operation. This schedule was laid down in Cairo under a resolution adopted—for the first time—by majority, not unanimously. These other countries affirm their commitment to the resolutions adopted by the regular Ministerial Council in March—resolutions that set the date for completion of the move in July 1991.

According to Arab sources, the Maghrebi note was drafted on 19 October in Algiers during a meeting of foreign ministers of the Arab Maghreb Union. It was delivered to the Arab League by the Algerian representative, whose country holds the union's revolving chairmanship, before being distributed to the league's members. In its note, the Arab Maghreb Union proposed deferring the question until the 94th session of the league's Ministerial Council reconvened (the session was reconvened at the permanent representative level) in order to avoid a further split between the Arab countries.

This session, which had opened on 27 September in Tunis at the permanent representative level, had immediately suspended its proceedings and had adjourned indefinitely, until the foreign ministers could agree on a new date. When it reconvened on 22 October, it attended to administrative questions and debated the appointment and replacement of diplomatic envoys to some of the league's offices.

Iraq, which opposed moving the league's headquarters to Cairo because of what it called "Egypt's biased position in the Gulf crisis," supported the Arab Maghreb Union's request in a note that was also delivered to the Arab League. Observers in Cairo see the Maghrebi proposal to postpone moving the headquarters to the Egyptian capital as equivalent to an indefinite postponement, because no meeting of Arab foreign ministers is expected in the near future due to the divisions in Arab ranks stemming from the Gulf crisis. Egypt therefore sent a note to the Arab League, demanding that it "immediately" take all necessary measures to implement the resolution moving the league's headquarters from Tunis to Cairo according to the timetable set by the resolution approved by majority at the league's emergency meeting in Cairo. An Egyptian source indicated that the Egyptian note came as a response to the Maghrebi note that Algeria had delivered to the league. The Egyptian note stated that "Egypt completely rejects the Algerian proposal."

Interestingly, AL-AHRAM, which published a report about the Egyptian note in its 25 October 1990 issue, never in all its talk about the "Algerian proposal" indicated that the note containing it had been delivered by Algeria to the league in the name of the five Arab Maghreb Union countries. The newspaper's discussion was limited to expressions such as "the Algerian proposal" and "the Algerian note."

EGYPT

Electoral Law Opponents Cite Shortcomings

91AA0053A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 19 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by Majdi Hilmi: "Law Professors and National Forces' Representatives on Podium and New Electoral Law in Dock; Law Is Unconstitutional and Lacks Sufficient Guarantees for Impartial Elections; Speakers Express Support for al-Wafd Decision to Boycott Election; Government Is Eager to Rig and Falsify Nation's Will"]

[Text] At a symposium organized by the Cairo University Teaching Faculty Club to debate the new electoral law, the guarantees required to hold the election, and the political climate in which the election will be held, law professors and the national forces' representatives have agreed unanimously that the new electoral law is unconstitutional and that its provisions codify counterfeiting and silencing the voices that denounce the law. They have asserted that the law lacks all guarantees for impartial elections. Moreover, they claim that the law has ignored the popular demands calling for judiciary supervision of all phases of the election process and for voters to sign next to their names on the voter lists. They have, furthermore, agreed unanimously that national forces and parties should boycott the elections if the required guarantees are not made available.

At the outset of the symposium, Dr. Badr-al-Din Ghazi, the club deputy chairman and the [unidentified] committee rapporteur, welcomed the participants and asserted that the symposium sought to debate the electoral law and the current political climate. Attorney Kamal Khalid stressed that talk about the amended law has become tantamount to expression of opinion and that the government will not pay any attention to this opinion because, prior to issuing the law, the government had not paid any attention to the demands of the national forces, parties, unions, faculty clubs, and the Judiciary Club which drafted a law befitting the judiciary's role of truly supervising the elections. Khalid also asserted that the current law has transformed the judiciary's role into a mere superficiality that belittles the judiciary. He further added that Egyptian public opinion is perceptive and intelligent and can determine that the elections (will be) rigged as soon as it reads the amended law.

Kamal Khalid criticized law makers and government advisers, asserting that they are totally eager to keep Egypt as their hamlet.

Khalid also asserted that the Judiciary Club's draft imposed strict, serious, and actual control in accordance with Article 88 of the Constitution which establishes the judiciary as the supervisor of the polling process. It is considered definite and certain that a judge shall chair each branch committee. But we find wonders in Article 24 of the new law. It gives the judiciary supervision over

the general committees. As for the polling, it is controlled by employees who head the branch committees. Kamal Khalid characterized this article as a challenge to and tampering with the Constitution. Touching on his dispute with the regime, Khalid contested the constitutionality of the referendum decree. He emphasized that the maker of Article 24 is eager to counterfeit the nation's will because, without counterfeiting, the ruling party cannot gain a single [People's Assembly] seat. He further asserted that the new redistricting is tailored to the government candidates' measurements. He added that the regime's indifference to the imminent issuance of a decision nullifying the assembly that will be elected confirms that this assembly will come to play a certain role. The ruling party has to get an absolute majority, and it can only get it through forgery. Concluding, Kamal Khalid demanded the adoption of more effective stances.

New Law Not Different From Old

Dr. 'Abd-al-Halim al-Ghazali, representative of the Businessmen's Union, asserted that the new law is not different from the old one and that what is happening now is far from democracy. Dr. al-Ghazali asked: I do not know what objective the regime has behind the increasing abuse of the citizen's will and rights. He emphasized that solving the political problem is the basis for solving all the crises. We feel that we are aliens in this society. He also emphasized that we are facing a cultural and democratic dilemma which we must overcome. He dealt with the issue of the parties' participation in the elections, saying: If one participates in an election which one knows is rigged and which has no connection whatsoever to democracy, then one participates in a crime. One can isolate one's self from public life and boycott elections. This, too, is a crime because the ruling party will monopolize the power. Concluding, Dr. al-Ghazali asked the audience: So what should we do?

Dr. Rif'at al-Sa'id, the Grouping Party assistant secretary general, asserted that the counterfeiting seeks to entrench one party in power and the Egyptian Constitution is arranged on this basis. The People's Assembly is the party that elects the president of the republic. The presidential candidate must win two thirds of the assembly votes in order to be elected. He said: I believe that power rotation is not permitted. He stressed that democratic expression no longer exists and that they [who are in power] are thus opening the way to change through violence.

Rif'at al-Sa'id said that Article 42 of the law is the most serious article and that it has been created to silence those who expose the counterfeiting. The article calls for a one-year prison term or for a fine against whoever spreads or publishes false statements on the referendum issue or about the conduct or ethics of a candidate with the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election, and so forth, whereas Article 45 calls for a 6-month prison term for counterfeiting. Al-Sa'id added that the process of contesting election impartiality is a political

process. If counterfeiting is denounced, all of Egypt's leaders will end up in jail. He said: How can we prove counterfeiting? It is difficult to prove because who are you going to complain to about it? With this article, they are clearing the arena for the dead and the expatriate to vote. Al-Sa'id also asserted that the regime is aware that it has lost the masses' trust and that it has only itself to blame for it.

Counselor Ma'mun al-Hudaybi asserted that there is no new law and that what is there is the old law, with some of its articles amended, because the election system has changed. Al-Hudaybi also discussed the system of voting by the electoral card, emphasizing that this card does not prove a citizen's identity and that the system offers no guarantee whatsoever. He added that the country has been denied political action since 1981 when the emergency law was imposed. He wondered: How can one be required to run for election, stir the masses, and organize a propaganda campaign in 17 days only? He also asserted that boycotting elections is not isolationism but a positive action because one participates in the other aspects of life and because such a boycott puts everybody in a dilemma.

Dr. 'Atif al-Banna then took the floor, asserting that he will deal with the gaps in the new law. Regarding the voter lists, [he said:] They remain as they have been, uncorrected and still containing the names of the dead. Moreover, it is mandatory that both men and women be registered. But the government has not implemented this law even though it was issued 12 years ago. The registration process continues to be haphazard. As for the election districts, it is well known throughout the world that they are divided on the basis of population. In our country, the regime has divided them according to its whims and has not involved in the division the tendencies which exist in Egypt and which have exactly the same interest in this division as the regime has. The regime has totally disregarded the nation's will.

'Atif al-Banna also dealt with the issue of guarantees, declaring that the law is void of guarantees, the least of which is voting according to the identity card which represents the minimal guarantee. The law has also ignored supervision by the judiciary. Even though the judiciary have asked that the (restriction imposed) on them be removed, the regime has paid no attention to their demand to exercise real supervision. The amendment which the government considers to be a response meeting the judiciary's demand is the amendment which provides for every judiciary body to nominate a number of its members. But the minister of interior is the one who makes the decision. Al-Banna stressed that if the government intended to hold honest elections, it could hold them in a few days under the supervision of Egypt's judiciary.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Majid Wahbah, deputy chairman of the Veterinarians Union, demanded that a black book containing all counterfeiting incidents be established and that the elections be boycotted because they are false.

Dr. Hasan Nafi'ah, a professor at the Economics and Political Science College, stressed that the law ensures no guarantees for impartiality of the elections, adding: The committees are still chaired by employees and administrators and supervised by the governors. Dr. Nafi'ah demanded that the democratic structure be debated because it is a chain consisting of links, beginning with the rotation of power—an issue that has not been determined yet—and ending with the election law. He added that the system consists of a chain of endless links.

The 1971 Constitution was issued on the basis of the single-party government. The parties law was issued with an authoritarian decree. A single article of the Constitution has been amended through a referendum. So we are ruled by a totalitarian Constitution into which some amendments have been introduced. Dr. Nafi'ah asserted that power rotation does not exist even within the ruling party itself, that the Constitution must be amended, that political participation must be expanded, and that the government-imposed shackles on the media must be eliminated.

Speaking of the rotation of power, Dr. Kamal Minufi, a professor at the Economics and Political Science College, stressed that it can be accomplished only through democracy which changes things for the better. There are real democratic countries and countries with an imaginary democracy. We fall within the second type. We have restrictions on political participation and on elections. He asserted that the new electoral law has been altered by court decision but that the regime has circumvented the unconstitutional provisions and has totally disregarded the basic guarantees. Dr. Minufi asked: How has this happened? In reply, he said: The head of state formed a committee to draft the law without considering the views of the national forces on this draft. Consequently, the outcome has been this law. Dr. Minufi also dealt with the electoral body, stressing that Egypt's parliamentary representation does not reflect society and that this representation has not undergone any modernization. He dealt with the gaps in electoral districts and with the election management process.

Mukhtar Nuh emphasized the need to focus on the obstacles to democracy, including the emergency law which paralyzes the Constitution. Dr. Badr Ghazi read to the symposium a message from Dr. Hilmi Murad demanding the provision of adequate guarantees, including the guarantee of voting according to the personal identity card and the holding of elections over several days. A discussion was then held by the participants, and they agreed to issue a final statement to the public next Friday declaring the university professors' view of political life.

Official Sources Predict Election Outcome

91AA0048A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
25 Oct 90 p 6

[Article: "New Map of Partisan Political Action in Egypt and Individual Elections Enhance Voter Interest"]

[Text] Now that candidates for the Egyptian parliamentary elections have started to file their candidacy petitions, the election campaign actually got under way more than a month before the election date. These elections are expected to give rise to a new map of political action in Egypt, especially if some opposition parties persist in their position on boycotting the elections. Election by the individual system will enhance voter interest as well as the electoral process in general.

The outlines of this map began to emerge when many party leaders broke away from the opposition parties that are boycotting the elections, the Wafd and the Labor Parties in particular, to run as independents.

In the Wafd Party, the exodus began when 'Alawi Hafiz announced his candidacy as an independent, as did Ahmad Taha of the Labor Party.

The change in the political action map will not be confined to the opposition parties, but will also extend to the National Party that recently lost one of its preeminent leaders, Dr. Rifat Mahjub, through assassination. And, assuming that the party will win the majority vote, the campaign for speaker will be open to many contenders.

Responsible parliamentary and partisan sources confirmed to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the candidacy of new leaders, who will assume responsibility for running the new Egyptian parliament and naming the speaker and the two deputies, will be settled within the next two weeks.

Also, the sources ruled out the possibility of selecting one of the ten presidential appointees as speaker of the parliament, as happened in the 1984 parliament when Dr. Rifat Mahjub, a presidential appointee, was selected.

These sources pointed out that this was due to a desire to block attempts by the opposition parties that have boycotted the parliamentary elections to again level harsh criticism, as happened in 1984, though the selection of a speaker from among elected members or appointees is not governed by the constitution.

Political and parliamentary circles have identified three key personalities from among the nominees to assume this position: the current Egyptian Minister of Education, Dr. Ahmad Fathi Surur, pointing to the cabinet reshuffle that will occur right after the parliamentary elections; the director of the president's office, Dr. Zakariyah 'Azmi, who has recently shined; and the secretary general of the Arab Cooperation Council, Dr. Hilmi Nimr, who recently put his activities on ice in the wake of the Gulf crisis.

This came right after the names of those who were supposed to be on the list of candidates didn't appear. In the forefront of them were Dr. Kamal Abu-al-Majd who, along with a number of law professors, drafted the new

Egyptian parliamentary law; Dr. Yahya al-Jamal, professor of constitutional law who was nominated by the previous parliament; Dr. 'Abd-al-Qadir Hatim, superintendent of the Specialized National Councils; and Justice Ahmad Musa, speaker of the previous Egyptian parliament, who has been kept out of the race and who was among the candidates nominated to lead the parliament for legal considerations, being a former justice minister and [having] seven years of experience as deputy speaker of parliament.

Regarding the deputy speakership, the sources said that the matter of selecting a deputy speaker to represent workers and farmers has been settled with the renomination of former deputy Ihab Muqallad, who stayed in this position for six years, while the matter is still up in the air regarding the position of deputy speaker for the educated class, which was vacated with the removal of Ahmad Musa, even though the most likely candidate is Dr. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ilah, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who can keep his position as committee chairman and deputy speaker.

On the other hand, responsible legal sources confirmed to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the growing number of candidates running as independents has advantages as well as disadvantages.

Commenting on the large number of independents who announced their candidacy when the nomination door was opened, these sources said that this will fritter away the electoral votes within the same district and that candidates will win by a small margin, thus raising the possibility of runoffs in over 25 percent of the precincts. Besides, competition could indeed intensify in some incumbent ministers' districts, especially since Shaykh Yusuf al-Badri, leader of the soon-to-be-formed Sahwah Party, who has declared his candidacy, has confirmed that he is running against Engineer Jamal al-Sayyid, minister of military production, in the Ma'adi district, emphasizing that if his experience in 1987, when he ran for the independent seat is any indication, he will win reelection.

As for the advantages, the large number of independents joining the campaign will ensure that a large percentage of the opposition will be able to occupy seats to close the gaps created by the decision of the opposition parties that carry weight in the political mainstream to boycott the elections. This is in addition to the participation of the Grouping Party that is expected to win a number of seats, especially with regard to party leader Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, Lutfi Wakid, and Abu-al-'Izz al-Hariri.

At the ruling party level, the party's hallways have witnessed a deviation from partisan commitment by some former representatives. Shaykh Muhammad 'Atiyyah, the Hulwan representative, who was a Wafd Party defector during the previous parliament, has decided to run for the first time in his hometown in

al-Sharqiyah, giving up his district which he has represented for 10 years in Hulwan and, at the same time, stating that, if he wins, he will rejoin the National Party ranks.

The same goes for Engineer Sa'd Shalabi, chairman of the industrial committee in the previous parliament, who has decided to run in his hometown in Kafr al-Shaykh Governorate.

Justice al-Damardash al-'Uqali, one of the leaders who, in the previous parliament, was drawn to the party from the Labor Party and has not been nominated, said that, had the opposition parties not boycotted the election, he would have run as an independent.

Commenting on his exclusion, he said that he had tried but failed to create a constructive opinion from within the National Party.

Meanwhile, Justice Fathi Rajab, former deputy chairman of the parliamentary legislative committee and one of those selected by the late al-Mahjub in the last parliament, praised the new candidates and the party leaders for making such good choices.

He said that he is committed to the party and that he will not run for election as an independent or under the banner of any other party because a seat in parliament is not a personal quest but rather a voluntary public service.

Sabri al-Qadi, chairman of the parliamentary suggestions and grievances committee, alluded to the need to draw up rules and regulations for such selections, but, at the same time, praised the candidate whom he described as an excellent choice.

Meanwhile, partisan circles in Egypt welcomed the renomination of Dr. Hamdi al-Sayyid, a key opposition leader within the National Party, as a party candidate, describing this action as the result of President Husni Mubarak's total conviction that democracy can grow stronger only through its two flanks.

Dr. Sa'd al-Khawaliqah, chairman of the former parliamentary transportation and communications committee, said that the ruling party is capable of nurturing new faces in their ongoing development. Party secretaries in the governorates emphasized that elements not nominated will be assigned to party posts during the upcoming stage because national service is not limited to the parliament.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that, in an apparent effort to avoid marginal conflicts during the elections by waiting for the election results, not one decision has been issued by the ruling party to dismiss any of its members who are running as independents.

Meanwhile, the Wafd Party has maintained its silence vis-a-vis its candidates running as independents at a time when only 'Alawi Hafiz has resigned from the party.

The opposition Young Egypt Party in Egypt has announced its decision to take part in the elections as the fifth opposition party behind the Grouping, the Ummah, the Khudur, and the Democratic Unionist parties.

Party leader 'Ali-al-Din Salih said that though he attended the meetings held by the leaders of the opposition parties that boycotted the elections, he rejected the election boycott principle and supported the party's participation with all 22 members of the command council. In a press conference held yesterday, he added that he asked to meet with President Husni Mubarak to present to him a party initiative capable of reconciling the opposition parties' demands and the government position by having all parties run for election. The initiative calls for the formation of a coalition government to oversee the elections with two interior ministers: Major General Musa, the current interior minister and minister of security affairs, and a minister for election affairs from the opposition. However, the president's trip to Saudi Arabia precluded such a meeting.

The leader of the Young Egypt party emphasized that his party will not enter into an electoral alliance with any other party and that he is willing to add the boycotting party nominations to the party candidates. He said that the party newspaper will come out before the election campaigns get under way and that the party's platform includes the Egyptianization of bread and the realization of self-sufficiency in wheat and flour. He added that he will not run for election in order to devote himself to the management of the election campaign.

In the next few days, the interior minister, Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, will issue special orders regulating election campaigns and setting a ceiling of 5,000 Egyptian pounds for individual campaign spending. The election campaign is scheduled to begin on 18 November, two weeks before the election date. Besides, Safwat al-Sharif has allocated 80 minutes of TV and radio time for each candidate, divided over four segments and the parties committee is looking into requests for financial support for party candidates.

Economist Claims Credible Elections Aid Reform

91AA0042A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
26 Oct 90 p 6

[Article: "Economic Reform Via the Polls"]

[Text] Dr. Sadiq 'Afifi, professor of economics at Zaqaziq University and former dean, analyzed economic reforms to be accomplished via the polls and determined that the elections are Egypt's current top priority. Is there anything more important for a nation than selecting its representatives?

The elections, it is true, were a consequence of the will of the masses to affirm a historical constitutional provision. Their significance at this stage, however, is not lost to the sincere. We are on the verge of an accord with the IMF and will be turning the corner towards relative

economic relief. Will we supplement that relief with true democratic expression at the polls?

Let our IMF accord be a prologue to candor at the polls [honest elections]. The peoples of the world have learned the bitter truth that there can be no economic reform without political reform. Our people have also learned that truth, having patiently paid an exorbitant price in the form of ineffectual leaders and representatives more interested in influence peddling than in policy planning or serving the nation's interests.

There is no doubt that good leaders and sincere deputies exist but corruption is forcing them to worry more about protecting their backs than about protecting their policies and defending their stands. This has caused the gradual degeneration of political practices that generally do not accurately reflect this nation's aspirations or encourage the sincere and innovative capacities of its citizens.

Can we realistically look forward to erecting a bridge of veracity from the IMF to the polls? I do not wish to answer that except in the affirmative because there is no salvation otherwise!

Honest elections would accomplish [the following]:

1. Honest selection of the people's true representatives. Only true representatives of the people's will can take on the role expected of the People's Assembly following the IMF accord. That role, in brief, is to direct the government to undertake diligent reform without reluctance or hesitation—a course of action supported by the people and its true representatives who would frankly and straightforwardly maintain that support no matter how difficult the decision or how heavy the sacrifice. It might be somewhat difficult to introduce structural economic reform but the people's [true] representatives would be more steely and steadfast, and certainly more courageous in defending the nation's interests against all odds, because they would be acting from positions of strength thanks to the honest elections we would guarantee.

2. Honest elections would create a healthy climate for political and economic action in which more competent leaders would flourish and have an opportunity to serve the nation. This will result in the gradual dissipation of insincere or incompetent elements qualified only by a talent for making contacts, networking, and sharing the spoils. That would automatically occur over time because elections are the ultimate arbiter of effective oversight and accountability.

On the other hand, a minister nurtured by a proper political climate would be even more mindful of carefully selecting his aides on the basis of ability and competence, and to meticulously prepare his nominees for the senior positions he oversees. He is more likely to be objective in his selection and his supervision since, in the final analysis, responsibility for their performance would be his.

But honest elections would teach us, above anything else, to make decisions objectively, to carefully compare platforms, and to take measured and planned steps since every action would be diligently scrutinized and carefully judged.

We must take several difficult steps if our achievement [accord] with the IMF is to bear fruit:

1. We are required [must] first of all to correct business sector flaws and bring an end to negativism, incompetence, and the squandering of public funds. That can be accomplished only by truly freeing the business sector from state controls and by significantly expanding the role of the private sector.

2. We are also required to continue our successful initiative to correct exchange rates and systemize foreign exchange transactions.

3. We are furthermore required to do everything possible to boost efficiency and terminate disguised unemployment. This involves certain labor problems for which appropriate solutions must be found.

4. We are similarly required to stimulate investment in all fields. This will be viciously resisted by the guardians of the government dole who look upon all investors as prey that must be domesticated then exploited.

5. We are required to proceed diligently towards the full implementation of a market economy and to stimulate competition in all fields but we must also be prepared for price and labor problems and ready to face resistance on several fronts.

6. We are also required to proceed with implementing plans for the privatization of governorate projects. The question here is how to protect public funds and how to affect a smooth transition in order to maintain productivity.

Chief Editor on Security After al-Mahjub Assassination

91A40097A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DU'WALI in Arabic
9 Nov 90 pp 1, 3

[Editorial by Ibrahim Nafi']

[Text] The police have reached the murderers of al-Mahjub and have laid hands on the perpetrators of the Israeli bus incident. This is a great achievement that increases our trust and confidence in the ability of Egyptian security to protect the stability and peace that Egypt enjoys. It makes us more confident and optimistic about the future.

But I hope that this success, the crown of exhausting efforts by the police, will not obscure for us facts that demand careful attention and that the recent developments have revealed.

The first fact: A powerful organization has remained hidden for the last 10 years, during which time no police efforts succeeded in ending it and protecting the country from its danger. Instead it kept emerging from underground from time to time to carry out an attempted assassination or a hideous incident like the al-Mahjub assassination. The method used to deal with this organization must be reexamined and its deficiencies determined. Whatever deficiencies the review uncovers must be corrected, whether these lie in the method of police confrontation or in the method of intellectually combating the false ideas that the organization represents. Responsibilities and orders must be assigned and confrontation efforts must be intensified on two coordinate fronts: police confrontation to prevent the danger before it occurs and intellectual confrontation to put a tight siege on this organization and prevent more young people from being duped by glittering religious slogans and falling into its snares.

In brief, we exempt no one from the blame of responsibility for the continuance of this organization with such strength for 10 years. We do not exempt the police. We do not exempt certain information media. We do not exempt some opposition party pens that made common cause with the ideas of this organization and contributed to the ensnaring of some young people. We do not exempt economic conditions from responsibility in facilitating the fall of some young people into the abyss of this extremist organization because of their sense of frustration.

I do not know how we let this powerful organization increase in power and boldness during the last 10 years to an extent that allowed its members to make explosives with complete freedom and to drill with arms unimpeded in the mountain area of Bani Suwayf and Qina they chose for training. So arrogant have some of the perpetrators of the al-Mahjub assassination become in their dealings with the law, that the leader of the cell that planned the al-Mahjub assassination and then entrusted its execution to another cell proudly answered the person questioning him about the facts of the assassination: "What do you want? I am the one who killed al-Mahjub. I have nothing to add." Then he maintained a haughty silence.

The group's members formulated the assassination plan after carefully monitoring the daily route of the interior minister's motorcade. They decided to carry it out in the following manner: They would aim at killing the interior minister if he traveled by the same route, but there would be no harm in killing al-Mahjub, if [Interior Minister] 'Abd-al-Halim Musa changed his route and fate led al-Mahjub instead onto the route. So when 'Abd-al-Halim Musa chose to go to the Interior Ministry through Tahrir Square and not by way of the Nile Corniche, the leader of the cell deputed to execute the plan signaled from his position on Qasr al-Nil Bridge to the group deployed on the Corniche that they should assassinate Rif'at al-Mahjub; this he did when he saw

al-Mahjub's car turn onto the route that 'Abd-al-Halim Musa had been scheduled to take.

The target is not the person of 'Abd-al-Halim Musa or Rif'at al-Mahjub. The target is the state itself, as the planner of the operation said when he boastfully told his wife before news of the assassination was announced: "You'll soon hear news that will shake all Egypt."

What hatred against this peaceful country! What ruthlessness and disdain for human lives, whatever claims this organization may hide under! How did some of its members, wanted for the attempted assassination of [former Interior Minister] Zaki Badr, remain at large and unapprehended by the hand of justice throughout the past months, until they were recently arrested as part of the police campaigns to ferret out the dens of extremists after the al-Mahjub episode?

How is it that we were unable to combat this organization decisively on the security, intellectual, and social levels?

We need a total confrontation with the thinking that this organization represents, to clean out all its pockets and prevent its seeds from later producing new shoots, more extremism, and greater crimes.

Should we not have already begun this total confrontation, now that we have learned the danger of this new challenge that has been added to the list of difficult challenges that confront our country?

The second fact: Security and stability are the best investment in any progressive society. Whatever money we spend on them is not wasted but comes back to the government in increased investments, flourishing economic activity, and increased bank deposits. In light of this fact it is a disgrace that the police should be complaining that they lack the funding needed to modernize their weapons, retrain their forces, and fill their personnel shortage. The internal security apparatus must be provided with all needed material and technical resources to perform its role with the highest possible efficiency to guard the stability, security, and welfare of the public.

The third fact: It is unacceptable that all the interior ministers who have held the ministry for the last 30 years have continued to complain of a shortage of policemen and a lack of interest in the job of policeman, while [college] graduates pile up by the hundreds and thousands without work, becoming fertile soil for the seed of extremism. If we are complaining of a lack of policemen, why don't we make police jobs a new door for unemployed graduates, a door that would absorb tens of thousands of them? They would be trained to do police work, and we would create new provisions that would allow them to carry on police work without having this conflict with the law governing the police. We might create a new position, between *amin shurta* [municipal police holding a high school certificate] and *dabit shurta* [police officer]. Young people could fill it under any

appropriate title and with an acceptable salary. We would thus win them in the confrontation with extremism, instead of having extremism draw them into its currents.

The fourth fact: Because security in Egypt is the joint responsibility of all the security agencies existing in Egypt, a new formula for coordination between them is needed, so that they all serve the goal of protecting security and stability in Egypt. External security, military security, and internal security—all of them are interwoven responsibilities aiming at the welfare of the country. The public welfare demands that they cooperate to achieve their goals without division or mutual estrangement.

The fifth fact: We do not deny the effort of the police in discovering the murderers of al-Mahjub and the perpetrators of the tourist bus incident and in arresting 13 terrorist groups that have slipped into Egypt to commit criminal acts against the security of this country. I am giving away no secret if I say that the efforts of the police not only were applied to apprehending the perpetrators of the al-Mahjub assassination, but also achieved something else: they foiled a major crime that a terrorist group was planning to execute. Its members were arrested only a few days before the execution date. The investigations will reveal more and more of the secrets of these terrorist operations.

Therefore, when we record certain aspects of shortcoming in police performance in the recent past, aspects which have begun to be remedied (as signalled by the trial of 19 officers for negligence in connection with the al-Mahjub assassination), this does not blind us to the sincere effort the police have made to hunt down terrorism, protect the country from its danger, and uncover its perpetrators.

However, we demand more alertness, more resources, and more preparedness and training, so that the areas of shortcoming disappear forever. Then the page will remain bright with the efforts and sacrifices of the police. After all that has happened it boggles the mind to think that one of the policemen who happened to be in the confrontation with the assassins had not used his revolver for a long time, so that moisture had seeped into its bullets. As soon as he fired a bullet into the air, his revolver failed and he did not fire the remaining bullets. This happened because there is no organized and continual training in shooting and marksmanship and no periodical programs to train regular, as opposed to special, police units in marksmanship; nor is there any reinvigoration of their men from time to time through intensive motivation programs like those of the police forces in advanced countries.

It boggles the mind that this is still the situation after all that has taken place. I do not deny the impact of tight resources, but that alone is not enough to justify the shortcomings. These cannot be accepted merely because

they are of long standing, especially now that the government has become aware of the seriousness of the situation and has allocated an effective annual budget increase of about 40 million pounds to the Interior Ministry, despite our well-known economic circumstances.

It remains to be said that we should deal with the present according to its danger and with the future according to all we hope from it.

It also boggles the mind that the training of some policemen and agents of the public prosecutor's office continues to be limited to carrying out precise procedures in preliminary interrogations, on-the-spot inspection, and obtaining cogent evidence. This allows professional criminals to exploit these gaps in court to escape punishment because some of the people who carry out investigatory procedures are ignorant of the tricks of professionals. So the courts acquit them, although the crime is obvious, because they stick to the letter of the law. Then these men return to life to continue their destructive criminal activity. They might not have escaped deterrent punishment had those in charge of the initial interrogations been people with experience and knowledge of the principles of procedures. I have learned that this point in particular is of interest to the current public prosecutor who is personally supervising the interrogations of the members of this powerful organization. Having been disturbed by certain of these "blunders," he did not want to allow tricksters to take advantage of loopholes in order to escape and threaten the security of this country.

I cannot imagine that all of this will continue or that we will ever allow it again.

IMF Proposal to Devalue Pound Opposed, Reasons Given

91AA0114A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
16 Nov 90 pp 24, 25

[Article by Safa' Lewis: "The Egyptian Dollar Will Collapse Worldwide and Go Up in Price Locally. It Would Have Exceeded 3 Pounds Except for the Recession"]

[Text] Economists and businessmen emphasize that there is no rationale for raising the dollar's cost in Egypt now that the country has been forgiven some \$14 billion of its external debt resulting in balance of payments improvement. Furthermore, foreign exchange deposits with the banking system grew from \$13.5 billion to \$14.8 billion over a three-month period. Officials also confirmed that the Gulf crisis did not adversely affect expatriate remittances, but has helped boost oil revenues.

They explained that the pound has gained purchasing power because recession in Egyptian markets has reduced demand for goods and services, causing prices of several items to actually decline. The recession also

caused a relative decline in importer demand for letters of credit needed for purchases abroad. This translates into reduced demand for the dollar.

Those domestic positives that would shore up the pound coincided with international positives manifested in the collapse of the dollar vis-a-vis world currencies. And yet, 1990 has been a peculiar year for the Egyptian economy. Dollar rates came close to three pounds on the black market and they continue to be administratively escalated by the banks. They are expected to exceed three pounds with the onset of the new year.

There is consensus that council of ministers executive orders, thought to be a literal application of IMF recommendations, are the real culprit for this increase in dollar rates and the sharp decline of the pound. It is as if the "devaluation of the pound is the cornerstone of all economic reform" [on the premise that] it would boost exports, reduce imports, and regain fleeing capital!!

Economic Reform

Regardless of the support for such an overall policy or the lack of it, the fact remains that the devastation of the pound has not and will not lead to economic reform in Egypt.

Experts also warn against overzealous reform policies and emphasize the need to reexamine the agreement with the IMF now that the tide has turned in favor of the Egyptian economy.

Ideologies aside, it is those with fixed incomes who are in the final analysis the primary victims of those policies that destroy the national currency in the name of reform. They [those on fixed incomes] are left with no avenue but to beseech the authorities to conserve what is left of the pound which has lost 88.8 percent of its value over the short period of four years. Their lack of means has preoccupied them with whether they should spend their income for food or for clothing!

The "conspiracy against the pound" serial began on 11 May 1987 when Egypt, ostensibly to bring an end to black marketeering in foreign exchange, agreed to establish a banking exchange market that would set dollar rates daily on the basis of supply and demand. The market was indeed created and it started by devaluing the pound by 61.8 percent.

That administrative devaluation continued with total disregard for preservation of the pound whose rate neared \$3 and for supplying the foreign exchange needs of the people. The currency market limps on one foot still!

Concern for the dollar therefore went beyond official and economic circles to dominate the talk of the town. Every Egyptian household aspired to have a dollar bank account. The dollar gained so much prominence that some people went even requested dowries in dollars!

Generally, as years draw to a close, from October through the first half of December, Egyptian markets routinely face noticeable firmness in dollar rates as businessmen garner dollars to open letters of credits and repay their debts before year-end in order to avoid what the new year would bring in increased costs of imported goods.

This unusual year, in the words of chamber of commerce director Mustafa Zaki, was an exception. A persistent increase in dollar prices that prevailed since last October prompted citizens to hoard their dollars for purposes of speculation. The difference between dollar prices at the banks and elsewhere jumped from a mere 5 or 6 piasters to more than 18 or 19 piasters. Instead of selling their dollars on the market, holders bought instead as they hoarded in anticipation of a further increase in dollar value to more attractive levels.

This coincided, oddly enough, with a worldwide collapse in dollar rates vis-a-vis certain currencies.

Despite this worldwide collapse of the dollar, officials in Egypt boosted dollar rates vis-a-vis the pound by means of executive orders to comply with demands by the IMF and the World Bank. God only knows to what height dollar prices will soar should it firm up worldwide.

It would have been natural for the dollar to dominate the pound and go beyond the 3-pound rate but for recession in Egyptian markets. The inability of those on fixed incomes to keep up with abnormal price escalations brought down the prices of such goods as fruit, vegetables, shoes, ready-made clothes, and electric appliances. This became apparent in September and October when Egyptian families had to make a choice between buying their children's winter and school clothes or buying the meats they need.

The result was an artificial improvement in pound value.

Seasonal Increases

Dr. 'Abd-al-Min'im Radi, vice president of 'Ayn Shams university, believes that the end of every fiscal year historically gives rise to discussions of the high cost of the dollar which is customary among businessmen on calendar year budgets who seek to improve their balance sheets and consequently seek more dollars to repay debts to banks and other creditors. That increase in demand usually causes a hike in dollar rates which would soon return to normal.

Even though we are convinced that demand for the dollar is on the increase because of population growth and development needs in Egypt, according to Dr. Radi, we also realize that the dollar supply is also increasing thanks to floating exchange rates over the past few years and to higher rates paid by government, causing higher inflows of remittances. Dollar prices stabilized for a period of time and dollar transactions stabilized as a result. The margin between official and black market dollar rates narrowed to a very few piasters.

This has happened before more than once and the storm will soon subside.

The phenomenon, however, is presently characterized with speculation in the dollar by currency dealers and this is the reason behind current rate escalations despite indications of the relative dollar availability in Egypt for the next few years thanks to lower indebtedness, rising foreign exchange deposits with banks, and inflows of loans, grants, and investments to bring more dollars into Egypt.

Dr. Radi adds that if higher dollar rates in Egypt and a devalued pound were mandated by the government's agreement with the IMF, then we should demand a re-examination of those policies especially that the Gulf crisis has changed the tide in Egypt's favor.

IMF Response

AL-MUSAWWAR briefly interviewed IMF and World Bank delegations over the merits of pound devaluation in dollar terms. They emphasized that devaluing the national currency would increase exports, reduce imports, and attract fleeting funds.

All that would gradually reduce the balance of payments deficit since a weaker pound means that Egyptian exports will be cheaper in dollar terms and will therefore attract increasing demand by foreigners.

By the same token, a weaker pound means more expensive foreign imports, resulting in reduced domestic demand for them. A soft pound would therefore mean more exports and fewer imports. When coupled with high interest rate, such a weak pound would attract capital that fled to escape excessive rates of exchange.

Intentional Escalation

Dr. Muhammad Mahmud al-Imam, former minister of planning, takes issue with the viewpoint above and emphasizes that the current escalation in exchange rates is an intentional increase and not the result of market supply and demand for the dollar. Higher dollar rates are a component of an IMF program driven by the illusion that raising dollar prices may possibly reform the Egyptian economy. Take bread, for instance. The IMF believes that raising the price of bread would rationalize its consumption. I doubt that a sharp decline in demand for bread would result if prices were raised from five piasters to one pound per loaf! That won't happen, of course, because there is no substitute for bread.

By the same token, higher dollar exchange rates will not reduce demand for it unless a dollar substitute is available. Obviously, we cannot print the dollar or grow it on trees. It results from economic activity, local demand, and consumption.

If local output depended on imported means of production and semi-manufactured goods, even to the extent of 10 percent, then reducing demand for means of production would necessarily translate into output declines.

We emphasize that a "monetary solution" would be to no avail. Reform can be accomplished only by delivering the Egyptian economy from dependence on others.

The claim that a more expensive dollar would narrow the balance of payments deficit is obviously false. We have increased dollar rates sevenfold, from 40 piasters to about 3 pounds. Has our balance of payments consequently improved sevenfold? It has not and will not.

It is commonly believed that raising dollar value would boost tourism and Suez Canal revenues, but this is also doubtful. We have boosted the value of the dollar with no corresponding increase in tourism, canal, or export revenues. We merely calculated those revenues using a new exchange rate and the resulting higher totals are consequently artificial.

I would like to point out here that the banking exchange market has not and will not accomplish its stated objectives because it operates under constantly escalating exchange rates that are administratively determined. That market was supposed to restore exchange rate equilibrium, but it has neither done so nor has it satisfied the demand for foreign exchange. Rather, it acts like a legalized black market!

Foreign Dependence

Mahmud 'Abdallah, president of the Cairo Barclays Bank, disagrees. He points out that administration intervention is necessary because the people do not know what is good for them. The basic premise in any market in the world is that prices go up when demand increases and decline when demand softens. Egypt, however, is the exception to this steadfast rule because it is dependent on others to a large degree. We import about 70 percent of our needs while revenues from remittances, tourism, and Suez Canal tolls have all declined by about 50 percent and are yet to recover. This has impacted the foreign currency supply allowing constant and increasing demand to control prices.

There are two options: relief from the exclusion of certain commodities. The other solution is what the administration has chosen to good result. When prices of bread and sugar were raised, consumption of those commodities was rationalized, i.e., declined. Administration intervention is therefore mandated because the people do not know that is good for them.

Muhyi Qandil, chairman of the importers' section of the chamber of commerce, believes that the increase in dollar value is an aberration and that dollar rates could have exceeded three pounds had it not been for Egyptian market recession and fewer importer letters of credit caused by the lack of liquidity.

The adds that the current leap in dollar prices in Egypt has a direct impact on importers. On the one hand, market recession precludes raising prices to make up for

dollar costs. What we buy today for \$100,000 dollar may cost \$110,000 tomorrow, translating into an actual reduction in, or erosion of, our capital. An importer is supposed to factor in not only his profit margin but also the prevailing inflation rate but we are unable to do because of market conditions, burdening us with unforeseen losses.

The problem is also aggravated by bank interest rates which, compounded, are as high as 24 percent annually.

All this would create a terrible recession in traders markets, forcing some to depress prices rather than go bankrupt and in order to repay their bank debts. I emphasize that the continued rise in dollar costs has actually triggered the bankruptcy of several merchants.

Rationalizations for boosting dollar prices and devaluing the pound aside, it is a fact that the only victims of these reform are government and public sector employees on fixed incomes, the retired, and the unemployed generation.

Mustafa Zaki cautions against blindly following the recommendations and stipulations of international organizations which have to be more sympathetic to our situation and circumstances and understand that our economic predicament would be aggravated by foreign exchange shortages and the Gulf crisis.

The IMF should also realize that we have bent backward beyond our endurance and have subjected those with fixed incomes to unacceptable pressure by raising the prices of rice from 100 to 120 piasters; of sugar from 50 to 160 piasters; and of western bread from 5 to 7.5 piasters while reducing its weight from 145 to 100 grams, effectively doubling its price. We have also raised the cost of electricity, gasoline, cigarettes, and services. Even if all those so-called reforms were necessary, they will have a tremendous social impact on consumers under current conditions. We can barely deal with the criminal reforms of 1990 and the market has no need for more. How much farther can we go with this when citizens have to decide which takes priority—food, clothing, or school expense?

Dr. Ramzi Zaki explains that bank pound rates have deteriorated from 1.25 to 2.36 pounds per dollar for a decline of 88.8 percent. The black market pound rates declined by 68 percent as dollar prices jumped from 1.50 to 2.52 pounds. The exchange market will not be able to stem this decline or to frustrate the black market. The difference in exchange rates between the banks and the black market, no more than 11 piasters in September 1973, has widened to 46 piasters in March 1986 and amounted to 23 piasters in April 1989.

Public Sector Change Seen Leading to Economic Stability

91A40042B Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI
in Arabic 26 Oct 90 p 6

[Article by Usamah Sarayah: "Elections and the IMF: How To Defeat the Economics of Fear?"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] As we plan to defuse the foreign debt crisis, the way to growth and to improve the Egyptian economy is through the new law and by changing the makeup of the Egyptian public sector.

No one believes that Egypt would be capable of attaining a high rate of economic growth without first changing the type and form of public sector management, and even public sector size. That flabby sector badly needs to be transformed from a civil servant haven to a really productive business sector that propels society and the economy to economic activity and substantial productivity. This can happen only after that sector rids itself of small ineffective units and after all its companies join into a strong holding company capable of cooperating, dealing, and even participating with global corporations. Only then can our Egyptian companies share in the global economic activity driven by strong [conglomerates] and holding companies. The public sector in Egypt would [then] have the capability to do so without offending sensitivities since it would be representative of Egyptian operations and interests as a whole. That weak and fractured sector, as it stands today, is not a producer but a sector exploited by its workers and employees at the expense of society and the economy. Public sector employees should realize before it is too late that the Egyptian economy will not be in a position to accord that sector any more than that. Both the economy and the citizens expect productive sectors to contribute to them rather than take away from them and exist at their expense in order that employees may grow at the expense of society [as published].

We believe that restructuring the public sector would drive it to grow and produce, ultimately boosting its contribution to rates of growth and development.

Stability Defeats Apprehension

Political and economic stability, as well as public sector stability, would make large investments possible and would enable the private sector to expand its share of development. Egyptians have the economic and financial means to induce economic development and propel high economic growth. Statistics indicate that Egyptians own the largest share—between \$120 billion and 140 billion—of aggregate Arab savings abroad. Egyptian savings on deposit with Egyptians banks amount to 60 billion pounds. Such tremendous resources could be utilized to finance projects and development once they are liberated from the economy of apprehension and once their owners realize that there is no reason to fear work and production, that new projects are better and more profitable than [deposits in] banks, and that they

[capital] would be safer and better off in Egypt than abroad. All this requires a new healthy investment climate that boldly creates opportunities and trusts the ability of Egypt and the Egyptians to build a vital, regenerating economy that would offer strong competition to the growing economies of Europe, America, and southeast Asia. The Egyptian economy and Egyptian resources predate economic reforms in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. We must maintain our lead and continue liberating the Egyptian economy in order that it may occupy a prominent global position. We are capable of accomplishing our aims and realizing our goals.

Density, Governorate, Age, Household Statistics Given

91A40113A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
16 Nov 90 pp 18-19

[Article by Najwan 'Abd-al-Latif: "Population on Steady Rise, But More Dangerous Is That There Are Fewer Producers and More Consumers"]

[Excerpts] We are getting ready to conduct the first economic census in Egypt's history.

At the end of next month, the Census Bureau will announce the final results of the 1986 census in Egypt.

An initial reading of the census adds new marvels to Egypt's wonders. We always talk about the dreadful population growth, but this time the numbers give a reading of society's pulse. Figures say that the number of producers is going down and consumers going up. Farmer migration to the cities is declining and the Muslim-Christian ratio is stable. Unmarried people make up the majority and married people comprise the minority and marriage on paper goes on until further notice. Men outnumber women.

Last week, the Census Bureau announced that Egypt's population has grown to 56 million, an increase of 1 million persons in nine months and seven days. In other words, we are growing by 110,000 a month and our human stock goes up by 3,570 new citizens a day.

What does a 1-million increase actually mean?

What are the implications of such an increase on Egyptian society? We searched for the answer at the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.

Ahmad al-Baz, the agency's undersecretary for the Central Statistics Administration, said: This estimate is drawn from birth and death statistics based on the 1986 general census that included population, housing, and establishments. One of the bureau's outstanding functions is the issuance of a communique when the population grows by 1 million persons. On 17 December 1989, we estimated the population at 55 million persons, which means that we realized the 1-million figure in nine months and seven days or one person every 24.2 seconds.

growth that represents the difference between the number of births and the number of deaths.) Thus, it is wrong to say that Egypt gets a newborn every 24.2 seconds. Rather, the population grows by one person during this period. According to Civil Statute Authority reports, on the average, there is one birth in Egypt every 18.5 seconds and one death every 78.4 seconds.

Is the average population growth going up?

The above estimate of 55 million brought us to the 1-million mark in 8 months 24 days. This means it took us longer this time to reach the 1-million figure, but we cannot say for sure that the average population growth has declined because the rate fluctuates up and down and, to say that the average growth is going down, there has to be a sustained decline for a long period, 5 years for example. However, we can initially say that the growth rate has dropped a little in the last two years.

About some aspects of the new estimates, Rawiyah al-Batrawi, director of the Population Estimates Division, said: Cairo's population is now 6.483 million, an increase of 77,000 or 1.2 percent, representing 11.6 percent of the country's population. When the population was 5.7 million, Cairo's population rose by 93,000 or 1.47 percent. These numbers are for Cairo alone. As for Greater Cairo, its population reached 9.959 million, an increase of 187,000 persons.

The population of Alexandria Governorate is now 3.173 million.

About the other governorates, Rawiyah al-Batrawi says: Al-Daqahliyah Governorate is the largest Lower Egypt governorate and al-Minya is the largest Upper Egypt governorate, except for Giza, in terms of population with 3.890 million and 2.991 million respectively. As for Giza Governorate, it has a population of 4.066 million.

More Males

About the population gender balance, Ahmad al-Baz said: Males still outnumber females and this, by and large, does not change. Males outnumber females by 1.166 million and this is true in all governorates, save for Aswan where females outnumber males.

The average population density is 1.017 persons per square kilometer (psk) and the populated part of Egypt remains 5.5 percent of the general area. In 1934, the density used to be 466 persons psk, which means a 118 percent increase in 54 years.

About overcrowding in Cairo, the numbers show that the population density went up 4,000 persons psk between 1966 and 1976, thus surpassing the national density.

Population density in Cairo varies greatly from one district to another, for while it is 7,000 persons psk in Qasr al-Nil, it is up to 103,400 in al-Sharabiyah, 91,000 in Rawd al-Faraj, and 75,000 in al-Muski.

Ahmad al-Baz said that the most densely populated areas are the old districts where rural people settle, perhaps because of the low cost of living. Migrants usually make their home in places where they have relatives. Besides, rural migrants are concentrated in populated centers on the capital's outskirts because of their similarity to their original environment.

In Alexandria Governorate, the density this year reached 1.184 persons psk. It has the most densely populated district of all, the Gumruk [i.e., Customs] District where the density is 123,000 persons psk, while in al-Sharabiyah District, the most populated area in Cairo, it is 103,000. The great difference in population density is noticeable, for after Cairo comes Port Sa'id, followed by Giza and al-Qalyubiyah due to their proximity to Cairo.

In Upper Egypt, Sawhaj and Asyut are the most densely populated and al-Fayyum and Bani Suwayf the least populated.

In Lower Egypt, al-Gharbiyah and al-Minufiyah are the most densely populated and al-Buhayrah and Kafr al-Shaykh the least populated governorates.

Ahmad al-Baz added that the population density in the city of Cairo is 30,000 persons psk, while the highest average outside Cairo is 6,000. This underscores the fact that the influx from other governorates to Cairo is still ongoing, but migration from rural to urban areas in Egypt has definitely abated. The 1986 census showed a slight increase of 1 percent in the urban population.

Results also indicate that the population in terms of religion is stable. Muslims comprise 94.12 percent and Christians 5.87 percent of the total population.

Children Gaining

A new observation in the latest census is that the number of children under the age of 12 has risen. In the 1976 census, this number had dropped to 31 percent, compared to 35.5 percent in 1960. It has again risen in the latest census to 34.1 percent.

This leads to economic and social decline because there are more people to support and, therefore, there is a greater need for adequate resources such as schools. Against the rise in the number of dependents, the number of people in the 12-64 age group, who are the lifeline of production, has dropped to 63 percent of the total population from 65 percent in the 1976 census.

Regarding education, results show that the rate of illiteracy among people 10 years or older has dropped to 49.4 percent from 57.2 percent in 1976.

As for marital status, results indicated that the rate of unmarried people has risen to 25.9 percent, that of married people has dropped and so has the rate of divorced and widowed persons that is now at 8.1 percent.

The new census made sure to include the rate of betrothed, but, due to special circumstances, still unmarried people. It is 1.2 percent.

The average family nationwide has 4.9 members. This average is 4.6 in urban areas and 5.3 in rural areas.

Housing Situation.

The new census shows clearly the housing situation for the Egyptian family in terms of family size and availability of utilities. A strange observation is that there are 2.2 persons per room in the North Sinai Governorate and 2.1 in the Port Sa'id Governorate while the national average is 1.5.

The rate of homes with fresh water is 92.4 percent in urban areas and drops to 55.9 percent in rural areas. Ninety-six percent of urban dwellings and 78.9 of rural dwellings have electricity.

As for housing units, 44.6 percent are rental, 31 percent privately owned, 4.4 percent condos, and 16 percent unsold. Moreover, 80.4 percent of these units are residences and 17 percent are unoccupied. [passages omitted]

Produce Exporters Hit Hard by Gulf Market Losses

Losses, Other Market Options

91AA0139A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 5 Dec 90
pp 18-19

[Article by Husam 'Abd-Rabbu]

[Text] The numbers indicate that Egyptian exporters lost their largest, most important market following the invasion of Kuwait as well as payables totalling about \$17 million. When they tried to move into the Saudi market, they encountered numerous obstacles. What are these obstacles, which exist despite an Egyptian-Saudi agreement, which remains only to be ratified. How can Egypt's exporters be compensated for their losses? How can the problems which they face in Saudi markets be solved? What is the range of possibilities for establishing new markets in Europe? Why has the experiment to export oranges and potatoes succeeded, while efforts to export other produce have failed. Many other questions also exist.

The Gulf crisis has greatly affected Egypt's foreign currency sources. Suez Canal passage revenues have declined. Tourism to Egypt and the entire Middle East has declined, and experts stress that a long time will be needed before it returns to normal. On the other hand, new hard currency sources have been realized from increases in oil price in the international market. However, this increase in foreign currency sources is limited by large domestic consumption and a limited strategic reserve that prevents expansion of production as a precaution for the future. In brief, exportation remains

Egypt's only source of foreign currency. The danger is that the Gulf crisis has paralyzed the export market, especially produce exporters, inasmuch as Kuwait was their main market.

The winter export season, which began a month ago, has faced many problems. A number of factors have conspired against produce exporters to prevent the establishment of new markets, especially in Saudi Arabia, and to cause an increase in the prices of Egyptian produce exported abroad in the face of intense competition on the part of a number of countries that subsidize their exporters and provide them with favorable climates. If we add to this picture the fact that most of the lists filled with exporters are imaginary, because those active in this field are a minority who bear responsibility for Egypt's presence abroad and who turn over new foreign currency resources to the country, we realize that we are facing a new crisis that will result in additional losses if we ignore it.

Egyptian exporters have lost about \$40 million in payables for goods exported to Kuwait and Iraq, of which \$17 million is the value of produce exported to Kuwait. Kuwait, despite its smallness, was the most important market for Egyptian produce for the following reasons:

- The presence of 200,000 Egyptians in Kuwait has made Egyptian produce enormously popular.
- The Kuwaiti market's smallness and high consumption throughout the year have induced a large number of exporters to focus on it, inasmuch as their capital is limited, which does not permit them a presence in more than one market at a single time. They have thus applied the proverb, "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush."
- The continuous air traffic throughout the year to transport Egyptian workers back and forth between Kuwait and Cairo has made many spaces available for the continuous shipment of produce.

That does not mean that Egyptian produce has monopolized the Kuwaiti market. On the contrary, the Kuwait market was filled with Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese produce. It was open to all exporters, large and small. However, Egyptian produce ultimately prevailed.

Iraq also provided a market for exporters, the majority of whom exported industrial goods, while the rest exported produce to Iraq. The payables lost in this market total about \$130 million, which represent the proceeds of exports for the two years prior to the crisis.

Losses and Lost Markets

Produce exporters are the most damaged group. 'Abduh Isma'il, the secretary of the General Exporters Division, states that small exporters left the market after losing their capital. Many paid shipments prepared for export are stagnating in warehouses. In losing Kuwait, the exporters have lost their largest, most important market, and it has become difficult to find alternative markets at the same level within a brief period.

Large exporters are bearing the burden alone. Mustafa Na'im, an accountant and the president of an exporting company, states: I used to export to Kuwait about a third of my produce exports. After the crisis, I have continued to export to a number of European markets.

Another exporter, 'Ali 'Isa, stated that his last shipment of kidney beans to the Netherlands did not turn a profit. He added that he was compelled to [continue exporting to] maintain a presence, so that he would not lose his customers.

The private sector has born most of the damage caused by the crisis, because it controls most of the produce exporting activity. The secret of that control is that fruits and vegetables are highly perishable, requiring continuous labor and full freedom to make decisions, elements not available in public-sector produce exporting companies.

Exporters Move Toward Saudi Arabia

The crisis occurred before exporters had a chance to seek new markets, taking them by surprise a month before the start of the winter export season. Exporters moved toward the largest Arab market that neighbors Kuwait, the Saudi market. Of course, the Saudi market did not absorb all of Egypt's produce exports. However, it was resolved that "something is better than nothing." When activity began, exporters discovered that the obstacles impeding them in the Saudi market were of Egyptian making. In this regard, the details are many.

In January 1988, The Saudi Government issued a resolution imposing customs duties of 12 to 20 percent on Egyptian exports to Saudi Arabia, including produce. These duties decidedly affected the prices of Egyptian produce in the market in favor of competitors. Exporters did not remain quiet. They exerted pressure here and there. Shortly before the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had signed a bilateral agreement providing for the elimination of duties. The Saudi party actually ratified the agreement, but the Egyptian party has yet to do so. However, the halt in sessions of the People's assembly and the Assembly's subsequent dissolution precluded ratification of the agreement, which remains postponed indefinitely.

The only way out of this dilemma is the promulgation of a presidential resolution ratifying the agreement, because competition inside the Saudi market favors others, specifically exporters based in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and the West Bank. As for packaging and quality, Egyptian exports have made considerable progress in this area.

The president's promulgation of such a resolution will salvage what can be salvaged, inasmuch as the only room left in the Saudi market is in the western part of the country after the loss of the entire eastern region, including the foreign forces that have come to defend Saudi Arabia along with their food needs.

Saudi Arabia, for its part, is inclined to support Egyptian produce exports. A Saudi resolution was recently promulgated that prohibits the entry of Jordanian commodities that have a Saudi alternative. However, the Jordanians are bringing in produce under Syrian or Lebanese cover. In addition, they price their produce low and transport it to Saudi Arabia overland by truck, whereas Egyptian exporters cannot use trucks, because such shipments would lose their freshness during the long trip. Egyptian exporters have therefore been compelled to use air transport, which costs more.

The European Market is Open, But...!

While exporters are seeking a foothold in the Saudi market, which is the only alternative market for produce exports in the Arab region, a question is being raised regarding new produce markets in Europe. Khalid Abu-Isma'il, a major exporter, states that the European market is considerably open; an exporter must be present with the appropriate good at the appropriate price at the best time. A presence in the European market not possible without these three conditions.

Egypt exports about half of its produce to such European states as the Netherlands, France, West Germany, and England. The most important items are potatoes and oranges, which are transported by ship. Kidney beans and artichokes are shipped by plane. Intense competition in Europe is posed by Morocco and Turkey on the one hand, and on the other hand by European market countries, such as Cyprus and Spain, because of the facilities granted to them and their use of land transport. Usually, price competition is not in Egypt's favor, especially since the Gulf crisis raised maritime shipping costs. Air transport is a major problem, like a handful of salt that spoils an appetizing meal.

The Burdens of Shipping Costs

Before the Gulf crisis, Egyptian exporters lacked sufficient cargo space to ship produce to the Arab and European states. International airline companies customarily reduce the number of flights during the winter, which has conflicted with the start of the winter exporting season.

When the crisis broke out, air traffic stopped completely for a brief time before resuming with limited intensity. The National Airline Company was compelled to replace large planes with other planes that have smaller passenger and cargo capacities in an attempt to cope with a cancellation rate that has reached 40 percent with respect to flights to the Gulf region and Western Europe.

Because of the increase in fuel and flight insurance prices, and with the agreement of international airline organizations, it was decided to raise transportation costs, although the National Airline Company raised its rates by much less than foreign companies did.

These increases shocked produce exporters. The price of transportation from Kenya to London and from South

Africa to Paris became cheaper than the Cairo-London and Cairo-Paris lines, and the reason is that most countries, except Egypt, ship their exports at low, fixed prices. In addition, some countries, such as Turkey, provide incentives to exporters for each ton exported. A resolution promulgated in 1983 halves export shipment costs, including those incurred by produce exports. However, it has been disregarded for reasons that are not clear.

Shipping costs constitute exporters' primary expense, surpassing production costs considerably. For example, the cost to ship a ton from Cairo to Jeddah increased from \$220 in 1987 to \$550 following the crisis. The use of chartered cargo transport planes cost three times more than the use of passenger planes. The National Airline Company owns three Boeing-707 planes intended for passengers. When they broke down and became worthless, the company designated them to transport goods. The jumps in prices for shipping cargo on these planes are frightening. The cost of transporting 29,000 tons on a charter flight from Cairo to Bahrain has increased from \$18,000 to \$40,000. This increase is attributed to the fact that the Egypt Air is charging exporters for a round trip, even though the plane returns empty. One exporter asked about the role of Egypt Air offices abroad regarding the marketing of return trips instead of saddling exporters with their costs.

Therefore, the sum total of circumstances affecting private sector exporters has caused more than just a halt in operations. New exporters, it should be stressed, are not joining the lists of exporters. An exporter is not born overnight, but is the product of accumulated capital, unlimited experience, and constant efforts.

The Decline of Agricultural Exports

The crisis affecting produce exports is actually the latest of many chapters in the story of the obvious collapse of most agricultural exports. The examples are many.

- Cotton was hit by many diseases last year and sank to its lowest averages in a long time, strongly affecting its reputation and foreign demand for it.
- In 1970, exports of rice, considered a main export crop, totalled about 700,000 tons. However, rice exports have declined in recent years to 60,000 tons per year due to an enormous increase in consumption.
- Onions have been hit by several native diseases that have ravaged onion exports. Onions affected by disease are flooding into the domestic market at low prices.

The peanut crop was not spared a similar decline. Exports declined from 5,700 tons in 1982 to 1,500 tons in 1987, and they have been weakened by strong competition from African and Latin American countries. Even Agriculture Ministry projects designated for export, such as the strawberry project, have failed. The European citizen did not get a taste of that seed-filled

fruit, because the ministry sold the strawberry crop on domestic markets, to be gobbled up by the masses for their enjoyment!

Oranges and Potatoes: Successful Experiments

On the other hand, Egypt achieved great success in two experiments:

- The first is the export of Egyptian citrus, most importantly oranges, to Arab and European markets. Intense competition was posed by Morocco, Turkey, and the West Bank. Experts even called it "a citrus war." However, the excellent taste of Egyptian oranges quickly decided the battle in favor of Egypt last year, when 252,000 tons were exported, after exports had declined to 154,000 tons in 1988. It is strange that this victory was achieved even though Egyptian oranges increased in price and average production of a feddan of oranges does not exceed 8 tons, compared to a world average of 24 tons. The secret of the victory is the bold decision made in 1987 to break the monopoly of the public sector's al-Wadi Orange Export Company and the participation of the private sector. The success was clear, which indicates the existence of enormous export potential.
- The second successful experiment is the export of potatoes. The volume of potato exports reached 140,000 tons per year. This increase also followed the intervention of the private sector, which gained control of the markets. However, the future appears ominous, especially inasmuch as Cyprus has acquired large facilities in the English market, which are expected to increase after the unification of Europe in 1992.

According to Ibrahim Lutfi, the chairman of the al-Nil Company, it is clear that public-sector crop exporting companies, have become unable to compete with the private sector, because they are constrained by rigid financial regulations that prevent them from adjusting their prices and competing, and because they have excessive manpower, which absorbs their profits. Therefore, these companies have lost their customers. AKHIR SA'AH believes that export companies must be given precedence when public companies are transferred to the private sector.

How do experts view the future of exported-oriented agriculture in view of the ominous nature of current and future circumstances?

Dr. 'Adil Rashid, the chairman of the Egyptian Exports Development Center, believes that fluctuations in the amounts of exports are a natural phenomenon, because the market is open, competition is strong, and the buyer himself sees the commodity and chooses the best and the cheapest. In a market of this type, no exporter can speak of an export target figure.

However, our most serious shortcomings is fragmentation. There is only one exporters federation in Egypt. It

is quasi-governmental and its exports do not exceed 38 million Egyptian pounds per year. Producers also suffer from the smallness of their agricultural holdings. The solution is to establish federations for exporters and producers. In that way, we will provide for greater control over production costs, long-term contracts, and the ability to diversify. These associations actually exist in the West Bank. Each association owns modern machinery and planes for transport to all parts of the world.

Trade Pact With Saudi Arabia

91AA0139B Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 5 Dec 90
p 19

[Text] In an attempt to save the winter export season, exporters are submitting to the president a number of extremely important requests:

- The promulgation of a resolution ratifying the Egyptian-Saudi agreement to exempt Egyptian exports from high customs fees, which is in keeping with the Saudi Government's support of Egyptian produce exports.
- The drafting of a schedule of low shipping prices on the model of other countries.
- The provision of spaces for exports on planes destined for Saudi Arabia, and the designation of two planes for transport, one to the Arab region and one to the European region.
- Compensation for the losses of produce exporters, which total \$17 million. A portion of the grant established by the Gulf Organization can be allocated to Egypt (\$300 million) to compensate exporters and keep them in operation, especially knowing that the exportation of one ton of kidney beans benefits more than 40 workers.
- A request to take into account the circumstances which exporters are experiencing this year when holding them accountable regarding taxation in coming years.
- The establishment of a system for guaranteeing the value of exports through a special organization that would be responsible for settling payables in arrears in the Gulf in dollars, instead of transforming the exporter in the blink of an eye into a criminal.
- In related developments, the Exporters Division will prepare a catalogue for distribution abroad that includes information on exporters and the most important produce exports, and the Agriculture Ministry has received a loan from the World Bank for \$380 million to improve the quality of produce.

Egypt Air on Conflict With Exporters

91AA0139C Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 5 Dec 90
p 19

[Text] AKHIR SA'AH met with an official of the National Airline Company in attempt to convey the other side of the picture. Najwa Mahmud, the director of the goods yard at the airport stated that: We first accept

requests from several countries and organizations to ship goods between points on the flight path. These shipments, designated transit shipments, have priority in all international airline companies. After that, all Egyptian products, from leather and textiles to produce, compete for the remaining cargo spaces. We are making strong efforts to distribute these spaces fairly to satisfy all exporters. We have taken into account the realization of the greatest possible return on the shipment. Produce represented 60 percent of the volume of shipments that left the goods yard last year. As for this year, the picture will not become clear until after the end of November.

International airline organizations have recently decided to add new fuel and insurance costs to cargo shipment prices. The increase that we decided in Egypt Air is much less than that decided by foreign companies. Egyptian exporters can attest to this fact.

AKHIR SA'AH views the situation as an undeclared war between airline companies and exporters. Each party wishes to add its losses to the other, so that it can exit from the bottleneck. The solution is to draft an [illegible] balanced policy to be adopted by the state, which preserves the interests of both parties, because, ultimately, the proceeds flow into the same conduit.

Reporter Writes on Status of Women in Elections

91AA0056A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DU'WALI in Arabic
1 Nov 90 p 3

[Article by Ahdaf al-Bandari: "Half of Society is Angry: Elections Without Women!"]

[Text] As we await the birth of infant democracy, Egyptian women were surprised to find that nominations [of women] for the elections were limited by a ruling party quota. The nominees included only four women members, or one percent [of assembly seats], assuming that they all win! Women raised their voices to protest that quota which they consider to be an official cultural setback, by the majority party!

Dr. Ahmad Salamah, minister of state for People's Assembly and Consultative Council affairs, justified that by saying that individual candidacies are hard on women and that the party's view was that women are so dear to the heart that it wanted to distance them from election vituperation and diatribes. Dr. 'A'ishah Ratib mentioned that we are still ruled by the "It's a Man's World" mentality. Dr. Camellia Shukri wondered why society allows women to represent it as ambassadors abroad but not at home.

At this point Khalid Muhyi-al-Din said: Frankly, no women possess the parliamentary qualities of the late Nawal 'Amir.

What is at the bottom of all this?

I asked Dr. Ahmad Salamah, minister of state for People's Assembly and Consultative Council affairs, if there were specific attributes for women deputies.

He said: No specific attributes. We all recognize women's important social and political roles. That is indisputable. Women deputies have participated constructively in every debate during the Assembly's last two sessions. The issue, however, has another dimension. The election of individual candidates is different from elections based on a list where the party controls its list of candidates and nominates anyone it wishes in any order it wishes. The electoral law which designated 30 seats for women has been ruled unconstitutional by constitutional court and had to be rescinded. The court further ruled that designating 30 seats for women negates the principle of sexual equality.

Because of constitutional considerations, elections by list have now been changed in favor of individual candidates in which the party does not control its members and in which any citizen can come forward to compete. The issue, therefore, has taken on another form and has gotten more complex. It is to be pointed out that individual candidacies require hard work and that nominees [frequently] target each other with criticism and worse. We attempted to avoid that. We wished we could have nominated 30 women but women by nature are no match for men in the altercations and physical effort that characterize individual candidacies. By nominating women we would expose them to a lot of jeopardy, but they are too dear to us for that.

Dr. Ahmad Salamah asserts that the scant number of women candidates in no way means that the party discriminates between the sexes or that it belittles the ability of women.

Dr. 'A'ishah Ratib denounces the current situation as no way to honor the Egyptian mother, sister, wife, and housewife. I do not want to describe this as a slap to the face of Egyptian women, but as we embark on the 21st century, and in view of Egyptian women's diligent efforts over the past years, I wish they would be given the appreciation they deserve. Egyptian women struggle patiently and carry the heaviest burden under existing social conditions. Egypt is productive and boasts a large number of fine women who would be a credit to any representative assembly in the world. We have enough physicians, engineers, scientists, and lawyers not only to fill less than one percent of the upcoming assembly but also to fill a lot more seats. [That would be preferable to] attempts to frustrate Egyptian women's rights to participate, steer, plan, and legislate in order to serve the interests not only of the family but also of the motherland as a whole. The party has a right to innovate, but it should have taken into consideration that equality of the sexes is mandated under innovation.

The notion that personalized elections are hard on women is, in Dr. Ratib's opinion, merely an excuse to exclude half the nation from participating in the electoral process.

Dr. Farkhandah Hasan points out that women have carried their weight in previous sessions and that more women than men distinguished themselves as deputies. I do not believe that the party meant to scorn known women leaders by not nominating them. The Egyptian rank and file still prefer to be represented by men, and the party was wary of losing seats because the role of women is recognized by only a small segment of our population. This is the view of all parties and not only of the National Party.

Dr. Hasan adds that 50 or 60 percent of former women deputies are quite active in their constituencies and that 70 percent of them played a significant role in the National Assembly. Their performance in the Consultative Assembly was 100 percent. The fact is, credit goes to women for 50 percent of Consultative Assembly reports.

What do Egyptian women deputies lack? Nothing, except that their efforts are ignored, implying that they play a minor role.

Dr. Camellia Shukri, member of the Wafd Party's supreme council [executive committee], opines that the nomination of only four women indicates a cultural regression. This [action] does not reflect the true status of Egyptian women either in number or educational level, not to mention that they hold 18 percent of all jobs.

It is risky to conceal the role of the working woman and mother. She now serves as ambassador of her country and as international expert. Why, then, can't she represent her fellow citizens in the People's Assembly? We emphasize that the political disappearance of women is a derisive insult to them.

Shahindah Muqallad, member of the secretariat of the Grouping Party, believes that generally speaking Egyptian women are a great resource and that they have proven themselves irrespective of their partisan affiliation. She added that women's voices were louder than men's at the assembly's previous session.

IRAQ

Islamic Council Member Discusses Crisis

91AE0120B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
6 Nov 90 p 7

[Interview with Muhammad Haydari, consultative member of Iraqi Islamic Revolution's Central Council, by Dalal al-Saqar in Damascus; "Muhammad Haydari to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: Saddam Has Taken Opportunity of Blockade Against Iraq to Impose Starvation Policy on Opposition Areas;" first four paragraphs are AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT introduction; date not given]

[Text] Damascus—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT interviewed His Eminence Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Haydari, consultative member of the Iraqi Islamic Revolution's Central Council. The council consists of 80

members, including 11 consultative members, and is headed by Ayatullah Muhammad (Baqir) al-Hakim.

The council includes Iraqi Shi'ite and Sunna factions, Arabs, and Turkomen. At the level of the Islamic movements, the council includes the Iraqi Mujahidun Movement, the Islamic Action Movement, the Islamic Da'wah Party, the Soldiers of Islam Movement, the Iraqi Islamic Movement, the Kurdistan Islamic Movement, and secular figures who are influential in the arena.

The Higher Council has a military force called the Badr Corps which incorporates so far nearly 15,000 fighters who are actually armed, including a large number of Iraqi officers.

The corps consists of two sections: Volunteer Iraqi Mujahidun [strugglers] and prisoners who have asked for asylum and who are called al-Tawwabun [penitents].

The interview began with this quick idea about the Higher Iraqi Opposition Movements Council, and we continued the interview, seeking further details.

[Al-Saqar] (I asked His Eminence Muhammad Haydari:) In what direction has your military activity been focused?

Three Lines of Struggle

[Haydari] We declared the military struggle when the Iraqi regime executed a number of ulema and members of the Islamic movement, in order to defend our existence as ulema and as politicians. But considering that the military struggle has expanded recently, we are now operating along three lines:

First, pursuing the regime's leader and the main figures to whom the regime has entrusted the main responsibilities.

The second line seeks to destroy the security structure, especially the structure on which the regime depends. This action is embodied in endeavors to blow up the security center and the Ministry of Interior. A large number of the operations is staged in this direction.

The third line seeks to build bases at home so that they can pursue the regime's followers and supporters.

Outside Iraq, we are mobilizing Iraqis who number more than one half million.

Since Saddam's assumption of power, we have been exerting efforts to confront his regime.

[Al-Saqar] What are the priorities that you take into your account?

[Haydari] The number one issue is to topple the regime and then to enlighten the Iraqi people as to the acts of distortion in which Saddam engages at the Islamic, Arab, or national level.

In a related area, we exert efforts to expose Saddam's true character to the (Arab) and Islamic countries and organizations that sympathize with Saddam's regimes by one degree or another. We also exert efforts to gain recognition of the Iraqi opposition as the Iraqi people's representative and as the alternative to the ruling Iraqi regime.

Financing

[Al-Saqar] How about the council's financing?

[Haydari] The council is, in fact, financed by two parties: The Iranian Islamic Republic and some contributions received by the council chairmanship.

[Al-Saqar] Have you received international support during your long struggle?

[Haydari] Of course, we have received support from the Islamic Republic, from Syria, and at one time from Libya and from the region's peoples, such as Algeria and South Yemen at one time.

This support is preliminary and formal. We have made efforts with the United Nations and the international organizations and have moved in their direction. But even in this podium which should be free from politics and which should defend human rights and legitimacy, we have faced resistance. Many of the violations which we have presented, supported by documents, have been rejected.

Our support is countered, of course, by the full Arab and international support which Saddam Husayn's regime has been receiving.

Opposition's Role

[Al-Saqar] What is the role the Iraqi opposition seeks to perform under the circumstances prevailing in the region (the Gulf crisis specifically)?

[Haydari] The opposition is now seeking to perform its role in leading the Iraqi people. We are currently exerting concerted efforts in the direction of uniting the opposition.

Now that the Islamic opposition has found its strength, it will exert efforts to coordinate with the non-Islamic opposition so that the two can emerge shortly with a united position.

This position will then require the world's countries to acknowledge that the opposition is the Iraqi people's true representative. Consequently, support should be given to the Iraqi people and opposition, not to the regime. Therefore, the region's states and countries of the world must understand the demands and positions presented by the opposition in this regard. We are working to launch efforts in these states and among the popular and Islamic organizations to explain our position and the regime's true character.

At the domestic level, we are mobilizing Iraqi citizens and reviving internal organization so as to launch a large-scale movement, either military or popular, under the right circumstance and at the right time, because we realize that there is an opportune circumstance through which the opposition and the benevolent Iraqi forces can perform their role and confront the regime.

[Al-Saqar] At this level, what have you accomplished during your visit to Syria?

[Haydari] We are currently working with the Iraqi Islamic and national opposition to draft a unified charter. We have had meetings with a number of Syrian officials. I have met with 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam to exchange views on the conditions, on Iraq itself, and on the perils facing Iraq and the Iraqi people. The viewpoints are generally in agreement in this regard.

Moreover, we are exerting efforts with the sons of our people in Syria and in the region to mobilize them and to get them ready to move at the decisive moments so that they may be prepared for any eventuality.

[Al-Saqar] What impact has the Gulf crisis had on the opposition ranks?

[Haydari] We believe that the opposition has been blessed with divine providence, considering that the crisis has turned the entire world against the regime, especially since most countries of the world had been supporting the regime.

We believe that this is a consequence of the steadfastness of our citizens in confronting the regime, of our martyrs' blood, and of our patient confrontation and effort. We, as Islamists, believe that God will not abandon us.

As for the Iraqi regime's occupation of Kuwait, it has been no surprise to us. We had previously warned the Gulf states, including Kuwait, that Saddam's ambitions are boundless. But the conditions were not right for our voice to be heard.

[Al-Saqar] How did you receive the news of the Iraqi army's invasion of Kuwait?

[Haydari] As I have already noted, nothing emanating from Saddam surprises us. Religiously, Saddam's action is rejected and sinful. This is an aggression against a Muslim people and an act of killing innocent people and devouring an Arab state.

Politically, we believe that Saddam's act is rash. We have issued a statement strongly denouncing this invasion and demanding withdrawal from Kuwait. We know what others may not know, namely that not all the Iraqi army supports Saddam. This is confirmed by the high number of soldiers and officers who have been absconding to Arab areas, to northern Iraq, or to the valleys, especially since the invasion.

Some sources assert that Saddam relies on special forces of the republican palace who enjoy special privileges. We

want to win over the Iraqi army so that it may join the opposition ranks. But what we fear is that Saddam may exploit the attempts to incite the people and the army if he senses external danger.

Necessity of Toppling Saddam

[Al-Saqar] So you are not inclined toward foreign solutions?

[Haydari] We support any solution that spares the region the perils of war. We believe that the ideal solution comes from within Iraq. What is the meaning of any solution when Saddam continues to be present? Is Saddam to be trusted? I believe that he is not to be trusted. Along with our struggle and our effort, we believe that the Iraqi people and opposition must be supported so that they may perform their true role in confronting the regime. The regime's survival for a long time and the opposition's failure to score any real victory are a result of foreign support for the regime.

[Al-Saqar] Do you think that the blockade has begun to have its effect?

[Haydari] We have supported the blockade against the regime from the outset. But we reject the starving of the people, especially since Saddam issued decrees, as soon as the blockade was announced, to starve the areas where the majority of the population belongs to the opposition.

Concluding the interview, his eminence said: I believe that Iraqi people are vigilant people. As for the regime's intelligence and dictatorial pressure and for the regime's practices, be they starving people, compulsory conscription at the age of 15 or other practices, they will, in our assessment, generate a very strong pressure which will inevitably lead to an explosion among the Iraqi people and to a real uprising.

'Liberal' Opposition Leader Interviewed

91AE0120A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
10 Nov 90 p 6

[Interview With Sa'd Salih Jabr, Iraqi "Liberal" Opposition Leader, by Ibrahim Nuwwar; "Sa'd Salih Jabr to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: Baghdad's Ruler Has Been Remitting 5 Percent of Oil Revenues to Outside World in Anticipation of 'Black Day,' Iraqi Officers Returning From Training Missions Placed Under House Arrest; Story of 'Adnan Khayrallah's Plane Crash Contrived; Saddam Killed 'Adnan With His Own Hands; We Want Real Democracy for Iraq; Whoever Thinks That We Need 'Strongman' Is Wrong; Forming Government in Exile at Present Will Divert Us From Our Fundamental Objective;" first two paragraphs are AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT introduction; date, place not given]

[Text] London—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—Nearly six years ago, Iraq's president said in a 3-hour speech broadcast from Baghdad Radio that "Sa'd Salih Jabr has formed a party with which he is trying to uproot me from

power. Tell him, folks, that all the Iraqi people want me." Sa'd Salih Jabr's response to Saddam from London was: The Iraqi people fear you; they do not want you.

What Sa'd Salih Jabr said contained half the truth. The other half is that Saddam Husayn hates and fears his people. Throughout the years, Saddam Husayn has killed with his own hands or through his aides hundreds of Iraq's best young men and experts in the various areas of military and civilian life. Some of those killed were as close as brothers, such as 'Adnan Khayrallah, the Iraqi defense minister whom Saddam killed and then alleged that he had been killed in a helicopter crash.

When I asked Sa'd Salih Jabr, or Abu-Salih, about the truth regarding 'Adnan Khayrallah's assassination, Jabr, who is considered the symbol of Iraq's modern liberalism, said that the plane crash story is contrived and that the new al-Ummah Party which he heads has sought the truth from the inhabitants of the area which Saddam alleges was the site of the crash. These people have denied that there was a "violent sandstorm" or a "helicopter crash."

Abu-Salih wondered: Where are 'Adnan Khayrallah's comrades who were lost in the same crash? Why have we not seen Iraq's leader awarding their kinsmen medals and badges of honor, considering that they are martyrs? Where are the wakes organized to commemorate those whom Saddam alleges were killed with 'Adnan Khayrallah? Abu Salih went on to add: Saddam killed him. He executed him for fear that Khayrallah would become a bulldozer that would uproot him from power with the support of the people of Tikrit to whom Khayrallah belonged.

I asked Abu-Salih, and this was the second time I have interviewed him, who would possibly be able to topple Saddam. He responded promptly: "The people of Tikrit themselves." Explaining his theory, he went on to add that even though the people of Tikrit have benefited most from Saddam's presence in power, they are also the people subjected to the ceaseless chain of executions. Should Saddam be toppled by other forces, the people of Tikrit will be the ones to pay the price after Saddam. This is why it is better that they remove him and gain the "credit" for getting rid of him so that they can avoid retribution.

Tikrit People Will Topple Saddam

Abu-Salih said that the people of Tikrit are, moreover, the people most capable of damaging Saddam because they associate with him daily and because his guard, secretaries, aides, officers, and cabinet ministers come from among them, contrary to the others who are kept far away from him even if they are in the government. Abu-Salih added that in dictatorial regimes, fear gets such control of people that it stops them from rebelling against the regime. The start of the Iraqi regime's downfall will come in the form of a coup that comes from within the regime and that brings down the dam of fear,

thus allowing the popular wrath to gush and prevent the establishment of another military dictatorship.

In the preceding paragraph, Abu-Salih answered a question I was just about to ask him, namely that a coup against Saddam Husayn is likely to lead to a new dictatorship and that the coup leaders will not offer democracy to the opposition on a gold platter and that what happened in Sudan in the days of Siwar-al-Dhahab was an exception to the rule. In any case, the premature answer to my question led me to ask another question about the relationship of the new al-Ummah Party, which is led by Sa'd Salih Jabr, with the other opposition factions, and about the reasons for this party's abstention from participating in the Damascus meetings which include most of the Iraqi opposition factions.

Abu-Salih said: To start with, let me explain to you a point that is currently causing much confusion among analysts and a number of political circles concerned with Iraq. This point is embodied in the fact that some circles are currently raising the slogan to seek a "strongman" to replace Saddam Husayn in Iraq even though we know that seeking such a replacement is tantamount to pursuing a mirage. What is more dangerous is that the slogan encompasses an incorrect concept regarding change. Change in Iraq lies in establishing and entrenching a true democracy, not in establishing a regime on the shoulders of a "strongman," because the regime will be transferred in this case into just a chair that the strongman uses.

Free Elections

The first and most important step toward establishing democracy in Iraq is to get rid of Saddam Husayn through a military coup. I find it most likely that an individual from Tikrit will lead such a coup and that a provisional government will then be formed under the chairmanship of an officer to govern for six months after which preparations will be announced for holding free elections in which the Iraqi people will determine the form of regime and government they want.

Sa'd Salih Jabr asserted: "We are opposed to Saddam, and we declare to all that we will not take revenge on anybody, not even on those who have cooperated with Saddam. We are opposed to Saddam because we are aware that he forces others to do his dirty work for him or else end up dead."

I looked at Abu-Salih when he paused for a moment. He understood the meaning of my look and smiled. He then let out a hearty and resounding laugh and hastened to say: Let us first have some tea and a few dates from Iraq, and then I will immediately return to your question about our relationship with the other opposition factions. I could find nothing with which to respond other than to reciprocate with a laugh and a swift comment. Abu-Salih then proceeded to make tea and bring some dates.

While drinking sweet tea and eating succulent fresh dates, we talked for minutes about the children, grandchildren, and families of the martyrs murdered by Saddam Husayn. The occasion for the conversation was a grandchild of one of Saddam's martyrs who stormed into the place, snatched a date, and ran away.

Let us return to our discussion, said Abu-Salih. We meet with all the opposition factions, and we have strong relations with everybody. Why not, considering that our objective is the same, namely to topple Saddam Husayn? However, we find that indulging in meetings and frequent statements will not bring us any closer to the objective we seek. We are aware that a dialogue is underway in Damascus. We have relations with the main parties to this dialogue, and we have carried messages from some of these parties to the capitals we have visited recently. If they reach agreement, we will support this agreement with all our might. We support all the steps being taken by the opposition to topple Saddam Husayn. This is the first essential step. We find it necessary to then entrench the principle of elections in order to establish in Iraq a democratic system from which the political and intellectual terrorization of individuals and political groups is eliminated.

Distinguished Relations

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What about a government in exile?

[Jabr] (He paused a little and then said:) Why a government in exile? We want to agree on toppling Saddam, and we do not wish to disagree on positions here or there. A government in exile may undermine the efforts being made to achieve the objective and may itself turn into an objective. Our main concern is to overthrow Saddam Husayn. Our domestic contacts are guided toward this objective. Our relations with the other opposition factions are targeted toward this objective. Our relations with friends abroad are also intended to serve this objective. We do not want anything that diverts us from our main objective in this phase. This objective is to work to overthrow Saddam Husayn and to prepare for a democratic system in the post-Saddam Iraq.

We kept on drinking tea and eating dates while Abu-Salih continued to talk about the role of the new al-Ummah Party in this phase and about his vision of how to lead Iraq out of the ordeal caused by Saddam. He said: "A delegation of the new al-Ummah Party's Central Committee visited Washington, Riyadh, and Tehran in recent weeks. We presented our viewpoints regarding the democratic alternative in Iraq and this viewpoint has been received with full understanding by the said capitals."

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What was Tehran's understanding of your viewpoint regarding the democratic alternative?

[Jabr] Tehran is changing. Today's Tehran is not the Tehran of five years ago. We believe that no matter what

form a system takes, democracy and man's political and economic rights, regardless of the latest names they have been given, are the basis for success and stability. It is my viewpoint that Tehran is moving along this path. Rafsanjani is bolstering his positions. He is a wise man who considers matters with a well-balanced view. The Iranians have deep faith in time and history. Therefore, change among them may take time. But when this change occurs, it will be immense. It is in Iran's interest to have stable relations with its neighbors. This stability will not materialize if instability is prevalent in one or more of the countries neighboring Iran.

Abu-Salih went on talking about his impression of his visit to Tehran and his meetings with the officials there, saying: "Yes, they do view us as a 'secular' party. But who says that secularism is opposed to man's interests. We have initiated a dialogue with Iran, and this dialogue has its roots, background, and history. We have worked with the Iranians before, and there is ground for common understanding between us. Many in the world did not take our words seriously, especially before Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. The picture is different now, and it has been proven to the others that we have been right. This is why they listen to us attentively. We have not altered our positions to get the support of others. Inversely, our positions are becoming firmer. Our relationship with Iran stands on this ground."

Sa'd Salih Jabr also talked at length about what he saw and his observations during his visit to Iran with the new al-Ummah Party's Central Committee delegation. He talked about the outcome of his contacts in Washington, his meetings with members of congress, and his discussions there on the Gulf crisis and on the means to overcome it. Abu-Salih said: I presented to them our viewpoint on the need to continue and stiffen the boycott against Saddam Husayn's regime and the need to make efforts to avoid the destruction of Iraqi economic or industrial installations in case war breaks out in the region, because these installations and facilities belong to the Iraqi people and because they will pay the cost of rebuilding them if they are destroyed.

Stolen Money

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] (I interrupted him before he could go on:) But do you truly believe that the economic boycott is effective?

[Jabr] (Abu-Salih responded succinctly:) It is not sufficiently effective because there are countries that are close to Iraq who help to mitigate the impact of this boycott. Moreover, Saddam Husayn has at his disposal nearly \$4 billion in liquid assets or in gold obtained from Kuwait. This money is used for purchases from abroad through other parties. But the main source for supplying Saddam Husayn's trade at the current time is embodied in the remittances made by the Ba'ith Party to its accounts in Switzerland since 1972. These accounts are estimated at \$23 billion. (Sa'd Salih Jabr went on to explain the story of these remittances, saying:) Since nationalization of the

foreign oil companies in 1972, the Ba'th Party has been gleaning five percent of the oil revenues annually and remitting this percentage to Swiss accounts in the name of foreign firms or of non-Iraqi persons.

These monies have not been subjected to the decisions freezing the Iraqi assets abroad, and they are currently used, with the help of non-Iraqi businessmen or firms, to finance what Saddam needs from abroad. According to the information available to us at the al-Ummah Party, a number of Iraqi businessmen who are well-known for their ties with Saddam's regime have been sent to Europe to make the necessary arrangements for the conclusion of trade deals through third parties.

It is our assessment, Abu-Salih goes on to add, that these steps, taken to reduce the effectiveness of the economic blockade, have not prevented the manifestations of nervousness and anxiety within the regime itself and on the Iraqi scene.

Manifestations of Anxiety

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What are the most significant of these manifestations of anxiety?

[Jabr] In the army, there has been increasing complaint against Saddam Husayn's policies. Because of this complaint, Iraqi Chief of Staff General Nizar 'Abd-al-Karim al-Khazari has been arrested and placed under house arrest, as you are aware.

'Ali Husayn al-Majid has failed to control the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. This is why Barazan al-Tikriti, Saddam's half brother, has been summoned to implement the policy of suppressing the Iraqi forces and occupied Kuwait simultaneously. One manifestation of this complaint is that tens of officers who returned from training missions in France have been placed under house arrest. There is a state of suppression, which is now simmering within the Iraqi army.

During our conversation, Abu-Salih asked one of his aides to hold off all incoming phone calls. But there was one call that could not wait. So I decided that we could continue the interview at a later time. I used the excuse of another imminent appointment and asked to be excused, with the provision that we meet again to continue the interview. While I was leaving, Abu-Salih said: There is still a lot. Not for Saddam, I said. I then bade him farewell and left him laughing at the entrance of his residence.

Effects of Blockade Examined

91AE0120C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
11 Nov 90 p 8

[Article by 'Abd-al-Rahman Ahmad al-Jabri, member of the Saudi Economic Association in Abha: "Degree of Economic Blockade's Impact on Iraq; Pre-War Step"]

[Text] The degree of an economic blockade's general impact depends on several criteria, including:

- agricultural and industrial production capabilities;
- a country's technological progress;
- supplies of oil and oil derivatives at home and abroad;
- possibility of exploiting the country's manpower;
- ideal political channeling of the production elements and the distribution of these elements according to priority; and,
- domestic investments and the exploitation of these investments internally and abroad.

The degree of this impact varies from country to country, depending on the aforementioned criteria. As for the blockade imposed on Iraq by the United Nations and the international community as a consequence of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, we must develop the aforementioned criteria from an economic angle to find out the degree of the blockade's impact on the country, whether this blockade has performed the desired role and created a gap that will lead to Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, or whether it has not created any vision that helps in this regard.

Regarding the first criterion, namely agricultural and industrial production capabilities, there is no doubt that Iraq is a good agricultural country, if we take into consideration the fact that it has a fertile arable area and water resources, such as the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which have helped create good agricultural activity. Iraq used to be called the fertile crescent to signify its abundant and varied agricultural production. Add to this the policy that Iraq's leadership has recently embraced focusing on the important commodities such as wheat and barley. This is in addition to Iraq's date production. Iraq is one of the biggest producers and processors of this agricultural commodity. Iraq also possesses big plants to turn out dairy products, milk, and milk derivatives.

On the basis of this point, it can be said that the serious impact of the economic blockade in this area is, if we take the general tendency into consideration, somewhat (exaggerated) because it is not significant to Iraq.

Industrially, it is well known that in any country that is going through or that has gone through a war phase, the emphasis put on this area is rarely significant. To put it more precisely, the emphasis is put on the area of military industry so as to strengthen the military arsenal for the purpose of confrontation or of going on the offensive. This is why no industrial economic blockade against Iraq will play an effective role in forcing it to withdraw.

As for the criterion of technological progress, it is also significant. But we cannot say that this criterion represents a highly significant factor in Iraq, and we cannot say the inverse because the war period through which Iraq is going has made the situation so vague that it is difficult to measure this criterion and [its role] in helping [Iraq] resist the blockade.

As for the criterion of the supplies of oil and oil derivatives, whether at the domestic or external level, this

criterion is of great significance, and it may have performed the desired role in ensuring that exports to the outside world are blocked. As for the domestic level, it is obvious that it has also performed an effective role in this regard through the policy of the fixed distribution of oil derivatives to individuals as a consequence of the fact that this criterion has been affected by the blockade. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, this [distribution] policy may be tantamount to a domestic oil policy with future objectives, such as preparing militarily or following an austerity policy—a policy currently adopted in Iraq—with the purpose of channeling the largest possible portion of oil production to the military sector. As for the manpower criterion, Iraq has launched a major campaign to attract people from all walks of life to the military sphere. This large number of people represents a high percentage of the manpower in the areas of agriculture, industry, and commerce, and in the professions, skilled crafts, and management.

This might be a point that weakens the balance of forces in Iraq's economic activity. This criterion may provide proof positive that the blockade will be economically effective. However, it will need a long period of time to work.

There is also the criterion of the ideal political channeling of production elements and the distribution of these elements according to priority and ideal economic yield. But what this criterion is faulted for is that it has to be used during very calm periods free from the storms of war. It may be difficult to get results from this criterion in a period of tension when the thinking is focused on the military aspect and other aspects are disregarded. One also has to add the element of time insofar as this criterion is concerned.

Finally, there is the criterion of exploiting domestic investments in Iraq. In a regime dominated by oppression, dictatorship, and individual rule, this is difficult to achieve. This is in addition to the freezing of investment activities which will in no way lead to positive results in Iraq's economy during this period. The objective of such investments, if they exist, is to channel revenues to bolster military provisions.

But there are prewar steps that must be taken into account. The following steps could have acceptable results and lead to the forced withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait:

1. The Soviet Union's role in the Gulf crisis.

Some analysts believe that this role continues to be vague. The Soviet Union wishes to solve the crisis peacefully for reasons that are known to many. The international community must urge the Soviet Union to stand with the United States and the friendly countries, because the Soviet Union must play a very effective role so that Iraq is not able to divide public opinion into two blocs since this would create a problem with extremely

detrimental future effects. Consequently, the Soviet Union should play a totally confrontational and more positive role.

2. Severing all kinds of international and diplomatic relations with Iraq and isolating Iraq from the other countries of the world.

Have the United Nations sever all telecommunications, postal, and information contacts and block all land, sea, and air travel to Iraq, thus sealing Iraq off.

3. Military and strategic cooperation between the friendly countries to seriously study Iraq's military capabilities.

These means may not be greatly effective in bringing about the withdrawal, but they are essential as steps preceding war, may God forbid it.

Kuwaiti Analysis of Government Food Distribution Policy

91AE0120D London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13 Nov 90 p 3

[Article: "Agricultural Crisis and Absence of Grains: Who Is Responsible or Starving Iraqi People"]

[Text] London—SAWT AL-KUWAYT—In a report from Baghdad, a foreign news agency has said that Iraq announced officially last Sunday that increasing difficulties are being encountered in supplying the domestic market with grains, and it declared that "steps have been taken to punish hoarders."

The agency links these difficulties, which emanate from the paralysis of Iraqi agricultural production, with the emergency meeting Saddam Husayn convened for the RCC [Revolution Command Council], the regional command, and the ministers to discuss the issues connected with agriculture and marketing agricultural crops.

Information acquired by SAWT AL-KUWAYT confirms that in an attempt to move forward with the agricultural season and to help alleviate the food crisis, the Iraqi authorities are working to bypass previous RCC instructions prohibiting cultivation in more than 2,000 villages in northern and northeastern Iraq. The information further confirms that certain steps have been taken in this regard, such as transferring the Iraqi positions existing on the borders with Iran to other areas north of al-Mawsil in order to ensure peaceful conditions for cultivation.

The information adds that thousands of the inhabitants of these villages have refused to return to their homes, including tens of thousands of refugees in Mardin and Diyar Bakr in southern Turkey because of their fear of the military annihilation campaigns awaiting them as soon as Saddam Husayn gets the opportunity—campaigns to which they have been subjected several times in the past 10 years.

The information also confirms that confidential instructions calling for the annihilation of people and livestock and prohibiting cultivation in vast parts of northern Iraq are still officially valid and that the Iraqi authorities are making efforts to lure farmers back to their activity so that these authorities may again seize their villages, confiscate their crops, and expel and annihilate them in accordance with these instructions.

The plains of Iraqi Kurdistan in the north are the area that supplies the domestic market with the largest amount of grains. However, there has been increased reliance on the outside world to meet domestic needs under circumstances in which agriculture in the provinces has declined as a consequence of brutal military operations and the chemical annihilation war that the regime ignited, which has resulted in the population's emigration to places beyond the borders and in the coercive eviction of half a million citizens to towns in the heartland.

As for agricultural activity in the Euphrates plains and in the south, it has also suffered a setback in recent years by virtue of two factors: the conscription of farmers in the ill-omened al-Qadisiyah army during the war with Iran and subjecting vast tracts of arable land to the dictates of military action; and the constantly decreasing water volume obtained from the Euphrates River, a fact which became well known during last winter's crisis.

However, the catastrophic past economic policy of Saddam Husayn—a policy founded on flouting the farmers' right and on "militarizing the economy," and the adventurous rush toward the obsession of unjustifiable armament—plus Saddam's latest venture of invading Kuwait and the subsequent international economic blockade resolutions have created a violent food crisis which can be tackled only by eliminating the nightmare of the hateful dictatorship sitting atop the government.

ISRAEL

MK Ben-Elissar on Control of Jerusalem

91AE0150D Tel Aviv HAYARDEN in Hebrew
30 Oct 90 pp 1, 11

[Commentary by Knesset Member Dr. Eliyahu Ben-Elissar]

[Text] From the rostrum of the Knesset and from here [in this commentary], I appeal to the President of the United States, President Bush, to the Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, and, through them, to the American people. I seek to convey only one message: Leave Jerusalem alone!

Jerusalem is ours and will remain ours. It was ours well before Washington was the capital of the United States, and even well before most European capitals became capital cities.

The issue [of Jerusalem] is unrelated to aid or an allocation. Our love for Jerusalem depends on nothing. It makes no difference whether we receive American allocations, grants, or guarantees for loans. Jerusalem will not be a subject of debate, discussion, hesitation, doubt, or concession.

I say this today—though these matters should be self-understood—precisely in the wake of that unfortunate resolution approved in the Security Council in light of the position of the President of the United States (and we all respect and admire him, and I say this here even now on this rostrum; we view the United States as a friend to Israel and [the President] personally as a man who more than once made a presidential commitment to vouch for the state of Israel regarding a number of aspects, and I do not need to outline this in detail). However, what has he said since that resolution was approved? "I therefore expect"—thus stated the president of the United States—"that the Security Council's resolution will be implemented." Secretary of State Baker also said that.

I ask to reinstate on our agenda the Israeli Government's demand that the resolution approved by the Security Council not be implemented. I say this simply, honestly, and with complete candor. This resolution will not be implemented, because we are forbidden to recognize its validity. I will not analyze the resolution. I will only mention three points in it that explain why we are forbidden to accept it.

1. The resolution refers to "the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people." This wording is not faithful to the Camp David accords and is actually contrary to them. The word "political" does not appear in those accords.

We do not recognize the "legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people." We certainly recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The difference is great.

2. It is inconceivable that the Western Wall is not mentioned in the resolution. It is, instead, swallowed somewhere in the words, "other holy places." It is unacceptable to us that the Temple Mount is designated by its Arabic name, "al-Haram al-Sharif," while the Western Wall is [included among] "other holy places" in the resolution.

3. We are considered "an occupying power in Jerusalem." We are not an occupying power in Jerusalem. We are a sovereign power in Jerusalem. Hence, as stated, the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Jerusalem.

Therefore, we do not intend, and it is forbidden, to implement a resolution that, in our view, calls on the Israeli Government to violate a basic law that stipulates that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.

I must also state the entire truth here. The American position is not new. The United States did not recognize Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem of 1967 or Jerusalem

of 1948. Even a very friendly American president, President Bush's predecessor Ronald Reagan, in that well-known American document of 1 September 1982, states that Jerusalem will be a subject for discussion. He did not distinguish between this Jerusalem or another Jerusalem. However, there is a very essential, deeply significant difference which is not only political, between a known existing [U.S.] position [on Jerusalem that is not given prominence] and a position that reminds you daily that it does indeed exist. This should be said here again. Everyone understands the difference. Not only are they saying that the position exists. They are also attempting to pull the entire blanket in a direction in which we have no interest in having it pulled by saying to us: Just a moment, there are sanctions [that can be applied] here [to Israel] as well, and perhaps not only sanctions. You do not want them to liken and compare you to Kuwait. Although I am saying that there is absolutely no speck of [mutual] influence between this and Kuwait, in so doing I, nonetheless, am making this very comparison. President Bush is not the only one to do this. Secretary of State Baker does it, and President Mitterrand of France does it explicitly, without a mantle of hypocrisy, though he did say that the two situations should not be compared. This is one situation, and that is another. However, that statement has already made the comparison. This comparison has also taken root among journalists and in public opinion. Kuwait/Jerusalem, the land of Israel/Iraq/the state of Israel—it is all the same. In the face of this, do we need to fold or accept proposals?

Here, I come to the main point. The proposals say: Just a moment, what difference will it make. You will receive them [a UN mission], and some [Israeli] official will see them. How can Jerusalem's mayor, whom we respect for his great work say: "I will receive them, I am not the government of Israel, I am in sum a mayor of a city, some municipal thing." With all due respect for Teddy Kollek, he has made a serious mistake. His mistake is not that he has volunteered. It is very nice to volunteer. Why has he erred so? What do the Americans seek? What do the French seek? What is sought by all who seek to take Jerusalem from us? They seek a precedent.

We have among us outstanding jurists. They know that when you insert a finger into the corral it becomes a precedent. How could it be otherwise? I have sufficient quotes. The woman with the deep voice, Margaret Tutwiler, states in a State Department announcement, with the secretary of state's knowledge of course, that this mission on behalf of the UN secretary-general, which we are ordered to receive by virtue of the force of the Security Council's resolution, will not create a precedent, because, in the words of the announcement, Israel already accepted a representative of the UN secretary-general in June.

There would be no precedent, because a precedent already exists, or, as a joker would say, an insane person cannot go insane....

The secretary of state himself also said this in a very important, detailed declaration where he states [that Israel should receive a UN mission] "just as a similar mission was allowed to come in June of this year." [In other words,] there would be no precedent now, inasmuch as one exists. How did Knesset Member Porez put it? [He said:] "This is twisted, because I once supported a representative that came, and I [have since] become wiser. So now I am going to receive a mission to implement what I view as an illegal resolution and thus break the law, and then it will be all right."

Mysterious Emissary Between Jerusalem, Baghdad

91AE0117D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 7 Oct 90 p 17

[Article by Smadar Peri]

[Text] At the end of the week, experts here recounted the errors in Husni Mubarak's solemn speech in Egypt, which immediately grabbed the headlines—how could it be otherwise—in Israel.

In Jerusalem, they are willing to swear that messages were never sent to, or received from, Baghdad. If "clarifications" went out from Jerusalem, and "situation pictures" were received from Baghdad, they were nonetheless not entrusted to that "American professor," whose name Mubarak was not at pains to specify.

Even Mubarak's unequivocal determination that Israel secretly sold military equipment manufactured by the Hagar Company is defined here as "nonsense." It is said here with a sigh that the height of Mubarak's errors is in his presidential statement, which was intended to threaten the Iraqi president, to the effect that the long arms of Israeli intelligence are well extended into every strategic corner in Iraq, and that Israel has a detailed, updated, precise picture. If only it were so the experts sigh. Only one politician here was willing to say "there is something" in the Egyptian president's disclosures. The same politician recommended the need to start investigating the source of the leak here.

At present, in Boston, Laurie Milroy (is she not the "American professor who transmitted messages from Baghdad to Jerusalem" according to Mubarak's claim?) did not know whether to be happy or to shake in fear. At the end of the week, she secluded herself in her modest apartment in Boston and turned on her answering machine to screen the hundreds of telephone calls reaching her from all over the world. In the longer term, Mubarak's disclosure will not benefit the career of the American professor, whose employment contract with the Institute for International Studies at Harvard expired a year ago. It is permitted to predict that Laurie Milroy will not receive a visa to enter Iraq in the near future, she will have to carefully calculate her journeys, and she will have to be wary in places where she meets with Iraqi officials or with emigre opponents of the Iraqi regime.

Professor Laurie Milroy is remembered well in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Avrasha Tamir, who used to converse with Milroy in the years when he served as director general in the prime minister's bureau and in the Foreign Ministry, describes her as "airy and eccentric." However, Tamir rejects Mubarak's claim that Milroy—tall, uncomely, and sickly looking—was asked to transmit messages. "She would come to me after each one of her trips to Iraq to ask what I thought, what my appraisals were. More than anything, she was interested in whether there was any truth to rumors that I had met with the Iraqis secretly...."

Professor Milroy also enjoyed an open door to the bureau of Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. "We never received messages, nor did we transmit any messages through her to Iraq," Rabin's confidants insist. "Milroy came to relate impressions of daily life in Baghdad. We were well aware that she did not succeed in going higher than certain officials in the Foreign Ministry. She did not even succeed in entering the office of Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz."

Nevertheless, Rabin, who was defense minister in the years when Milroy used to visit Israel as well, saw to it to free up his schedule to listen to Milroy's "impressions" and to explain to the American expert on Iraqi affairs what we think about subjects related to her area of expertise. During meetings with of "our ministers," he even quoted remarks heard from Professor Milroy. [Were these remarks] messages? Knesset Member Moshe Shahal, whose name is immediately connected to that of Milroy's and the "notes" from Jerusalem to Baghdad, states: "It is natural that anyone who meets with members of the regime there and with us, and who is able to present an updated situation appraisal that stands the test of reality—and that is exactly what happened with Milroy—merits serious treatment as a conveyor of messages. It is a fact that no senior Israeli politician refused to meet with her. On the contrary."

An Israeli who met with Professor Milroy a number of times states:

"Laurie Milroy, in contrast to others, never sought publicity for herself. It is probable that she had an interest, beyond the area of her specialization, in hearing what Israelis had to say, so that she would have something to say in Baghdad in order to facilitate her entry and exit to and from Iraq and the suspicious ministries there.

"More than anything, I remember Professor Milroy's statement: 'Iraq will not initiate any military action against Israel. However, Iraq is not a peace partner with Israel.'"

Professor Milroy, a student of the well known orientalist, Nadav Safran (who has been accused of having close working relations with the American CIA), began her romance with the Iraqis, as far as is known, ten years ago. Nizar Hamdun, the active Iraqi ambassador in Washington, made efforts to draw near to him experts and

researchers interested in his country. No one, even among us, disputes Milroy's expertise in Iraqi affairs. In 1988, she decided to use her sabbatical year from Harvard University to come with an American grant to the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University. Segments of the study that she prepared in Israel on "The Connection Between the Arab-Israeli Conflict and Arab Politics," were published in articles which Milroy wrote for respected American newspapers. A hot detail from that period: Milroy rented an apartment in Ramat-Aviv, in the same building where former Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin resided.

The "Iraqi story" pertaining to Milroy, and the surprise that Mubarak prepared for Minister Moshe Shahal two years ago, when Mubarak invited Shahal to "hop over" to Iraq in his presidential plane (Shahal declined the offer, explaining that "they would not let me leave from there"), were disclosed a number of months ago in a detailed report in YEDI'OT AHARONOT. That report mentions Laurie Milroy's name and her trips between Washington, Baghdad, Saudi Arabia, and Jerusalem.

Some are now placing Professor Milroy in the same ranks with better known international liaisons, such as Professor Steve Cohen from New York University who conveyed Shim'on Peres' messages to King Husayn, capital magnate Armand Hammer, and others.

Were substantive messages entrusted to these intermediaries? How seriously have we and the Iraqis treated the conveyors of these messages? Avraham Tamir, who has been on dozens of secret trips in the Arab world said, "There are many eccentrics among these 'experts.' Some 'work' for one of the parties or for a third party. However, whoever comes to us tomorrow to say that he is traveling to meet with senior officials in Iraq will of course be told what we think about the other side, and will be asked to relate to us what the other side thinks of us."

Print Media War Against Saddam Examined

91AE0142A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
13 Nov 90 p 10

[Article by Shmu'el Shnitzer]

[Text] The war against Saddam Husayn is being conducted not in the sands of the Arabian desert but rather in newspaper editorial rooms. There the armchair, desktop strategists sit and plan the military courses of action through guesswork and prophecy.

Several dozen previous prophecies have turned out to be wrong, but that does not weaken the hands of these diligent experts, those who predicted that war would break out in the fall, after the dissipation of the scorching heat that makes wearing a gas mask torture. Now that we know that was not the reason for postponing the military actions, they have come up with a new target date: February 1991. They did some calculating and figured out that transporting the additional 150,000 troops that

the U.S. is sending to Saudi Arabia along with their heavy equipment will take from now until January. In 1991 the veteran American soldiers—those who were flown to Saudi Arabia in August, who now have been in the desert for seven months—will begin showing signs of weariness and sagging morale. President Bush will then have to decide whether to start a war or not.

It is also still unclear whether all the allies will agree to go to war. The large coalition against Saddam Husayn is not all that stable and decisive. They are constantly busy repairing tears and patching up cracks. It is unclear whether the Arab forces sent to Saudi Arabia are really prepared to fight against an Arab country. The Syrians cannot be relied upon since not all of their pronouncements have shown particular aggressiveness. It is not entirely certain whether the French will take part in the fighting. All the French hostages have been released. Was their release the result of a secret agreement between them and Iraq? And Gorbachev—will he support a war? He shows very little enthusiasm for one, even though he has agreed lately that there is no longer any hope of finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Clearly the Soviets will not participate in the battles. But will they at least agree to hold their peace in the event of an American war against Saddam Husayn?

The armchair, desktop strategists are not agreed on the question of what war has to be waged against Iraq. Will the objective be the liberation of Kuwait from the yoke of the Iraqi aggressor, or will the goal be the conquest of Iraq and the destruction of Saddam Husayn's military potential?

Some experts feel that because Iraq expects a big attack from the south, it would be desirable to immediately open a second front in the north, from the direction of Turkey. Others believe that in general there is no need to invade Iraq because Turkey could almost completely stop the flow of Iraqi water, both in the Tigris and the Euphrates; without water Iraq would not be able to hold out for even a few days.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, which provides this advice—that still requires Turkish agreement, of course—together with other pieces of advice intended to enlighten the American general staff, also raises the idea of not using ground forces at all, but rather of opening an air offensive to destroy the Iraqi air force and, afterward, Iraqi tanks and missiles, as well. A pretext could be found for such an offensive since it is reported that the allies do not recognize Iraqi control of the skies of Kuwait. Allied planes would fly over Kuwait and do battle with every Iraqi plane that tried to stop them. If Husayn were, indeed, to attack allied planes, that would be a signal for a general air attack against Iraqi air bases and missiles.

There is yet another piece of advice in that same issue of THE NEW YORK TIMES: perhaps conquer a slice of Iraqi territory that doesn't have a lot of troops and

propose a swap to Iraq: Return the conquered territory in exchange for a retreat from Kuwait.

The question is, of course, whether Iraq would agree to that kind of limited warfare in which the front would be chosen by her enemies, who would dictate its terms. The journalist experts do not bother to answer that question. But that is the big advantage of the analyst over the general. The latter must also take into account the less desirable possibilities. The analyst can conduct his imaginary war according to his own scenario. If it turns out wrong, nobody will hold a grudge against him.

A war that is left to the pages of a newspaper and not to the desert sands has unlimited possibilities. It always ends with the victory of the "good guys."

THE WASHINGTON POST has its own scenario. Where all the other experts conduct war without Israel, the POST imagines a war with Israel alone, without the grand coalition of Bush and Baker. Israel becomes annoyed that America does not put at its disposal enough information about what is going on and is unwilling to wait passively until the first Iraqi missile lands. According to the paper, Israel is likely to keep the first strike option open should the Iraqi threat be seen as real and perceptible.

The paper, true to the rule that journalists do not have to answer all questions, does not focus on the question of how coordination will be assured between all the large forces now concentrated against Iraq if any one of the elements in the area should decide on its own that the time had come to activate its forces. In any case it is not entirely clear how coordination will be assured between the forces, some of which do not know if and when they will want to act, and some of which will clearly try to avoid hostilities as much as they can.

Iraqi Threat Used as Excuse for Spending

91AE0117A Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
12 Oct 90 p 15

[Commentary by Gabi Nitzan]

[Excerpt] I have not yet received a notice about my gas mask. Nor am I likely to receive it in the near future, insofar as my address on my identification card is not up to date. In any case, even when the intelligence of the Civil Guard catches up with me, I will not be pushing to get in line to receive a mask. As far as I am concerned, they can outfit my dog, Bo'i [come] and my cat Zuzi first.

In principle, gas masks are not so terrible. If there is a little free space in the boyd'am [expansion unknown], there is no reason not to store a gas mask next to the cooler and the inflatable mattress. On the other hand, gas masks are not the most pressing item to have at home. Nor would they solve much in the event of a chemical attack, because their filters are adequate for several hours, but not for repeated bombings. However, that is not the problem. The problem is that the distribution of

gas masks in Israel is part of an enormous, well-oiled, sophisticated campaign that has been structured to faithfully serve several economic interests in whose profits I have no share.

Those among us with good memories are asked to recall when Iraq became one of the greatest military powers in the world. True, I was only a child (I was not even a subscriber to BAMAHA NE GADNA [In the Youth Battalions Camp]), however, as far as I can remember, throughout all of Israel's wars, Egypt was mentioned as having the strongest Arab army, followed by Syria, not Iraq. After Camp David, and after the impression developed that most of the Arab states were not seeking a war with Israel, it seems to me that mention was made of the name of a certain Mu'ammār al-Qadhafī, who had all sorts of dangerous weapons, was crazy, and on the verge of liquidating the world (beginning with Petah Tiqva). The name Saddam Husayn was not mentioned in this context. He was mentioned in the context of the Iran-Iraq War, a war that went on for years, in which there was nothing sophisticated. Children fought children with worn-out weapons that suffered from a serious shortage of ammunition and spare parts.

So when did Iraq become the third greatest military power in the world? When did Saddam Husayn come to hold the keys to the third world war? This occurred when he invaded Kuwait, and not one day before. Kuwait, from the standpoint of America and the Western countries, had a decisive role in moderating OPEC policy. In other words, Kuwait had a decisive role in maintaining the economy of the West, inasmuch as the Kuwaitis waged a rear guard war with Iraq in an effort to prevent an increase in oil prices which would cause a chain reaction in world industry and a hard shock to the Western economy. The Dow Jones Index could perhaps absorb such a shock, but it is not certain that George Bush could. Bush, it can be recalled, came to power after an election campaign aimed at the wealthy, under the slogan "read my lips—no additional taxes." Therefore, from George Bush's standpoint, a sharp increase in oil prices (such as the one demanded by Iraq) would, to a certain extent, be more serious than a war in the gulf, because a war in the gulf would not necessarily rob him of a second tenure. A steep increase in prices and taxes would damage him more.

Saddam Husayn, for his part, has been less troubled by Bush's economic considerations. He had troubles of his own: The war with Iran had greatly diminished his treasury, and even the increase in oil prices that he was demanding was not sufficient to reconstruct the destruction in Iraq. The occupation of Kuwait was an easy, natural solution in his view. Many Iraqis never become reconciled with the arbitrary separation of Kuwait from Iraq at the end of the mandate. As far as they are concerned, the border between the two states was a fiction (economic, so what), and the regime of the corrupt shaykhs of Kuwait was a [source of contention] for the poor Iraqis. Saddam Husayn would not need the third greatest army in the world to occupy Kuwait. Nor

would he need any especially exotic weapon. Iraq would have been able to occupy Kuwait within 24 hours using iron implements alone.

However, Husayn did not act wisely, to put it delicately (in any case, "Alibi [the name of this column]" will not be the provocation to agitate Saddam). If he had continued to pressure Kuwait, he would have obtained an increase in oil prices as well as what he calls "monetary compensation" from Kuwait (he demanded \$2 billion, and the shaykhs had already agreed to a \$1 billion). However, due to chronic insensitivity, he landed like a roach on America's cream cake. Kuwait represented American interests. A large portion of the local shaykhs' wealth is in the United States, in the form of billions of dollars in investments and bank accounts.

Saddam Husayn consequently became the most dangerous man in the world. True, he apparently has non-conventional weapons. However, he is in very good company in this regard. If al-Asad had invaded Kuwait, he would have become the new Hitler. If Qadhafī had invaded Kuwait, he would have been marked as [leading] the most dangerous military power in the region. If, by contrast, Australia had invaded New Zealand, it would have been recorded as a diary note, because New Zealand has nothing to sell to the West.

Due to the tradition of presidents who love golf, America cannot present its enormous military maneuvers in the gulf as a Bank of America operation, even if that is clear to everyone. Therefore, Saddam must be transformed into the devil's messenger on Earth, which is not so difficult, just as it was not difficult to transform any other ruler in the region into the incarnation of evil (at least in the eyes of the West).

Until now, it has remained unclear how we fit into the picture. Apparently, we could sit quietly and observe developments from the sidelines. What is there? Even such lovers of an emergency as ourselves can rest for a week or two without pushing ourselves into the eye of the storm. As far as we are concerned, on the face of it, Iraq does not currently constitute any greater threat than it did in the past. Saddam Husayn has always declared that he will be free to liquidate the state of Israel immediately after the holidays, and we have always known that his weapons would be disqualified disdainfully in any self-respecting golf club (even though conventional weapons are much more dangerous than chemical or biologic weapons, according to what is known to date). Moreover, we are now the least of Saddam's worries. In addition, we have deserved to see the day when America sits with a large army in the Saudi desert that separates us.

However, we too have economic interests. Even before Iraq's invasion of Washington's safe, there was serious concern in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] over a completely different matter: The massive immigration from Russia has been depicted clearly here as a supreme, national budgetary priority. A million Jews, prisoners of

Zion, have been released, and because it did not occur to America—because of economic considerations—to allow them to enter its gates, a million Jews from Russia will arrive to their second choice, Israel. It has been made clear to all of them that this moving, historical, turning point will be translated well in the Finance Ministry's account books, and that it will become a primary budgetary objective.

This was not to the IDF's liking. The Defense Ministry forgot long ago that there could at all be a debate over the question of where most of the national budget would be swallowed. So far there has been a consensus in this regard, by virtue of wars of choice and not so badly synchronized wars [as published] for which there was no alternative. However, now, when more and more people have found themselves pushed at an amazing speed into the tent camps of the homeless, cracks have suddenly appeared in this consensus. Also, close to three years of the intifadah—which has finally proven that as strong as the Army might be, it does not constitute a solution by itself—helped to undermine the defense budget's immunity to cuts.

Against this background, it is clear why Saddam Husayn deserves a mark of gratitude from the Defense Ministry accountant. There is nothing new here. As a rule, to the extent that the defense-military system becomes inflated, it needs more enemies to justify its existence and to successfully continue to maintain the mechanism. Until a certain stage, the system can be satisfied with true enemies, if those enemies are sufficiently active. However, as the system becomes more inflated (by virtue of the same enemies), it becomes more immune to the old dangers. At a certain stage, it needs imaginary enemies to argue convincingly that it still requires every penny in its enormous budget.

Saddam Husayn is of course not entirely an imaginary enemy. However, he is very far from endangering the existence of the state of Israel. From a purely military standpoint, Syria—we will assume—is a much more concrete danger. However, it is currently difficult to sell Syria as an enemy in order to justify not cutting or not inflating the defense budget. Saddam Husayn, by contrast, is really a Miss Lucy. He sells himself. He is arrogant, Levantine, kidnaps children, and curses America. Even his weapons are a wonderful advertising gimmick.

The heads of the security system are well aware that if there is any real reason at all to be concerned about Saddam, it lies not in his chemical weapons but precisely in his conventional weapons. However, conventional weapons are not penetrating into the oppressed consciousness of the Israeli public. Chemical weapons, by contrast, are a wonderful media item. There is nothing more photogenic than children training to use gas masks. Until every old lady in Yoqne'am has a mask at home to protect her from Iraqi mustard gas, no one will dare touch the defense budget.

Further, it is possible to prevent the planned cut by virtue of Saddam. What do you know! It is even possible to create a public atmosphere that will require a special addition to the budget! Let the immigrants from Russia suffer grievously. Our military system is preoccupied with activating an emergency regime, also known by the good old nickname of "panic free." There is nothing more convincing than some major general or some IDF spokesman with blue eyes and a bold shock of hair asking the public to behave with national responsibility and not to become panicked, accompanied by the mass distribution of monstrous masks to every house in Israel, and some other secret action that is kept quiet, even though half the state knows about it (and tells only its neighbors, which are the other half). With great secrecy, everyone returns home on their secret leaves from their secret reserve duty, and recount, in whispers, the rigorous preparations for the great "stink." The last authorized date which I heard (a regular soldier related it very confidentially to someone who related it to me very confidentially) [was] 14 October, and the target city for the bombing [was] Haifa. On the other hand, I also heard that Beersheva would be the target at the end of November. Within a week, every man and woman was going around with our urban date in one hand and a gleaming rubber mask in the other. We will see who will be so bold as to turn off the faucets of the Defense Ministry. Of course, there is some danger in this building up of Saddam Husayn from all directions, inasmuch as he might become convinced that he is indeed truly that great. However, this is not such a terrible danger. The White House is not within range of his mustard gas, and a war would only prove to American voters that Bush was right when he said that Saddam was dangerous. Nor is the IDF in danger. With American backing (and very likely without it) this would not end any worse than the Yom Kippur War at most. Subsequently, there would be a need for a special addition to the Defense budget. [passage omitted]

Temple Mount Shaykh, Muhammad al-Jamal, Profiled

91AE0099A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 19 Oct 90 pp 6-7, 9

[Article by Roni Shaqad]

[Text] Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal is the one who inflamed the masses on the day of the bloody incident on the Temple Mount. He is red-headed and has the nature of a red-headed person. He erupts easily and is admired by the shabab [youth of the intifadah]. At 57, he has succeeded in maneuvering himself into the upper echelon of the Muslim hierarchy in the territories. He is the deputy mufti of Jerusalem, the most powerful person on the Temple Mount. He has six children, a high standard of living, and a comfortable house. His only failure is his eldest son.

"Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, come defend the Temple Mount, the Jews are coming." That excited shout, heard

over all of the loudspeakers on the Temple Mount, echoed throughout the old city. Merchants in the alleyways hurried to close their shops. People sitting in coffee houses stopped smoking their narghiles and playing backgammon. Others, who were in their homes, locked their doors. They recognized the voice of Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal and hastened toward the Temple Mount.

The police claim that Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal incited the masses to throw rocks on worshippers at the Western Wall. The police claim that his calls inflamed the masses and caused the most serious bloody incident since 1967. This time, the police decided that Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal had crossed the red line. In less than 24 hours, police from the minorities' section of the Jerusalem police region were knocking on the door of his house in the al-Tur neighborhood. The shaykh opened the door, dressed in civilian clothing. "We request that you come with us for questioning," one of the detectives said. "Please," responded the shaykh, "just give me some time to get dressed." Several minutes later the shaykh emerged, dressed in his clerical clothes (a robe and a white turban with a red skull cap in the center of it), and got into the police van. Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal is perhaps the most well-known personality on the Temple Mount. It is easy to identify him, inasmuch as he stands out among Arab personalities. He is red-headed and has the nature of a red-headed person. Because of the color of his hair, he has been nicknamed the red shaykh.

"He becomes excited very quickly. One word suffices for him to take off. When he becomes excited, his face reddens. He then stands on a rock or on a high place so that he can be seen, as he waves his hands and fervently delivers his remarks. It is no wonder that he is admired by the shabab," states an employee of the Religious Endowment [waqf].

Shaykh al-Jamal (his full name is Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal al-Rifa'i) was born in Tulkarm 57 years ago. Upon finishing high school, he continued his studies in the religious college in Amman. He later completed advanced studies in Islamic law in Damascus. When he returned to the West Bank, he was appointed to the registrar of the religious court in Bethlehem. He was then transferred to a similar position in Ramallah, and subsequently served as the secretary of the court in Jericho for a long time. His success in that position, together with his accumulated experience, resulted in his appointment to be in charge of all religious court registrars in the territories.

His appointment as a religious court judge in Jericho occurred more than ten years ago. That position brought him close to the Religious Endowment institutions administration on the Temple Mount. As a pious Muslim, he was careful to pray every Friday in the al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount. It was important to him to be seen among the worshippers, to stand out, and to accumulate power. Gradually, he moved to the

front line of worshippers, which is reserved for leaders of the religious public and notables. From time to time he was honored by an ascension to the preacher's rostrum to deliver a sermon.

When the intifadah broke out, the Religious Endowment and the institutions of the Temple Mount were completely under Jordanian control. The shaykhs' activity was subject to control and supervision, and the Friday sermons were censored. At the same time, the shaykhs were under pressure to identify with Palestinian nationalism, in addition to pressure exerted by Muslim believers loyal to the PLO. On one Friday, Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal delivered a sermon critical of Jordanian control. The response was not long in coming. He was dismissed from his position in Jericho and transferred to Jerusalem to serve as the secretary of the Mufti, Shaykh Sa'd-al-Din al-'Alami.

The red shaykh could not hope for better punishment than this, which parachuted him into the Temple Mount, the center of action. He quickly learned the secrets of politics. One of his first initiatives was to reconcile with Jordan. After all, the budget, including salaries, originates in Jordan. Because of his position, he frequently traveled to Amman for meetings with the minister of religious endowments. He expanded his contacts and succeeded in entering the circle of close friends of King Hasan, the Jordanian crown prince.

Friendship with the leaders of the Jordanian regime paid off. Six years ago, Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal was appointed deputy mufti Jerusalem, with responsibility for supervising the religious courts in the territories. In recent years, he was also appointed chairman of the al-Aqsa Mosque building committee. These positions transformed him into the second highest person in the Muslim religious hierarchy in the territories.

Each day, at 7:30 a.m. exactly, the car of the shaykh's son stops at the Damascus Gate to the old city. The shaykh gets out and slowly walks toward the Temple Mount. On his way, he customarily converses with passersby, attempting to absorb the mood of the street. At exactly 2:00 p.m., he makes his way back. His son is already waiting for him, and together they travel to their home in the neighborhood of al-Tur, on the heights of the Mount of Olives.

Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal likes his house and his family. He resides with his wife, four of his five sons, and his daughter. He knows how to pamper them. The Shaykh is considered a Jordanian official, and as a senior official, his salary approaches 1,000 dinars (about 3,000 shekels) [per month]. However, he makes the bulk of his money from monetary gifts given to him for performing religious ceremonies, such as marriages, divorces, and other registrations connected to the Religious Endowment. Incidentally, these funds also flowed into his account when he held his previous positions. His house is considered an open house. Many residents of the city visit him in the evening. During the fast of Ramadan, he

is punctilious about providing a meal for the poor every night. He is aware of the power of the media. He cooperates with it willingly. Shaykh al-Jamal speaks English fluently. Consequently, he has become the Religious Endowment's public relations person vis-a-vis the world. He is an animated person who comes across well on the television screen; the international media is a welcome guest in his home. His rivals are willing to swear that they have seen him in the American consulate several times, and that they have seen consulate personnel at his home on several occasions, in an attempt to hint that the Shaykh is a collaborator with the CIA. However, that has not been confirmed by another source.

Shaykh al-Jamal is involved in extensive missionary activity. His sons relate that he has brought about 300 men and women, mostly Europeans and Americans, into the fold of Islam. Before the intifadah, Muslims who had returned to religion resided permanently in the bottom floor of his house. The shaykh supported them while they studied, and he helped them obtain work after their Islamicization was complete. "Since the start of the intifadah," states his daughter, 'A'ishah, 24, a nurse in the Augusta Victoria Hospital, "only one woman has lived with us, a 60-year-old from Canada. The others are afraid. They do not come."

His son Ja'far, 25, who works in the religious court in Jerusalem, speaks Hebrew fluently. He studied the language in high school and subsequently in private courses. He states: "Father encourages all of my brothers to study Hebrew. He is not an extremist. He is certainly not a fundamentalist. Even regarding matters of education, he did not pressure us. He allowed each of his five sons to choose his own lifestyle. For him, education is the most important thing."

Only with regard to the education of his eldest son, Mahmud, 27, has the shaykh failed. Mahmud completed his studies in the religious college on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. However, he was not inclined toward religious affairs, but rather to business and the good life. He used to spend his free time in West Jerusalem, becoming known for his many Jewish girlfriends. About three years ago, he opened a car insurance office with an Israeli girl from Jerusalem and became involved in fraud. When the police raided the office, they found forged forms of other insurance companies and the stamps of Bank Hapo'alim and Bank Le'umi.

The court sentenced him to two and a half years imprisonment. When he was released from prison several months ago, the shaykh decided that it would be best for his son to begin his life anew in a distant place, and he sent him to study law in the United States.

The intifadah has transformed the shaykh into a real leader. His arrest last week only strengthened his status. His image on the television screen, dressed in clerical garb, in the police courtyard in Jerusalem's Russian

Quarter, as he was being transported for extended detention, angered Muslims in the territories. "The Israeli police does not know how to honor clerics. They treat him like a criminal," stated one of the heads of the Religious Endowment in east Jerusalem. In a calmer tone, he said: "You are lucky that the shaykh does not belong to the Hamas [Islamic Resistance] Organization or the Islamic Jihad, otherwise many riots would develop around his arrest."

Theoretically, Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal is the mufti's deputy. In actuality, he is much more than that. Since the mufti is elderly (82), has heart disease, and has been bedridden for many days, Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal is the most powerful person in the Temple Mount courtyard. Every letter, appeal, or request directed to the Mufti passes across his desk. He has learned to be faithful to the Mufti and to gain his complete trust. In the Religious Endowment offices in Jerusalem, there is an awareness of his power and authority: "Control of Temple Mount affairs is actually in his hands. He has overshadowed the other shaykhs, even though they include persons with greater stature as legal scholars and teachers. He has managed to become acceptable to everyone—Jordan, the Palestinians, the PLO, even Israel."

Nevertheless, members of the Religious Endowment on the Temple Mount assume that Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal will not be the next mufti. It is said in there that "he is suited to serve as number two, to implement the orders of someone else. Others are greater theologians or legal scholars. His power stems from his status as the mufti's deputy and his ability to always be in the right place."

The Friday sermon precedes the prayer service and is an integral part of worship in Islam. It lasts for 20 to 40 minutes, whereas the prayer following it lasts no more than ten minutes. In the days of Muhammad the Prophet, the preacher's duty was to lead the community of believers. A preacher in the Muslim world is not only a teacher of the law, he is also a national guide. He must be rooted in political and mundane problems. The sermon has the power to incite and to arouse, but also to calm and restrain.

"Islam is not similar to other religions," explains Shaykh al-Jamal in a conversation which I had with him at the beginning of the intifadah. "Islam is a part of daily life, which includes politics. The Imam must instruct the worshippers regarding all areas of life. The mosque is the place where the Muslim receives guidance. A Muslim has the right to express his political opinion, even inside a mosque."

As a preacher, Shaykh al-Jamal is loved by the shabab. He frequently shouts, raises his voice, makes hostile, inimical remarks against Jews, settlers, and the occupation, and censures the United States and the West. However, he especially likes to speak about Temple Mount affairs. He listens to what is happening on the

street, reads many newspapers, and knows how to analyze events and inflame the young people.

There are five permanent preachers on the Temple Mount. Two of them, Shaykh Bitawi from Nabulus and Shaykh Sulayman Muwahhidah from Gaza, are known as members of Hamas. Two others, Shaykh Sabri 'Akramah and Shaykh Muhammad Husayn, are known supporters of the PLO. It is said that Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal always lines up with the strongest side.

Before the intifadah, Shaykh al-Jamal used to frequently visit police posts on the Temple Mount. He would converse with policemen and the commander of the post, receive guests of honor, and give them personally-guided tours. The intifadah of course changed his behavior. Now, he is afraid to appear together with police officers and municipal officials.

In the Jerusalem police, they recall two incidents involving the shaykh. He emerged unscathed from both of them. About three years ago, he was summoned for questioning after he delivered a particularly venomous sermon. Softly and calmly, Shaykh al-Jamal explained to the police: "They pressured me to make these remarks. In my position, I was obliged to do so. There was no intent to incite. Believe me, I know how to calm the masses. Aside from that, the remarks I made are anchored in the religion of Islam." Five years ago, on the day commemorating the incidents at Sabra and Shatila, the heads of the Religious Endowment asked the police for permission to demonstrate (the heads of the Religious Endowment at that time still used to inform the police in advance of any unusual demonstrations on the Temple Mount). Shaykh al-Jamal convinced the police that the demonstration would be non-violent: "We will circle the Dome of the Rock twice, chant several slogans, allow the television cameras to photograph us, and, later, I will see to it that the demonstration disperses quietly. The demonstration will be held even if approval is not given. However, it is preferable that it take place with police approval."

At the end of the negotiations, it was agreed to grant him a license, provided that flags and fliers not be carried in the demonstration. On the day of the demonstration, Shaykh al-Jamal walked in front. He declared trenchant slogans and inflamed the youths. After the demonstrators had circled the Dome of the Rock Mosque two and a half times, the police started feeling pressured. The shaykh marched the demonstrators toward a corner of the Temple Mount and delivered a lengthy sermon to them there, after which the demonstrators dispersed quietly. Later, when the police asked him why he was more extremist than everyone else, he responded: "If I was not, they would not have listened to me, and no one would have dispersed as I requested."

The al-Aqsa Mosque is the source of his power and thus the center of his life. Gershon Slomon and the Temple Mount Faithful are like a muleta. During conversations held with him in recent years, he always spoke of the

disaster likely to be caused by Slomon and his people. He is not afraid to confront them or the police, even if that were to entail physical confrontation. Whenever the Temple Mount Faithful have attempted to go up onto the Temple Mount, they found the shaykh leading the demonstrators and inciting his people.

Last week, when the shaykh was brought before the judge for the extension of his detention, he requested the right to speak: "I am placing all blame for the massacre on the government of Israel, which gave a free hand to Slomon to play with security and peace.... The Muslims came on Monday to the Mosque to defend themselves against this man. He was there next to the Mograbis' Gate. His presence caused the incident. I request that Slomon be summoned by the court and tried by the state."

According to senior officials in the security system who have monitored activity on the Temple Mount in recent years state, "Shaykh al-Jamal knows how to play a double and triple game. He is like a Russian doll. You remove one doll to find another within it. He tells the Israelis that he is a moderate. He tells the Jordanians that he has placed all his trust in them. Since the decline of Jordan's power, he has slid toward the PLO. He can always be found in the field with a megaphone in hand leading young demonstrators. This man certainly dances to several tunes." On the day of the bloody Temple Mount incident, after quiet had returned to the Temple Mount, Shaykh al-Jamal was still in the enclosure of the al-Aqsa Mosque. He circulated back and forth between the mosques, gauging the yard. He later reported to the mufti, the heads of the Muslim Council, and to the Religious Endowment. At 4:00, contrary to his custom, he returned to his house on foot. His son, Ja'far related that "father arrived tired and sad. He said that he did not think that the catastrophe would be so great." In the evening," relates his daughter 'A'ishah, "he sat in front of the television set and watched the news in Arabic. He then watched the MABAT [Hebrew] news edition. He sat quietly."

On Wednesday morning, the police knocked on the door of Shaykh al-Jamal's house and asked him to accompany them for an investigation. At approximately 11:00 on the same day, the Jerusalem police called his family to inform it of its decision to arrest al-Jamal. The police were certain that he had incited the unruly mass.

[Box on page 9]

'The Temple Was Not on the Temple Mount'

About two years ago I spoke at length with the shaykh about Temple Mount affairs, Jerusalem, and the intifadah. He spoke using the tone of a teacher seeking to convince in a pleasant manner. He attempted to soften his hard remarks with a quiet, calm delivery:

"We will not allow the Jews to worship on the Temple Mount. We will defend the holy mosques with our lives. Every religion has its place of worship, and the mosques are ours, the Muslims, exclusively. If a Jew wishes to

visit the mosques as a tourist, we will welcome him. However, if he comes for another purpose, we will send him away.

Jerusalem is ours. We welcome members of all religions, Jews and Christians, if they wish to perform a ritual in the city. We are prepared to defend freedom of ritual in the city. We oppose any violence in this city. However, it should be remembered that this city is Muslim.

The mosques are an inseparable part of the land of Palestine. It is therefore natural that the intifadah should enter them and the Temple Mount.

The Temple of the Jews was not on the Temple Mount, but on Mount Zion, next to the tomb of King David. I toured the area and the archaeological excavations outside the Temple Mount wall, and I saw only Muslim remains. You are looking for the Temple there, but it was not there."

Temple Mount Faithful Movement Examined

91AE0150E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
2 Nov 90 pp 16-19

[Interview with and profile of members of the Temple Mount Faithful Committee by Iris Milner; place and date not given]

[Text] As he grasps in his hand the fresh report of the Zamir Commission, as an inexhaustible source of quotations that support his succession of claims, Yo'av Sha'uli, 18, youth coordinator of the Temple Mount Faithful Committee, summarized for me his movement's response to the incidents on the mount: "We are very sorry that this cost human lives. However, despite all the sorrow and pain, it was a catalyst. The Temple Mount has risen to the public and international agenda."

The catalyst in this context is the "Water Drawing Festival March" to the Shiloah Spring [from which water was drawn for libations on the Feast of Tabernacles]. The Faithful held the march on the morning of 8 October, the day of the bloody events in Jerusalem. The march would have continued to the Temple Mount had it not been for the pressure of the stormy events. Marches of this type are routine, especially during holidays and days historically related to the Temple ritual. The Committee, established immediately after the Six Day War, has, since 1967, opposed the government's policy, according to which the Islamic establishment—the Waqf [Muslim institution responsible for property placed in a religious trust] and the Supreme Muslim Council—are in charge of maintaining the sites holy to Islam on the Temple Mount. According to this policy, Jews are prohibited from praying on the Temple Mount, and they may enter it only as visitors. The Temple Mount Faithful Committee has fought against this policy consistently for 23 years. The Committee's declared, long-term goal is to re-establish the Temple on the mount. According to the Committee's plan, the first stage in realizing this dream entails removing control

over the Temple Mount from the Waqf, permitting Jews to pray there, and establishing a house of worship there. In the meantime, until its demands are met and construction begins, the Committee holds symbolic activities. It ascends to the Temple Mount in the tradition of the pilgrimage in the days of the Second Temple and holds cornerstone laying ceremonies for a new Temple. On the Feast of Tabernacles a year ago, such a ceremony was held in the village of Silwan next to the Shiloah tunnel. This year, like last year, the police rejected the Committee's request to hold the cornerstone laying ceremony on the actual Temple Mount, and the faithful had to again be satisfied with a march to the village of Shiloah. This year, unlike previous years, the Muslims' response was particularly stormy, ending in what has been designated the Temple Mount incidents.

Yo'av Sha'uli is a member of the movement's leadership group. This week, a day after the publication of the Zamir report, which deals with the incidents, I met with Sha'uli and six other active members. All of them seemed to be in a good mood and, like their young colleague, satisfied with the events of the past month. The bloody incident on the Temple Mount on the seventh day of the Feast of Tabernacles, the wave of revenge acts that followed it, and the condemnation in the United Nations are indeed grievous facts. However, in and of themselves, they are no more than decisive proof of their thesis that the true battle for the revival of the people of Israel on its land will be over the Temple Mount.

There are certain similar, noncoincidental details that typify the biographies of the seven members of the leadership with whom I met and seven other members of the movement's secretariat who were not present at the meeting: All of them have a clear political affiliation (though not all are official members of parties). According to a young member of the group, Avishai Raviv, they thus represent "the extremities of the political spectrum," i.e., Likud, Tehiya, Tzomet, and Moledet [which are all right-wing parties]. When asked about the presence of members of the other ends of the spectrum, Raviv responds: "That is the entire spectrum, it does not have other extremities."

Thousands of members are currently registered in the Committee according to its representatives. However, the secretariat, considered the group's leadership body, has only 15 members, though anyone wishing to be included in it is invited to join without having to be elected. Sha'uli, who reached a respectable position in the leadership team at 18, terms this openness "growing leadership." This "growing leadership," it should be said, usually displays a low profile in the shadow of its one and only leader, Gershon Solomon. The group is composed, based on the sample I met, of representatives of the youth movement and persons who have reached retirement age. We first spoke about the results of their recent attempt on the Feast of Tabernacles to again lay the cornerstone for [rebuilding] the Temple (such a ceremony was already held, as stated, last year, but

because of its symbolic nature, the group saw no reason not to repeat it). They then discussed the connection between the march to the Temple Mount, cut off at the start because of the disturbances, and subsequent events. My interlocutors frequently consulted the Zamir Commission's report, leafing through it forward and backward. Because it had just been published, they had not yet memorized it, nor marked the passages which they considered important, i.e., those determining that members of the Waqf caused the incident. They enthusiastically approved of all of the commission's conclusions. However, they were disappointed with the commission's refusal of their offer to meet with them. The commission did however read a detailed memorandum which they sent to it.

Nonetheless, something in the report does not sit well with them. On the one hand, they are pleased to read that they are not blamed for what happened. In this regard, Penina Pel'i, a veteran activist, determines that "whoever says that we are the provocateurs is himself a provocateur." Gershon Solomon fills in after her in a somewhat more explanatory tone, stating that "whoever believes that the Jewish aspiration to become connected again with the religious and spiritual center is a provocation, is saying something very stupid and terribly dangerous." On the other hand, it is difficult for members of the group to disagree with the argument put forward by former Jerusalem Deputy Mayor Aharon Sarig, which I repeated to them. Sarig maintains that the Muslims take seriously, and fear, the group's intentions to seize control of the Temple Mount.

"Rightly!" Pel'i hastens to declare. "Let them be afraid!" Regarding anyone who might mistakenly assume that the group prefers to disassociate itself from the events of the 8 October, young Sha'uli clarifies the unequivocal position of the leadership (which "is very preoccupied at present with the incident and its aftermath"): "We think that there is a connection between our activity and the incidents, because our desire to lay the cornerstone for building the Temple symbolizes the Jews' desire to live in the old city."

There is an awareness in the Jerusalem municipality of the connection between demonstrative acts performed by different bodies and the disturbances and riots in east Jerusalem. [Jerusalem Mayor] Teddy Kollek mentioned the prime minister's declaration regarding the establishment of a new Jewish neighborhood in the eastern part of the city as one of the accelerating factors that led to the riots. According to Aharon Sarig, who left the municipality but continues to provide Teddy Kollek with consulting services regarding east Jerusalem affairs, the demonstrative activity of the different Jewish movements to promote Temple Mount affairs is directly related, in the view of Muslims, to the government's policy. Minister Ari'el Sharon's entrance to the Muslim quarter [to establish a residence there], the seizure of buildings next to the Temple Mount, holiday processions

[by persons dressed] in priestly garb, with shofars [ram's horns sounded on some religious occasions], and musical instruments, are all related.

The municipality is attempting to prevent conflagrations. Sarig: "These (extremist organizations) generate each morning's news and various provocations. The municipality then rushes to send its representatives to calm tempers and reiterate that, this time as well, the status quo will not be disrupted and, in particular, that the provocation is not a government-initiated act."

During the same evening in which I met with the seven leading members of the Temple Mount Faithful, two representatives of the municipality, Amir Hashin and Moshe 'Amirav, met in Jerusalem with two Palestinian journalists, Hanna Seniora and Da'ud Khuttab, to discuss the situation that developed after the events of 8 October. Among other things, Hashin, the mayor's advisor on Arab affairs, detailed the attempts made by municipal officials on the morning of the day of the incident to convince the Supreme Muslim Council that the procession of the "Faithful" would not reach the mount.

However, the Muslims, Aharon Sarig told me, did not buy these explanations, especially inasmuch as, to the best of his recollection, not once in the past, not even following the recent events, has a governmental element unequivocally disassociated the government from the activities of the Temple Mount Faithful and their colleagues. On the contrary. Similar bodies, such as the 'Ateret Kohanim Yeshiva, which are concerned, among other things, with preparing priests to serve in the Third Temple and seizing property in the environs of the Temple Mount, receive governmental support and money.

Now that Jerusalem is on the public and international agenda (which clearly satisfies the desire of the Committee's "mother parties"), the Committee's urgent mission is not to relent. In its last meeting, the Committee's secretariat started to prepare for the next event, a torch race on the festival of Hanukkah, and information activities. The working plan for the coming weeks includes lectures in the schools. Solomon will lecture at the Merkaz Shapira state religious school, at the invitation of the school's administration of course. The topic will be the Temple Mount and its importance in the life of the Jewish people.

The following are the main points of the thesis that he will probably present to the students (not propaganda according to Solomon, but historical information): The Temple Mount is a symbol of the revival of the Jewish people in its homeland, it is the main stage of Jewish history, and is charged with great accumulations of faith, ethics, history, and monotheism. By contrast, the Temple Mount, the Mosque of 'Umar, and the al-Aqsa Mosque, according to Solomon, have no religious significance for Muslims (reminder: The mosques were built at the end of the seventh century where, according to

Muslim belief, Muhammad ascended heavenward). The Muslims are struggling to control the Temple Mount, because they know that, for Jews, it symbolizes their full control of the entire land of Israel. The Muslims know that as long as they continue to hold onto it, they will not despair of their ambition to remove the Jewish people from its homeland. The Temple Mount is a basic, vital interest of the state of Israel's welfare and security.

[Milner] What is your opinion on the "political wisdom" of Moshe Dayan, who decided in 1967 not to transform the Arab-Israeli conflict into a religious conflict, and to behave with excessive sensitivity regarding Muslims' religious sentiments?

'Eli Arbel, a member of the secretariat says: "It is not political wisdom but stupidity, and we are paying a dear price for it."

[Milner] Is the people of Israel not paying a dear price for your provocative actions?

[Arbel] If our activities are viewed as a provocation, every Zionist enterprise should be treated as a provocation. The Temple Mount is a symbol. Conceding the temple is conceding the entire land of Israel.

[Milner] Is a "symbol" worth so much bloodshed?

On this point, it emerges that "bloodshed" is a sensitive point. The Committee is careful to maintain the image of a group that upholds law and order. The group requests a permit from the police for each demonstration that it wishes to hold. It does nothing without police approval. It wages its battles in the courts and the Supreme Court. In general, it treats authorities with respect: "Relations between us and the police are wonderful. We treat the police and uniformed personnel with respect and esteem." As stated above, Sha'ul qualified his satisfaction with the recent events by expressing sorrow over the bloodshed.

The question of the bloody price of the "symbol" therefore arouses differences of opinion. Penina Pel'i, a veteran member of the Committee, responds with the following, somewhat contradictory monologue: "I do not think that the land of Israel or even Jerusalem are worth shedding the blood of one Israeli. I lost my cousin in the Six Day War in the battle for Jerusalem. I would be willing to accept half of Jerusalem so that he would not have had to fall in battle. I would not give him up for Jerusalem."

[Milner] Are you willing to concede the mount and Judaea and Samaria in exchange for a promise that there would be peace and no bloodshed?

[Pel'i] No, because [King] Husayn [of Jordan] imposed a war on us. We have maintained a low profile regarding our demand that Jerusalem be the capital of Israel. Our demands are minimal. We want only to go up there to pray. We are not even permitted that.

[Milner] Why, in your opinion, is there opposition to this small demand?

[Pel'i] Because there is pressure throughout the world for the Jews not to go up to the Temple Mount. The Christian world is even more afraid than the Arabs. If the people of Israel goes up onto the Temple Mount, that is the greatest blow to the existence of Christianity. The Vatican and the Waqf are preventing the Jews from controlling the Temple Mount.

[Milner] Do they have such strong influence over the free world?

[Pel'i] There is no free world. There is only a religious world. The entire West is Catholic imperialism and Muslim imperialism. The entire world is waging the inheritance war of the brothers in the Bible against us.

[Milner] Is there Catholic imperialism in the United States as well?

[Pel'i] Certainly. The United States—this is also imperialism.

'Eli Arbel, regarding the same bloodshed issue comments: "Everything is wisdom after the fact. If you ask me hypothetically whether we would have perhaps conceded the cornerstone laying ceremony procession had we known that there would be bloodshed, I would say that we would have perhaps conceded it. Blood does not grease the wheels of our idea. I emphasize that such a concession would not be a concession of our entire idea, but only the concession of a certain ceremony on the Feast of Tabernacles. However, we did not know in advance that there would be bloodshed. On the contrary, we concluded with the police that they would do everything to prevent such an outcome. We were convinced that they would act to do so, but they did not. We had more reasonable grounds to assume that the police would handle the situation."

[Milner] But that is playing with fire, is it not? Did you know of the chance of bloodshed, but hoped that someone would prevent it?

Here, Gershon Solomon interjected: "There is no need for victims. Authority is in the hands of the government, and it is possible to introduce order without victims."

[Milner] What does "introduce order" mean?

[Solomon] To purge Jerusalem of Arabs, to remove them from houses and from the Temple Mount.

[Milner] Without bloodshed?

[Solomon] Without [bloodshed]. It is necessary to purchase the old city from them with money. They will sell. Perhaps not the Temple Mount. The Temple Mount would have to be confiscated.

[Milner] Would that not disregard Muslim religious sentiments and arouse the entire world of Muslim religious extremism?

[Solomon] Why should I respect religious sentiments that do not exist? As far as they are concerned, this is not a religious struggle, but a political struggle for the soul of the land of Israel. They are only exploiting religious arguments. Pel'i's position differs from that of Solomon: "On the contrary. They are exploiting politics for a religious struggle. Religion is the great force inundating the world. There is no oil, there is no money, there is only religion."

[Milner] But you also said earlier that your struggle is political. Is your struggle religious or political?

[Solomon] It is impossible for us to distinguish between politics and religion.

[Milner] Is all of this preoccupation with the Temple Mount and ritual contrary to the spirit of Judaism?

[Arbel] Maimonides [a major theologian of Judaism, d. 1204] said that not every Jew is Abraham our patriarch. I maintain that not every Jew is a Liebowitz [a major contemporary Orthodox thinker]. It is impossible to expect everyone to be able to think and feel abstractly. We want to re-establish the thing that holds the people, all the layers, together.

Aside from the bloodshed issue, another issue that is sensitive for the Temple Mount Faithful is the manner in which the movement is financed. Activities to promote the [Jewish] status of the Temple Mount cost money, and considerable sums are involved. According to the press, the silver menorah [candelabrum that is a facet of Temple ritual] made by one of the bodies preparing to rebuild the Temple costs \$50,000. It has previously been reported in the press that the Temple Mount Faithful organization is financially linked to Christian fundamentalist movements in the United States. In an investigative report by 'Amos Eylon (HA'ARETZ, October 1983), it was reported that such support was provided by Christian movements that view themselves as being related to Judaism. The construction of the Temple, in their view, is likely to advance the coming of Jesus and lead all of the Jews into the bosom of Christianity. They also argue that the Temple Mount is holy to them as well, because Jesus was tempted there. According to 'Amos Eylon, the liaison with these movements regarding financial affairs was Stanley Goldfut [as published], an Israeli businessman close to Tehiya. Goldfut established the "Jerusalem Temple Fund" in 1983, which apparently received financial aid from fundamentalists in America. A circular that was distributed in American churches explained to believers that Goldfut's Temple Fund had united with the Temple Mount Faithful in a joint project to plan and build the Third Temple. The circular invited them to send contributions and gifts.

Gershon Solomon denies any financial link with Christian groups. "First of all, the menorah did not cost \$50,000, but only \$12,000. Second, we were not the ones who built it, but the 'Temple Institute,' a completely different body with which we are not connected. Another company belonging to the Albuyam [as published]

family produces holy vessels [used in Temple worship] for us. Aside from that, we are a poor organization that does not even receive governmental support, and that collects, shekel by shekel, a few contributions in Israel and from rich Jews abroad.

[Milner] Do they cooperate with organizations whose goal is to promote the status of the Temple Mount?

[Solomon] The goal is one, but each organization attacks a different front. There is no organizational or financial cooperation between us.

[Milner] Was not Stanley Goldfut an activist in the Committee, and did he not use his financial connections with Christian movements to your advantage?

Solomon claims that Goldfut was not a member, but only a "marginal element." In this context, it should be recalled that there are declared supporters of Solomon in the Jewish religious establishment. Solomon also has good friends in right-wing parties (he was included as a desirable, respected member of a group of Knesset members, including Shilinski, Ge'ula Kohen, Yuval Ne'eman, and others, who visited the Temple Mount in January 1986, provoking, as the reader may recall, an angry reaction and riots).

Also, Solomon now has a public throughout the world. He maintains that, in the weeks following the Temple Mount incident, he has spent many hours in front of the television cameras of more than a few foreign stations. The gentiles finally want to hear about the Committee. Regarding the Christians and their relation to the Temple Mount, he hastens to correct an undesirable impression that was perhaps created by Penina Pel'i's somewhat over-generalized remarks. There are Christians and there are Christians. In summarizing Israel's current position in the family of nations, Solomon states "I actually hear from quite a few Christians that the return of the people of Israel to the Temple Mount and a Jewish Jerusalem would flood the Christian world with a wave of identification and happiness."

[Members Profiled]

Penina Pel'i

She was born in the United States. In 1951, she married the emissary of an Israeli agency and immigrated with him to Israel. She is a music teacher, but has not practiced her profession in Israel, being content to raise four children.

She outlines her extensive activities in the area of women's rights according to Jewish Law. Five years ago, she states, she organized an international conference on women and law in Judaism. She is also an activist in the "Hug Hakeshet [Rainbow Circle]," an interfaith association whose members include monks, priests, theologians, and Christian and Jewish leaders.

Fifteen years ago, she joined the Temple Mount Faithful Committee, as the result of a traumatic experience she

had when a Jewish policeman prohibited her from reciting psalms on the Temple Mount from a small Book of Psalms and also "warned me not to recite the passage aloud by heart, but silently."

A short time after that incident, her deceased husband, who was a rabbi, met a man "with side-locks [worn by observant Jews] and a beard" who asked him if he was interested in rebuilding the Temple. Rabbi Pel'i said yes, and added that his wife was even more interested than he was. After it was made clear that all of the committee's activities were legal, they joined.

Rahel Klein

A social worker who immigrated to Israel from England 23 years ago; she is married to Miguel, a tourist guide. She lived in Kibbutz Lavi' and then in Beersheva. She now lives in Qiryat Arba'. She has two married daughters and a grandson.

After the Yom Kippur War, she joined Gush Emunim and established a branch of the movement in Beersheva. Since moving with her family to Qiryat Arba' in 1975, she has been a central activist in the Tehiya branch there. Five years ago, she met Gershon Solomon and joined the Temple Mount Faithful.

Avishai Raviv

Twenty-four, a student of Jewish history, born in Holon to a MAPAI [Israel Workers Party] family and was [a member of] the Labor Youth. At 13, because of the trauma of the evacuation of Yamit, he underwent a reversal and joined the youth movements of Tehiya and Gush Emunim. In the Army, he served in the Giv'ati Brigade, was injured in a training accident, received a disability rating of 32 percent, and was released.

Two years ago, he became religious. Four months ago he married Hana, whom he met in the Temple Mount Faithful youth movement. They live in the settlement of Ma'ale-Levona in central Samaria.

Li'on Barshaw

An engineer, he immigrated to Israeli six years ago from the United States with his wife, from whom he is since divorced; has two children. He works with the Loz Company, which specializes in solar energy. He does not speak Hebrew and is not engaged in ongoing political activity. He voted for the Likud in the last elections. He is not religious.

In 1989, he read a letter to the editor in THE JERUSALEM POST by a Christian pilgrim who expressed shock that Jews are prohibited from praying on the Temple Mount. He heard about the Temple Mount Faithful from a friend, Professor (of theology) [Emil] Fackenheim (Penina Pel'i: "Fackenheim gained renown when he said that the defense of Jewish lives in the land of Israel is a great victory that proves that Hitler lost"). Barshaw did not participate in the discussion, which was conducted in Hebrew. At the end of the discussion, he

asked to stress, contrary to the prevailing view, that the Temple Mount Faithful Committee was not an extremist body, but a body which upholds law and order.

'Eli Arbel

Sixty-four, he immigrated with his parents from Germany at a young age (they had gone there from Israel for professional training). He grew up in Rish'on Letziyon, studied electrical engineering and management at the Technion, and was employed, until his retirement, as "a professional in governmental institutions," which he prefers not to specify for security reasons, he says.

However, he does detail his long military career from the distant past: The Hagana [a voluntary Jewish self-defense organization established in Palestine during the British Mandate], a guard course, and an officers course. In the War for Independence he joined Brigade 7, and was wounded in the Latrun battles. He then served in the Army in his profession.

He is married to Rut Arbel, the granddaughter of writer Nehama Pohchevski [as published], and a member of the Biluyim [as published] Family. He has four children and grandchildren.

In his youth, he belonged to MAPAI. However, his views changed quickly and he became an activist as early as the struggle against the British [began]. He began to engage in continuous political activity only several years ago, joining Tehiya and later the Temple Mount Faithful Committee, whose members he met while praying at the Western Wall on Yom Kippur.

Yo'av Sha'uli

He is in the academic reserves [i.e., attends college and performs military service on academic breaks and after graduation], studying mathematics at Hebrew University. He is 18 and was born in Mevasseret Yerushalayim into a "moderate, Likud-Labor Alignment" home. His parents, well-to-do people of the center, according to his definition, did not join him when he made a rightist switch, because they "had already gone beyond the age of demonstrations." (Sha'uli, who, after this remark, seems like someone who becomes embroiled easily, hastens to clarify that he does not mean that demonstrative acts of the type undertaken by the Temple Mount Faithful Committee are suited [only] to adolescents).

At 14, he decided that he did not want to follow the path dictated by his parents. He began to search for what he truly identifies with. He perused information on all of the movements, from RATZ [Citizens Rights Movement] a rightist, and has discovered that Tehiya suited him most. He is currently writing a "fat book" containing arguments that justify the ideological line of the "whole land of Israel," the gist of which is that the Temple Mount completes the circle of the return of the people of Israel to its land, because "Shkhem [the biblical name of Nablus], Jerusalem, and Hebron" are written in the Bible, not Tel Aviv.

[box on p 19]

The First Round

As of 17 October 1989, the Temple Mount Faithful had already staged a march to lay a cornerstone for the Temple. HA'ARETZ reporter Lili Galili described the event:

A cornerstone for the Temple was laid yesterday in Silwan, or to be more precise, it was laid on a truck owned by the Alafi [as published] Brothers, the contractors who contributed the huge stone, on the outskirts of Silwan, after the police had rejected other sites where the Temple Mount Faithful had asked to lay the stone, because of the riots breaking out at the same time in east Jerusalem.

The fact that the Temple Mount Faithful were ultimately compelled to be satisfied with establishing the Third Temple on a truck in Silwan, slightly marred, as far as they were concerned, the festiveness of the ceremony. "We are starting the ceremony to lay the cornerstone for the Third Temple," announced Gershon Solomon over a megaphone. Three youths grasped the arms of the priest, who was dressed in reconstructed priestly garb, and lifted him onto the truck. Under the priestly garb and turban and the stylish dark glasses was Yehoshua' Ne'eman, a Jerusalem official who underwent a single day of training for the priesthood. Ne'eman spent most of the hours of the ceremony with his arms stretched forward to bless the masses to the delight of tens of television cameras from all over the world.

When Ne'eman the priest ascended to the truck, he grasped a reconstructed basin (a vessel in which the blood of sacrifices was collected in the Temple) and he poured, over the stone, water that had been drawn earlier from the Shiloah Spring. "Shofar" called Solomon, and nonuniform blasts broke forth from the ram's horns. David Alafi, one of the contributors of the stone, whispered: "When Betar [soccer team] took the cup, we blew [our horns in celebration] better."

Solomon marched at the head of the strange procession of about 300 people, supported by his staff. Next to him was the priest, who disappeared from time to time, prompting Solomon to call on the megaphone: "Where is the priest?" The priest, meanwhile, was giving brief interviews to the media and heralding to the world that "he had hoped for this day for years." Behind them walked the musicians playing an accordion, a clarinet, and a small harp. Next to them was Rabbi Yisra'el Schneider, in a streimel [fur hat worn by some eastern European observant Jews on special occasions] and a capote, jumping quickly onto the truck bearing the stone, and breaking into a sweeping Hasidic dance. All of this was accompanied by Hasidic music mixed with Moroccan calls of joy, the national flag flapping in the breeze, and the amazed looks of Arab residents of Silwan who had come out to the thresholds of their homes.

New 'Terror Cell' Surfaces in Gaza

91AE0088A Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
5 Oct 90 p 14

[Article by Mikhal Qedem]

[Text]

The Deceased Rafiq Salmi Comes Home

Since the beginning of the intifadah 297 Arabs in the territories have been murdered, suspected of collaborating with Israel. Last week, within a five day span, in the Gaza Strip alone, five residents were murdered, three of them within 24 hours. The overwhelming majority of these acts of murder and others are attributed to a cruel, mysterious gang that has been operating in the Rafiah area for several weeks and calls itself the "Gang of A-Shahid Rafiq Salmi" ("Shahid" being a victim of the intifadah—M.Q.).

The gang, with an unknown number of young members, has instituted methods of murder and punishment that were previously uncommon in the intifadah. It has put an end to sadism and torture. Gang members work clean—execution by means of a few pistol shots to the head, dumping the body in a conspicuous place so that people will see and be afraid, accepting responsibility via posters, or slogans scrawled on walls.

To the mystery surrounding the gang's members has been added the halo of the man whose name they bear—Rafiq Salmi. Salmi has become a symbol in recent years, and the story of his life and death passes from mouth to mouth, from father to son.

Salmi was born in the Shati refugee camp in the northern part of the Gaza Strip. In the early 70's, when he was about 20, he joined Al Fatah and took part in a number of military terror activities. In the mid 70's he was transferred for operations in south Lebanon, at the height of the battles with the Syrians. Salmi stood out and gained the nickname "Lion of War." In 1976 his family was notified that he had been killed in battle and his body not recovered.

Suddenly, in 1982, Salmi returned and appeared in the Shati refugee camp smiling broadly, his face adorned with scars. He was reticent about his activities during the six years of his absence and mumbled unclear words about Beirut, Lebanon and the PLO. The story of this mysterious figure passed from mouth to mouth throughout the entire Gaza Strip. Salmi, sunburned and muscular, with green eyes and scars as testimony to his past, became an object of veneration for the residents of the Strip.

It quickly turned out that Salmi had not returned to the Strip to rest. He arrived armed with a detailed list of names of people suspected of collaborating with the Shin Bet, whom he was charged with eliminating. The rumors had it that PLO headquarters had gotten a detailed list in those days of Gaza residents who had contacted the Shin

Bet, turned over information that had frustrated planned operations and exposed the names of the organization's activists in the area. The list, said the rumors, was so precise that the Mukhabarat was shell shocked and suffered a heavy intelligence blow in the area. The story is also related in Gaza—and it is hard to know whether it is based on fact or on romantic aura—that Salmi got a small pistol and ammunition from Yasir 'Arafat himself along with a "Bon Voyage" for the accomplishment of his mission.

Salmi managed to eliminate 15 collaborators before he was killed. He drove to report in the evening hours at the homes of those who appeared on the list, to knock politely on the door and to ask for the suspect. When the latter appeared, Salmi would fire three to six bullets between his eyes and disappear. In Gaza they began to identify Salmi and beware of him, and he improved his technique. When he left on a rub out mission, he would masquerade as an old man, a peddler or even a woman, and only then knock on the door of the house, find his victim and shoot.

For a long period of time the security forces conducted a stubborn manhunt for Salmi and set up extensive searches for him, accompanied by curfews and sweeps. Salmi was killed in the evening, at the Shati refugee camp, on his way to eliminate victim number 16 on the list. A security forces ambush spotted him and opened chase with bullets flying. Salmi managed to reach a thick grove on the northern edge of the camp, where he had previously hidden a Kalachnikov. At the end of a short gunfight, he was shot to death.

These incidents of murder constitute a strong challenge to the security forces in every way. A masked gang of young men has been roaming the streets of Rafiah for many long weeks, armed with a variety of live weapons and murdering anyone it chooses. The hint to the security forces is clear: It is only a matter of time before the live weapons are directed at the Zionist enemy himself, and not only at its dependants in the Strip. The challenge is even more serious in view of the gang members' unexhausted store of ammunition. There is also no doubt, whether or not those executed really were collaborators, that the chain of murders is diluting the security forces' storehouse of informants, who fear for their lives. The gang members' message is clear: In the territory, we are boss.

There are also additional signs of that. These days in Rafiah the residents have set up their own internal traffic police. Serving in it mainly are police who resigned at the start of the intifadah from the Israeli police force and members of shock committees. They are authorized to revoke drivers' licenses and to impose fines on drivers who travel on strike days, contrary to instructions. This phenomenon is aided by the new IDF [Israel Defense Forces] policy in the Strip—to stay as far away as possible from such so-called hornets nests as Rafiah.

The security forces, said a senior officer in Gaza, are well aware of the activity of the "Rafiq Salmi" gang and are sparing no efforts to catch its members red-handed. On 16 September one of the gang members was killed in an encounter with an IDF force in the Shabura refugee camp adjacent to Rafiah. The soldiers appeared, and the masked men spotted them and opened fire. The soldiers returned fire and killed 'Ala a-din Shahin, 19. Another masked man was seriously wounded but managed to escape among the alleys. The other masked men also escaped.

The IDF imposed a curfew on the area and set up sweeps for the wounded man, but in vain. The first round ended in victory for the "Rafiq Salmi" people. The gang members increased the murder rate. The struggle, which has become a struggle of minds, continues in full force. "We will eventually catch them, alive or dead," the military source said.

This week another gang came into the picture calling itself the "Eagles of the intifadah." Its methods of operation have not yet been fully exposed.

Violent Incidents May Provoke Arab Transfer

91AE0117B Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
15 Oct 90 p 7

[Article by Avner Regev]

[Text] Most of the newspaper headlines on the eve of Simhat-Torah and on the Friday after the holiday were "hundreds of masked persons carry flags of Iraq; tires burned at intersections; gasoline bombs thrown; students set up rock throwing range; PLO flags displayed" and so on. These incidents did not take place in Judaea, Samaria, or Gaza, but in Nazareth, the villages of the Galilee, Wadi Nisnas [as published] in Haifa, Taybah, Wadi 'Ara, Umm al-Fahm, Majdal Krum, and in Ksayfah and Rahat in the Negev. These reports, which have become our daily fare, are no longer unusual. Segments among the Arabs of Israel are actively engaging in violent acts similar to those of the intifadah in the territories.

Knesset Member Mi'ari and other Knesset members are appearing on television, claiming openly that a police helicopter attacked innocent demonstrators on the Temple Mount with live ammunition, thereby blaming police for the violent incidents that occurred there, as if there never had been a hail of rocks and iron.

Transfer As the Only Solution

For more than a year, 'AL HAMISHMAR has been warning about a dangerous process among the Arab population in Israel, leading to an impasse in Jewish-Arab relations, a process that is liable to continue.

In the past year, Faysal Husayni has been engaged in justifying the intifadah and its methods of operation to public opinion in Israel, including Israeli-Palestinian

public opinion. At the same time, he has also asked the Arabs of Israel to act more moderately to prevent an unnecessary clash with the authorities. It actually emerges that the opposite has occurred. Signs of that, which were seen clearly after the murder of Arabs in Rish'on Letziyon, developed into repeated acts of violent, mono-national protest, which testify to a consistent line as opposed to spontaneous incidents. In their current response to the incidents on the Temple Mount, the leaders of the Arab public in Israel are acting as if against foreign rule. The Follow-Up Committee is making decisions on this public's behalf, formulated as "them and us," and the connection between the Arabs of Israel, on one hand, and the state of Israel and the Jewish public on the other, is weakening.

On the other side stands the Jewish population, which is witnessing the miracle of mass immigration from the Soviet Union and feels in command in the face of the hostility. This feeling is expressed in the growing voices on the right-wing margins of the political map, which are calling for a transfer of both residents of the territories and the Arabs of Israel. To the extent that the position of the Arabs of Israel becomes more extreme, so too, among segments of the ruling establishment, an opinion is taking shape according to which a transfer is the only possible solution. When one of the prime minister's advisers determines that "there is no democratic solution regarding the Arabs of Israel," he is actually expressing a position prevalent among many policymakers. Such thoughts stem from thinking also fed by the violent actions of the Arabs of Israel, who are themselves encouraging the idea of a transfer.

Now more than ever, the Arabs of Israel have lost any hope of having any real influence through democratic means. They are therefore turning to violent protest methods. They fear that a million immigrants over the next five years will change the face of Israel and detract from the influence gained by the Arab minority in recent years.

The Backing of Ministers for an Extreme Solution

It is certainly possible to understand the distress of the Arabs of Israel in view of the Temple Mount incidents. At the same time, [their] crossing of the fine line is liable to invite governmental reaction, and consequently they might find themselves under the rule of a "hard hand," followed by a transfer. The leaders of the Arabs of Israel must understand that even if their claims are justified, the adoption of more extreme positions and actions will not bring about the solution that all of us desire.

Parties calling for an extreme solution regarding both the Arabs of the territories and the Arabs of Israel are represented in the current government. Minister Yuval Ne'eman and Deputy Minister Ge'ula Kohen enjoy the support of Knesset Member Elyaqim He'atzni, whose opinions are not much different from those of Knesset members of the Moledet faction, who leave no doubt as to their political intentions. The idea of a transfer is also

acceptable to several Knesset members of the Likud, including senior members of the Gush [Emunim] leadership. The tendency toward extremism in both camps is leading them to discuss this possible solution, and growing security tension is liable to result in its actualization. They remember that, in 1948, there was a kind of transfer of Arabs from the Galilee, Haifa, Yafo, Ramla, and Lod. In 1967, there was also a kind of transfer of tens of thousands of refugees, who were residents of the camps in the Jordan Valley, as attested by the empty, asphalt huts still standing there. The current violent reactions of the Arabs of Israel might lead the government to decide to implement the idea of a transfer at the first opportunity that presents itself, and precedents exist.

Fatalities in general, particularly in a holy place, constitute a potential danger to a democratic regime. Even if the actions of the police during the Temple Mount riots are justified, there is no justifying the number of persons killed or injured. The most senior advisers of the government believe that a gradual transfer in phases would be received in the world with greater understanding than a mass killing. The deportees, according to this scenario, would be transferred to Jordan, whose population is obviously made up of a Palestinian majority. Israel would assist the Hashemite house to remain on its foundation, but as the ruler of a Palestinian state in which the bedouins would constitute a minority. This idea has not been foreign to persons in the government's leadership in recent years, as evidenced by recent remarks made by senior ministers.

Shamir is resolutely determined that there is no room for territorial concessions in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. Political pressure and any attempt to impose a solution will help supporters of the transfer option. Shamir's position is that the voluntary transfer of hundreds of thousands of Jews from the Soviet Union is a model for the possibility of removing from the country those who do not wish to be under Israeli rule.

The recent occupation of the Christian enclave in Lebanon by the Syrians and their supporters, and the assassination of the Egyptian parliament chairman in broad daylight in the center of Cairo seem to ignore the enormous security tensions in the Persian Gulf, tensions to which Egypt and Syria are partners. A war in the Middle East is likely to play into the hands of supporters of the transfer option. These supporters would seek to take part in the general confusion to create a new order that would release Israel from the need to be concerned about a solution for the Palestinian problem, which, in their opinion, has been augmented by the weight of problem of the Arabs of Israel.

U.S. Expected To Endorse Further Anti-Israel Moves

91AE0133B Tel Aviv HADASHOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 19 Oct 90 p 13

[Article by Alex Fishman]

[Text] It is related that Israel's first president, Hayim Weitzman, received, for his home in Rehovot, a pair of

purebred horses of choice stock from the government of his majesty. The president returned the gift and explained: I do not need gifts that eat and excrete.

The Israeli Government in 1990 also received a gift of the same type: a prize granted by the Americans for good behavior. Through a presidential order, we have entered into the family of those entitled to the positioning of the Patriot anti-missile missile on their soil. However, the gift will cost the Defense Ministry \$40 million, a sum not provided for in the budget. What are you waiting about? The Americans say that the gift is worth \$120 million. You will need to pay only a small amount: improvements, upgrades, technology.

The gift is not being rejected in Israel. However, a sediment of bitterness is beginning to develop. The Patriot story actually reflects the real situation of U.S.-Israeli relations. At the end of August, during the peak of the gulf crisis, Defense Ministry Director General David 'Ivri went to the United States secretly. 'Ivri landed, and they discussed business with him. At that time, we still did not want to understand that they simply wanted to buy us. Against this backdrop of events, The United States offered compensation, namely Patriot missiles and F-15 aircraft. Later, Arens also travelled to the United States, openly. This was a matter you see of a gift worth about \$1 billion dollars. He was followed by David Levi, who maintained that it was he who brought the gift. It was said in Levi's entourage that Baker is angry with Arens. No one in the entourage thought of the possibility that the security system had every reason to be angry with Baker, rather than the opposite.

It is already clear that we will not receive the F-15 aircraft at present. That was only a tranquilizer which the rich uncle sent to his miserable pauper of a nephew, who is pestering him in Congress. There is no dialogue between partners. The Temple Mount incidents completely removed the masks. It emerges that George and dear Jimmy are treating us in the same manner that tough businessmen treat small but demanding clients.

Since the end of September, the administration has been explaining to us, by telephone, that our strategic situation has improved. Until 2 August, it says, you were facing the Iraqis alone; now half of the Western world is opposing him. However, the security system is beginning to adapt to the idea that tension in the gulf will be a part of the region for many more months. The chance of the Americans reaching a settlement with the Iraqis is greater than the chance of war. The Iraqis are launching settlement plan balloons to blunt the war sting in American public opinion. What, in sum, do the Iraqis want? They want oil wells, access to the sea, and, as a bonus, two islands. Within several months, the Americans will swallow the lure.

Israel's complaint regarding the Saudi weapons deal only angers the American administration, because it pushes it

into choosing between its domestic economic interests and an ally's security interests. The administration has already decided what is more important to it. It is therefore selling us a gift wrapped in strategic prattle: We have removed Syria and Saudi Arabia from your eastern front, and Mubarak and Saddam, who were once friends—look at them now.

That is correct. However, the security system is not concerned about Iraq's current position as a besieged country. The probability that Iraq will launch missiles against Israel will remain low as long as Iraq believes that Israel has a nuclear weapon that it will use. Iraq translates the distribution of masks, for example, as an Israeli preparation for an attack, not a defensive measure. The Americans also share the Iraqi interpretation.

However, after the crisis, Israel will also remain with Iraq, which will be much more dangerous. Iraq's threats during the crisis have become much more factual. The crisis caught Iraq in a critical stage within the development of its nuclear plans. Iraq was not far from becoming free from foreign elements and entering into an independent development situation. Two years could elapse between Iraq's disconnection from foreign technological help and the fabrication of the final product. After the crisis, Iraq will need three years to acquire a military, nuclear capability.

Throughout the crisis, the Americans have learned to wink. The Syrians had an interest in closing in Lebanon. The Americans winked, and the Syrians wiped out General 'Awn in 15 minutes, after refraining from the aerial bombardment of Beirut for 14 years. The recent Syrian action in Lebanon is only the start of the American payment to Syria in exchange for its support in the gulf coalition, and the Americans have not drawn a red line. Tomorrow, Syria will demand American pressure regarding the Golan Heights. The Syrians will present "reasonable conditions." People in Israel are already thinking about a situation in which the Americans would take punitive measures against us, such as reducing aid. The Hrawi government in Beirut could demand to implement its sovereignty over south Lebanon, a logical demand by a regime that gained hegemony by dint of Syrian soldiers, who received a wink from the Americans. Will Israel seek the dismantlement of all of the militias in Lebanon as a condition. Will it seek the Syrians' withdrawal? These are internal Lebanese matters, and American public opinion will not understand. Security elements in Israel will not fall out of their chairs if they hear about an F-16 deal for the Syrians.

Against the background of the Temple Mount incident, the Americans disappointed the Israeli government in the Security Council. Here, the Americans already paid the Syrians in Israeli currency in an official manner. It was decided in Israel not to accept the delegation of the UN secretary general. However, Israeli resoluteness is not being directed at the correct body, nor at the correct issue. Consequently, the American wink is liable to turn into an aggressive blink with both eyes.

Currently, two mine fields are clearly marked. One is abroad. It includes Washington, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Amman—a partial list. At home, we have put an ice pack on the intifadah. A comprehensive curfew was imposed to freeze the situation. We are now lifting it slowly to see what remains underneath.

It is clear in the Defense Ministry that there will be a fight in the coming year to increase the defense budget. Every additional shekel will go to the development of combat means. According to the outlook of the security system, the United States has eroded the qualitative advantage that was promised to Israel. All of the equipment [that would give Israel a qualitative edge] has been sold to the Arabs. The defense minister's request to increase [U.S.] defense aid to \$2.5 billion will be delayed after the Temple Mount [incident]. An increase in Israel's strength will thus be possible only through self-development. Combat with Iraq, if it breaks out, will obviously be conducted over long ranges, and a war of this type requires new inventions. The timing of the abatement of military tensions in the gulf is extraordinary, providing Israel with an opportunity to undertake a true strategic stock-taking with itself and with its friends, and to re-examine high-flying expressions such as "ally," partnership between two equals," "reciprocal relations," and the like. However, who has time for trifles when a fateful question is standing on the agenda: Who caressed Shevardnadze's hand more, Levi or Baker?

Western Christianity Said Pushing Palestinian Issue

91AE0175B Tel Aviv 'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew
Oct 90 p 19

[Article by Moshe Butchaqo]

[Text] If and when the U.S. subdues Iraq, whether by war or by some other means, President Bush will be accepted around the world as a hero and his strength and influence will be unlimited. Then Bush will have the time to settle the score with Israel. I will be so bold as to say that the entire battle with Iraq is merely a prelude to his main objective, Israel. He will come to us with an ultimatum to establish a Palestinian state in Judaea and Samaria. Jerusalem will be divided and East Jerusalem will be the capital of that state. Bush will speak not only in his own name and that of his country: He will repeat the scenario that went so well for him on the Persian Gulf matter. He will assemble the UN and the Security Council and get backing from the whole world, both Western Europe and Eastern Europe, not to mention the third world. It would be the Security Council that would discuss sanctions against Israel, the effectiveness of which has now been proven. These are sanctions that would come down hard and heavy and cause Israel's isolation. Thus the U.S. would turn from "the friend of Israel" into a nation desirous of killing her with the kiss of death.

Has not the U.S. tried to subject Israel and force her not to settle anyone else in Judaea and Samaria? And Foreign Minister David Levi, in a letter sent to James Baker, promised that Israel would not use monies lent by the U.S. for construction in the territories across the Green Line, including East Jerusalem. Indeed, the two sides arranged this war of diplomacy so that the struggle would not openly be over the future of Judaea and Samaria but over the matter of the settlement of immigrants. But, in fact, it would be preferable to be open and tell the Americans that if their intentions are directed toward the future of Judaea and Samaria, we will give up the 400 million dollars. But we will never give up Judaea and Samaria. The State of Israel is an independent state and no one has the right to interfere in its affairs.

We have to ask ourselves what the underlying true reason is for telling us not to settle immigrants in Judaea and Samaria. It seems that we have to make a distinction between the approach of the U.S. and that of the USSR. For the USSR it is not a question of "belief." If Gorbachev could give up on the entire empire of Eastern Europe, he certainly does not care about who settles in Judaea and Samaria. But that is the final matter by which he hopes to curry the friendship of the Arab world. The reasons for the U.S. and Western Europe are entirely different. They are not doing what they are doing out of love for the Palestinians. And even less out of love for "honesty" and "justice." After all, from the point of view of honesty and justice, Judaea and Samaria are part of Israel. There was never a Palestinian state there. It was territory captured by Jordan, and it went to war against us to throw us into the sea. They lost the war they started and certainly lost the right to the territory they captured even before that. That and more. King Husayn has already several times publicly renounced all ownership of that territory. The Palestinians, on the other hand—all that they wanted then and what they still want today is to throw Israel into the sea. After all, whenever they lived under Jordanian rule, they never even asked for a Palestinian state. Where, in that case, is the honesty and justice in the desire to steal Judaea and Samaria from Israel?

Anyone who is familiar with the problem in depth knows that the nations really have no interest in the Palestinian problem. The Palestinian problem is merely a camouflage for their real demand. If the problem had not existed, they would have created it. In truth, I would say, they were the ones who always created the problem, and they are the ones who have not allowed the Arabs to make peace with Israel.

The essence of the problem is not a territory or a state, but religion. It is Christianity against Judaism, the Roman empire against Jerusalem.

For two thousand years Christianity has sentenced Israel to be a lowly nation in exile, a wanderer because it rejected the New Testament. The return of Israel to its country and the declaration of Jerusalem as the eternal

capital of Israel is therefore a serious blow to Christianity. There is no doubt that today, as then, it is the Roman empire that is pulling the strings of all Western policy, and it is not for nought that Italy stands at the head of those countries demanding a Palestinian state. For this reason there is not to this day a country that recognizes Jerusalem and transfers its embassy there, and it is for this reason that Mr. Baker insisted so strongly that the inhabitants of East Jerusalem must also be allowed to take part in the discussions for elections within the framework of autonomy.

If those rabbis who rule that the saving of a life is more important than territory would understand that this is not a question of territory but a religious war and that the Roman empire is again decreeing for us "Write for yourselves on the horn of the ox that you have no part in the God of Israel," they would rule that here too we are obligated to risk our lives. And it is interesting that very often the man in the street can feel what the VIP's and scholars do not understand.

Now is the time to state our opinion clearly, without evasion and without diplomacy. If we are firm and clear and speak with self-confidence and deep conviction so that it will be felt that these are not "territories" but a part of our flesh and blood and soul and that we are right to fight for every inch of our land, then, against their will, they will have to say "Amen."

The nations must know that a foreign invasion into Judaea and Samaria is no lesser a matter than the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. To the extent that we believe that ourselves, the nations will know and understand that the nation of Israel and the Land of Israel are one, and the time will come when all people will praise God and all the nations will laud Him, for His mercy will have taken hold of us.

Changing U.S. Attitudes Toward Israel Examined *91AE0133D Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 26 Oct 90 p 14*

[Article by Hami Shalev]

[Text] Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir lives from day to day, or, more precisely, from one American election day to another. In recent years, the political appraisal issued by his bureau regarding the future of relations with the United States has included a signpost in the form of the next [American] election day. According to Shamir, the ability of an administration, any administration, to exert pressure on Israel is limited by the everlasting loyalty of the votes of Jews in particular and the broad American public in general, and the desire of persons to be elected president of the United States.

Shamir cannot be accused of being blind to the Bush administration's orientation. Long before the tensions rose to the surface, as in recent weeks, and in fact since Bush came to power, Shamir has been expressing fears and doubts regarding the American president's commitment. There is also awareness in the Israeli Foreign

Ministry of the negative trends that are developing in U.S.-Israeli relations. Many analyses have been prepared in the Foreign Ministry recently which point to dangers to Israel's interests, and to the need to begin the fight now for the 1992 annual aid [package from the United States].

However, these sober situation appraisals are nonetheless based on a concept according to which administrations may come and go, but Congress, the Jews, and the majority of American public opinion are everlasting. Because of this concept, a discussion of the possibility of a substantial, strategic change in U.S. policy on the Middle East has never taken place in this government or in any of its forums. Given that no such discussion has occurred, there is obviously nothing to say about contingency plans as well.

Israel's political, military, and economic power is derived in an unmediated fashion from the amount of support that it receives from the United States. Without the United States, the Israeli economy would have collapsed, its deterrent power would have been impaired, its diplomatic relations would have been constricted, and it would have long ago become a pariah in the world. That scenario is so apocalyptic that they prefer not to think about it at all in Jerusalem. Therefore, whenever the government has examined the effect of its actions in the web of its relations with the United States, it has always assumed that relations with Washington have a firm, unshakable basis. Prime Minister Shamir's continuing, stubborn refusal to respond to President Bush's clearly desperate pleas regarding the UN delegation for [investigating] the Temple Mount incidents rests, among other things, on [Shamir's presumption of] the axiomatic nature of Jewish and congressional support for Israel and the abatement of the confrontation [between Israel and the United States] as soon as the 1994 presidential election campaign begins in several months.

Analysts in Jerusalem have appraisals regarding each of the four basic components of Israeli strength in the United States. These appraisals point to the possibility of a change for the worse. For some reason or other, these analysts do not describe the entire picture, [which is as follows]:

1. Israel's strategic value: In this regard, what is important is not the truth, but the thinking in Washington, where voices expressing reservations about the axiomatic nature of Israel's strategic value are growing. In the media, in research institutes, and in the corridors of the administration, the thinking taking hold is that, in the post-cold war era, when the Soviet Union is facing fragmentation, Israel's strategic value is not as it was heretofore. It is now easy to argue in Washington that Israel is a burden, not an asset, and that the United States is losing more in the Arab world because of its special relations with Israeli than it is gaining in the way of strategic fruits from these relations. The plans to

renew the Baghdad alliance—or the anti-Baghdad alliance in its current edition—only buttress Israel's depiction as a disruptive factor.

2. The Jewish vote: The current administration was not elected by dint of the Jewish vote, and it feels no special obligation toward Jewish leaders. Therefore, it has not taken the trouble to have special ties with them. Even the loyalty of American Jews to the Israeli Government's current policy is somewhat illusory. The Council of Presidents [of Major Jewish Organizations] is headed at present by Seymour Reich and Malcolm Hoenlein, who receive their orders directly from the prime minister's bureau in Jerusalem. Therefore, their declarations and positions frequently reflect the most right-wing common denominator of organized American Jewry, which represents only a small percentage of all Jews of the United States. The Jews themselves, as indicated by most surveys, are gradually losing interest in Judaism and Israel, and those who remain interested are in many cases critical of it.

3. American public opinion: It continues to express basic support for Israel. Only a week ago, there was a hastening in Jerusalem to publicize the results of a survey conducted by THE WASHINGTON POST, which indicated that a decisive majority of U.S. citizens continue to support special relations between the two countries. However, public opinion surveys of the last decade show a steady, significant erosion in support for Israel paralleled by an increase in support for the Palestinians. Regarding the American media, the situation is much more serious; any bloodshed caused by Israel or Israelis receives prominent coverage, which further erodes public opinion.

4. The Congress: a bastion of strong, serious support for Israel in the United States. However, Jerusalem is also endeavoring to embellish the position of Congress. Spokesmen in Jerusalem point favorably to the 90 to 8 vote in the Senate in favor of not cutting aid to Israel because of settlement activity. However, this vote, and the decision to increase military aid to Israel, did not occur in a vacuum, but against the backdrop of a weapons deal—unprecedented in scope—with Saudi Arabia, the erasure of Egypt's debts, and a feeling in the Senate—which is currently struggling with the administration on many fronts—that Bush and Baker have been somewhat excessive in their harsh treatment of Israel. In any case, it should not be forgotten that the loyalty of the Congress is a direct function of the firmness of support for Israeli among public opinion and Jews.

A basic, decisive change in U.S. policy toward Israel is perhaps not inevitable. However, the probability of such a change requires greater treatment than that accorded by Jerusalem. The writing is on the wall, but they prefer not to look at it and to even argue or be convinced that the wall does not at all exist.

A Likud minister said this week that even if the scenario is possible, Israel has no choice but to act according to its

vital interests (i.e., not returning the territories), and, in any case, it has no alternative to U.S. support.

By agreeing to the government's peace initiative of May 1989, the prime minister demonstrated sensitivity to the need to mollify the United States. By being unwilling to apply the initiative or to agree to any proposal that was raised before its acceptance, Shamir is applying his realization that any progress on the discussions track will ultimately lead to a need to return territories, which brings us back to a basic certainty regarding the situation of our relations with the United States. As long as a government that refuses to part with the territories holds office in Israel, a real, fundamental conflict with the United States, while it may tarry, will come. Yitzhaq Shamir will never part with the territories, and there is therefore no need to trouble his ministers and aids with scenarios that probably will not occur [according to Shamir's thinking]. If they do occur, the government will not have taken the necessary steps to prevent them.

Impact of Possible U.S. Sanctions on IDF

91AE0133C Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 26 Oct 90 p 14

[Article by On Levi]

[Text] The IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] Planning Branch, which is responsible for preparing operational plans, has many plans and scenarios for different, anomalous situations—plans whose use by the system is highly improbable. However, there is no plan for a situation in which the United States changes its policy toward Israel, beginning with the application of moderate pressure, to the breaking of its ties with Israel. Senior Army personnel say that dealing with this subject is like handling explosives, and that it is better not to be preoccupied with it.

The identification of points of possible friction in U.S.-Israeli relations is of course connected to political affairs. There is a preference in the security system not to engage in analyses that could be received by the minister in charge and the prime minister as a threat or as the preparation of "material" that does not suit the political echelon's desires. Therefore, it should be assumed that the defense minister has never asked the IDF to prepare such plans, just as it can be assumed that, if the IDF took the initiative in this regard, the political echelon would have asked it to conceal the matter. However, things that were never supposed to happen have happened.

A study of the implications of a change in, or cessation of, American aid for the security system is especially sensitive, because it could point to Israel's weak points. In fact, the treatment and presentation of such a possibility would point to the system's strategic problems.

The probability of a break in relations between Israel and the United States aspires to zero. However, it is difficult to deny the possibility of the United States, in the future, seeking to pressure Israel regarding disputed matters, and the possibility that it would do so by imposing

sanctions, some of which would have security implications. Israel has been tried by American pressures in the past: The "renewed thinking" in 1975, and the delay in American aid and the F-16 aircraft shipment in 1981.

Former Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin believes that, with the end of the gulf crisis, the United States, as well as other countries in Europe and perhaps the Soviet Union, will seek to end other conflicts in the Middle East. Knesset Member Rabin believes that one of the first things that the United States will seek to do is to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the event that Israel evades the difficulties of finding a solution to this conflict, the United States would probably impose sanctions on Israel. One can almost determine with certainty that these sanctions would be mainly economic. However, some of them would no doubt have security implications.

There is a tendency in the security system to believe that even if the United States imposed sanctions, such sanctions would not pose an immediate problem to the IDF. Over the years, the IDF has built a system with independent stamina, which is not immediately dependent on the external supply of equipment. This system was not built based on a fear of sanctions, but as a result of operational thinking to the effect that, if equipment stocks are used, and the IDF requires the supply of additional equipment, the time required for Israel to submit a request for additional equipment to foreign elements, American or European, and for the latter to decide on and implement the request is liable to be critical.

The IDF is thus built so as not to be immediately dependent on the provision of such aid. However, the limit of its endurance would of course depend on whether it is facing an ordinary situation, an emergency situation, or a war situation.

In this context, it is appropriate to point out that the air train from the United States to Israel in the Yom Kippur War was of virtually no assistance to the IDF in "real time," and the supplies sent by sea arrived after the fighting.

Both Yitzhaq Rabin and Defense Minister Moshe Arens tend to believe that a military embargo on Israel has a low probability. However, both argue that such an embargo, if it is indeed imposed, would cause real, significant damage. It should be indicated that not only would an embargo pose a problem, but the reduction of financial aid or a delay in its transfer are also likely to leave the defense system with its tongue hanging out.

The first to understand that Israel's complete dependence on American aid poses a real threat to Israel's security were David Ben-Gurion and Shim'on Peres, who turned to the development of an Israeli defense industry in the early fifties. Israel has since become an unprecedented model relative to other countries of the same size regarding the development of industries as a response to defense needs in the air, at sea, and on land.

However, it should be emphasized that the development of Israeli military industries and their technical capability, which is no doubt among the most advanced in the world, does not respond to another significant concern: Israel is still dependent on the supply of raw materials from abroad.

The development of military industries, and the stocks of equipment in Israel's possession, grant it strategic endurance in short wars. Israel is also not dependent on external factors regarding its deterrent ability. However, it is important to emphasize that this independence applies only to short terms, and that Israel's dependence on the United States is firm and abiding.

It is therefore probable that the most relevant matter from the security system's standpoint is not whether it is prepared or planning for changes in U.S. policy that would affect its activity, but the gap between the security system's willingness to deal with the question and the political positions of the political leadership, inasmuch as the positions of Israeli politicians are likely to determine whether the United States will exert pressure on Israel and how much.

Defense Minister Moshe Arens was asked this week in an interview whether the security system is preparing for the possibility of a change in aid, be it partial or even a full suspension. Arens responded:

"Two questions should be distinguished: Do we see such a possibility, and, is it possible to prepare for it. Let us assume that the United States were to stop supplying us with the aircraft that we need to obtain, such as the completion of the Apache helicopter supply. Let us assume, in our worst dreams, that the United States were to inform us that they were stopping their supply immediately. There is no way to be prepared for that. Then, we would have less Apache helicopters. However, I do not see such a possibility. I think that the probability of that has so far aspired to zero. We see no signs of the United States retreating from the commitments it made.

"If the unbelievable, which we prefer not think about, were to occur, we would certainly be much more dependent on Israel's defense industry, which, in certain areas, is the best in the world. There are no systems that compete with some of the products of our defense industry."

'Signs in the Sky' Signal West's Demise

91AE0101A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 2 Nov 90 p 4

[Article by 'Amos Gilbo'a]

[Text] The term 'insha'allah' (If Allah Wills It) is well-known to all of us and has even become part of our vernacular. It expresses doubt and uncertainty in the ability of mortal man and submission to the will of the omnipotent God.

The term 'Allah Akbar' (Allah the Greater) is also well-known to us, but it never escapes our lips. The use of it is the exclusive heritage of the more or less Orthodox Muslim. In our minds and in our historical memory over the last one hundred years, it is automatically connected with attacks on Jews and murders of Jews. This term therefore serves the Muslims in two ways: One, as a call to prayer and two, as a call to battle.

In Islam, religion and state are one. Islam did not arise as a persecuted, repressed faith whose leader was betrayed and crucified, but as a conquering, victorious religion, whose mission was to expand the boundaries of its rule as much as possible. Muhammad was not merely the leader of the new religious community; he was the head of state, he was the army commander and the supreme judge.

Islam is a religion of "law," that dictates all aspects of the Muslim's daily life. In our society we have "secular Jews" and "religious Jews." With most Muslims, it doesn't work that way! There are religious Muslims and there are more religious Muslims, who are "reborn" in repentance and who carry out their commandments to the letter.

I say these things against the background of the sharp, compressed and impassioned religious atmosphere that was injected into this fertile soil by Saddam Husayn and the Persian Gulf crisis.

Before our eyes things are happening that seem like ridiculous nonsense to most of us, something from another world, something we find difficult to understand. Apparently that is not the case for the Muslims, at least most of them, who are brought back these days, on the pages of the media in all its varieties, to the golden era of Islam: the epos and the mythology and the great heroes, whom they are all the descendants of. Two examples, one of which was recently publicized and the second, which is less known.

1. Kuwaiti newspapers, now published in Saudi Arabia, recounted, each in its own version, that the prophet Muhammad recently appeared to Saddam Husayn in a dream, dressed in a white robe and with a serious countenance. In the conversation that developed between the two of them, the prophet advised Saddam to mend his ways and his mistake by fixing the direction of his missiles and aiming them in the right direction. And what was the right direction? Israel, of course.

Saddam, so the story continues, reported the incident to his people, all excited and elated, and the latter made sure to make this amazing appearance known in the markets of Baghdad (of The Thousand and One Nights?). The lesson for the reader is clear: Saddam will leave Kuwait and is preparing public opinion among his faithful for that. Idle chatter? Perhaps! But we must remember that before the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam sent a personal letter to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia in which he claimed that his own line of descent stretched

back to the prophet Muhammad and, therefore, he was to be numbered among the 'Ashraf (the descendants of the prophet Muhammad).

2. In one of the East Jerusalem newspapers, a short time before the Temple Mount incident, several "scoops" appeared on the front page. One of them reported, on the testimony of travelers returning from Saudi Arabia, that flocks of black owls with long, sharp beaks ('Ababil is their name), were recently seen fluttering above the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. That doesn't tell us anything. But to the Muslim it is very clear. All the way back in the pre-Islamic period an army went out from Ethiopia to attack Mecca, accompanied by a lot of elephants. The salvation of the city came in the sky: 'Ababil birds appeared suddenly, scattering the elephants with their long beaks.

The moral is clear: The American conquerors have taken control of Islam's holy places in Saudi Arabia, and the heavenly vision of salvation is about to repeat itself. Another "scoop" relates, this time attributed to travelers returning from Jordan, that flock upon flock of pure white doves were seen on their way from Saudi Arabia to Jordan. The Divine Presence had been exiled from Saudi Arabia, where aliens had desecrated her holy sites, and was pitching her tent in another holy place.

Now, in the eyes of Muslims, alien Jews came and desecrated the Mosque of 'Al 'Aqsa. In Islam, Jerusalem was sanctified not only because of the wonderful night journey by Muhammad from Mecca to 'Al 'Aqsa, but perhaps no less because of the struggle to protect her from foreign conquerors. Mecca and Medina had always been under Islamic rule.

Only once, during the Crusader period, was a bold attempt made to raid them. The Crusader commander who ordered that raid was executed later, by Saladin, after the battle of Hittin, near Tiberias. The remaining Christian commanders were pardoned.

What is amazing is that in the wake of what happened on the Temple Mount, even a Christian Arab, who considers himself an atheist in his faith, could scream in impassioned writing: "Woe to holy 'Al 'Aqsa. You are the heart and you are the blood."

These days the religious element has been joined to the Arab nationalist component. If we add to that the personal feelings of vengeance on the part of the population of the territories (almost every family has been affected one way or another by the intifadah), and if we add to it the unceasing provocation, first and foremost in posters scattered about like seeds, in which the Arabs are called upon, in the name of Allah, to murder Jews, then we can grasp the background and explanation for the scattered, individual violence of the last two weeks.

The posters inciting murder are not from fringe groups. They are from all the headquarters of the various organizations in the territories and not just of Hamas. If I am not mistaken, to this day, since the beginning of the

intifadah, not a single one of the writers of inflammatory posters has ever been arrested or punished.

Why?

Acquisition of Satellite Imagery Analyzed

91AE0175A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
16 Nov 90 p 3C

[Article by Moshe Jacques]

[Text] The Jordanian colonel 'Abdallah Tal, who was the contact man between Israel and the king of Jordan, once asked Moshe Dayan to be sure to publish articles attacking him in THE JERUSALEM POST, explaining that the harsher the Israeli criticism, the more it would help his position.

In terms of that rule, Americans today are enjoying publications that emphasize the misunderstandings between Jerusalem and Washington, not only issues of UN emissaries or the arrest of members of the intifadah command, but also concerning the issue of how to deal with Iraq. Stressing those differences helps the American effort to "liberate" the Saudis from the charge made against them that they are partners in a military coalition that includes Israel.

U.S. concern about Saudi Arabia was expressed in a conversation between Jewish leaders and President Bush. He threatened to confront them with American public opinion if they should try to foil the American arms deal with that country. Bush knows that in contrast to its past position, Israel has reconciled itself to the Saudi arms deal. Israel is demanding only that the qualitative gap between this country and the Arab armies be maintained as the Reagan administration had promised. The Bush administration reaffirmed that commitment. Given that wide-ranging deal, he was asked to put some stock into the promise and give Israel appropriate compensation. The administration knows this, but wanted to publish Bush's biting remarks to give the Saudis a feeling of victory over Israel and the Jewish lobby, with a controversy that really does not exist. Even publicizing the lack of an American agreement to supply Israel real-time satellite photos over Baghdad does not make the administration unhappy.

Israel has a right to demand information from the U.S. in exchange for Washington's request that Israel refrain from an aerial initiative over the skies of Iraq to gather information vital for deterrence. But discussion with the U.S. cannot be conducted by means of the American media. A public debate might supply Iraq with the information it needs about the quality of the Israeli deterrence.

Israel has repeatedly explained to the U.S. that it will react independently if attacked by Iraq. The Americans did not dispute the Israeli position but asked that Israel alert them in advance of its reaction so as to not jeopardize Israeli pilots and soldiers in the region.

The U.S. did not request that kind of coordination on the Iraqi issue, and Israel, too, was disinterested in full coordination since that would imply an element of control. After the reactor in Baghdad was blown up, President Reagan sent a special emissary to Begin asking to set up rules for advance coordination between Israel and the U.S. for an Israeli reaction. Begin convinced the emissary that coordination implied assuming to some degree responsibility for Israel's actions. The U.S. had to beware of accepting such responsibility since Israel could not have her hands tied on matters of self-defense.

In the book by William Casey, former CIA chief, it was revealed recently that the U.S. supplied Israel satellite photos of the Iraqi reactor in exchange for reigning in Israeli opposition to the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia. At that time the information about the satellite photos, whether the Americans were or were not supplying them to Israel, did not leak. Even when the Americans punished Israel by stopping the shipment of planes and by sharp condemnation in the Security Council, Israel did not expose U.S. involvement. Israel refused to accept the coordination formula so as not to tie her hands.

Unnamed Israelis cited in the American press complain about the lack of coordination between Israel and the U.S. They assume that in this way they will pressure the administration to supply Israel with the satellite pictures. But that is not the case. Along with the demand for coordination lurks the danger of entrusting the decision of an Israeli response to the coordinating power. We do not want the U.S. to fight for Israel, but Israel cannot limit her freedom of self-defense until the wheels of the heavy American engine propel the decision as to the scope of the Israeli reaction.

William Safire, the astute journalist, called this week in THE NEW YORK TIMES for not giving Saddam Husayn a respite in the confrontation that would be used by him to achieve nuclear capability. That is not the opinion of the administration, which prefers to wait. Before the crisis broke out, the administration erred in judging Saddam's intentions and even tried to persuade Israel of Iraq's readiness for peace. Saddam then deceived the administration in order to gain time to prepare for the invasion of Kuwait. Now he is trying to gain time to perfect his instruments of intimidation.

Saddam knows how to exploit the American hesitation for arbitration initiatives that push for an "Arab solution" to the conflict. Israel is the glue for the "Arab solution." For that purpose the prophet Muhammad appears in his dream and advises him to aim his missiles in another direction. Saddam does not reveal that he would already have aimed his missiles at Israel were it not for fear that this might trigger an American reaction. Israel does not have to spell out for the Iraqi dictator the extent of the American obligation to Israel and whether it includes the obligation to attack Iraqi missile launchers aimed at Israel. At the disposal of those with a need to know are more effective channels of clarification

than the American media. Israel does not have to volunteer information to Saddam.

Israel is trying to obtain real-time satellite photos of Baghdad from the U.S., but from Jerusalem they broadcast very valuable intelligence information about the limits of cooperation with the U.S. Saddam does not need spy satellites. He can pull the information from quotations of unnamed Israelis in the American media. Even if the leaked information is incorrect, Saddam might be seduced into thinking this is the proper time to challenge Israel. News about differences of opinion between Washington and Jerusalem, occasionally blown out of all proportion, encourage him in this direction.

Economic, Social Growth Said Stunted by Defense Needs

91AE0084A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
1 Oct 90 p 1B

[Article by Dani Rubinshteyn]

[Text] It is no accident that Minister 'Ariel Sharon, during his last appearance on the TV show "Moqed," had to resort to metaphors from the military and defense establishments to explain to the viewing audience the nature of the "battle" for the absorption of the throngs of immigrants. It is a language in which he is fluent and which we all understand. When Natan Sharansky complained about absorption shortcomings, he, too, was assuaged with examples from the era of the Six Day War. "You don't know how this nation behaves and mobilizes during an emergency," they told him.

It has been decades now that the Israeli national effort has invested overwhelmingly in defense matters deriving from the violent and prolonged conflict with the Arab world. Those matters determine almost everything. Last year the author 'Aharon Meged said he had investigated and found that nine out of every ten new Israeli films deal with Arab and IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] issues. That illustrates Israeli reality—especially since 1967—in which most of the energy and the best brains, in almost all areas, are directed in Israel to this one field. There is almost no need to prove it. The defense establishment has funneled generations of young Israelis and cultivated the best among them to be pilots, paratroopers, intelligence agents and, afterwards, managers of the country and the economy, with large defense budgets serving as comfortable foundation and upholstery.

The IDF was and remains the home of professional growth for many people—for engineers, for doctors, for economists, for educators, for psychologists and even for historians (the history branch of the General Staff). Functionaries in all fields have grown and matured in the IDF. Even Israeli efforts in the field of education, for example, were always seen through the security prism: military boarding schools, the Rafal youth and the seminary arrangements. The same applies to medicine—in emergency surgery and in burn treatment. And, of

course, the same can be said for technology—the military industries, the Combat Means Development Authority and electronic intelligence. These are merely examples, to which could be added the almost compulsory preoccupation with Arab affairs and defense that engages the world of Israeli culture and the humanities, the theater, literature and music.

That is perhaps the reason why Israeli youth and young adults never took any part in the problems and movements that occupied their contemporaries throughout the Western world in the last generation. There are no "Greens" here now and there never were any other serious movements for environmental quality, no feminist groups, and no antinuclear struggle groups either. We didn't have the time or the energy for any real social reform. When one Israeli book finally reaches the top of the New York Times best seller list, it could only be a "defense" book by a renegade Mossad agent. Israeli authors, as well as producers, artists and sculptors, never even got close to lists like that. That would seem impossible in a provincial setting that fosters and nurtures mainly defense officers, security personnel, weapons experts, traffic analysts—"a generation of secret police," as Yeshayahu Leibovich predicted 20 years ago.

In order to absorb the immigration we need to develop other systems, economic and social. Such systems were established and expanded in the 50's and 60's and even before that, but have since become dormant and conservative. In contrast to the military-defense establishment that has moved forward, education, health and welfare seem almost as they were a generation ago, subject to worn-out, cumbersome schemes. All attempts made since the 1967 and 1973 wars to promote them have failed. Once, a few years ago, the division among the parties in Israel and (sometimes particularly) in the settlements had to do with social and economic issues. Who can remember such a division today when what distinguishes the parties are only issues of territories, Palestinians, settlements in the occupied territories and annexations. On social and economic issues, the disputes are within the parties, thus preventing debates, struggles and changes.

Sometimes it seems that where immigration absorption is concerned, Israeli spokesmen cannot manage with military metaphors alone, but rather the entire issue is measured through the eyes of defense. Will they settle in the territories or will they contribute to demographic change in the Galilee? Maybe they will reinforce the annexation of East Jerusalem? Minister Sharon told Jews in Moscow that it is important for them to come to Israel to work in construction so that the building industry will cease to be Arab and become Jewish. And Minister Levi responded to Secretary of State Baker, who demanded guarantees from him that American money for the immigrants not go to the territories, using tough language: "You have pressures, but I have a Weltanschauung." What Minister Levi sees as a "Weltanschauung" is territory, and that is the defense trap that could bring disaster to immigration absorption.

Bruno Expresses Fears for Economic Program

91AE0133A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 26 Oct 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with the Governor of the Bank of Israel, Mikha'el Bruno by Sabbar Plotzger; date, place not given]

[Text] For weeks, the governor of the Bank of Israel has been sitting quietly, eating his heart out. The government's economic plan is very similar to the plan prepared by the Bank of Israel. It seems that no Israeli government, except the present government, has ever adopted a concept prepared in the Bank of Israel. The governor is thus finding it difficult to disassociate himself from the plan's results and has decided to speak his mind after waiting a relatively short while.

Professor Mikha'el Bruno, in his composed style, sees the plan dissolving. A resolution is not a decision, and if this is nevertheless the case, it is being ruined in its implementation. Unlike many others, Bruno still believes that careful implementation will yield the hoped for results. However, such implementation is not seen from the seventh floor of the Bank of Israel. There is much evidence, and Bruno enumerates some of it, that the matter is not working properly. If this is the case, there is a risk that the immigrants will not come, veteran Israelis will leave, or all of us will become [residents of] an Albania.

Bruno does not discuss politics. However, one can discern from his remarks that, beyond the economic mistakes in the implementation of the plan, a political difficulty in implementing the plan is bursting forth on the horizon. Whoever proceeds on a line of confrontation with the United States will not obtain the necessary financing for investments in the economy. The plan's success is conditioned on quiet and political settlements, two products prominently lacking in the Middle East in general and in Israel in particular.

The following is what Mikha'el Bruno said this week in response to questions posed by MAMON [YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement)]:

[Plotzger] Two things can be discerned in the economic program. One is that, except for legislation, nothing is required of the government. The second is that the public is not required to bear a burden. It is as if some kind of machine existed here, in which immigrants and a lot of money from abroad are inserted and mixed, and everything comes out fine. It is said that you are responsible for the concept.

[Bruno] The plan for absorbing immigration includes not only a series of measures decided by the government in its last meeting before the holidays, but also what it decided prior to that regarding housing and industry. That is the plan in its entirety. Now, [moving on] to the "burden." First of all, regarding the government: Very

weighty duties are imposed on the government. However, there are things that the government cannot do. I want to re-emphasize this distinction. The government has three central duties. One is to make direct investments in areas in which the private sector is unable to invest, [such as] highways, communications, research and development, basic research, and higher education.

Second, the government needs to create a climate in which the private sector can operate more efficiently, including conducting a macroeconomic policy that includes markets and the maintenance of stability.

Third, the government needs to reduce uncertainty in the economy. For example, the government is assuming very large risks through the guarantees system, whether regarding its commitments to acquire apartments from a contractor, or [its provision of] guarantees for investments in production.

[Plotzger] And the public?

[Bruno] We traditionally identify the public's burden as an increase in taxation. The first question that must be answered is whether or not a larger overall tax burden is now required. My reply is that the burden is high and should not be increased further. On the contrary, the overall burden should be decreased over time. If the government decides to impose an added-value tax on vegetables, fruit, and tourism, such a tax would not be intended to increase the overall tax burden, but to finance a decrease in another area, such as the national insurance paid by employers.

Nonetheless, I want to say that we could see large temporary governmental expenditure in the budget submitted for 1991, due, for example, to larger defense expenditures. The burden will probably increase for that purpose, but only temporarily. Is a larger, overall tax burden needed to absorb immigration? My answer is no.

[Plotzger] It is convenient to talk about taxation. However, this burden is [composed of] taxes, subsidies, and payments for public services. Does the government perhaps need to trim flesh rather than raise taxes?

[Bruno] The absorption of immigration requires [the placement of] a burden on the public, but not through taxation. However, the public's willingness to bear that burden is not at all clear. I am referring to what is heard in the labor market. Investments are needed to absorb a very large number of immigrants into the labor force, especially investments in industries that make it possible to export and exploit the advantage gained by the absorption of immigrants with great human capital, a high professional level. However, the investment process takes time. If you invest considerably now, dividends will not be realized for another two or three years in the best of cases. Therefore, within the next two to three years, it is actually necessary to employ hundreds of thousands of workers on the basis of the existing production system. That is a problem. The only way to contend with it is to liberate the rigidity in the labor market.

[Plotzger] That is Greek to me. To liberate rigidity means to reduce wages.

[Bruno] It means to allow wages to be fixed at the level required by objective conditions, which is to say to reduce real wages temporarily. In practice, such a "reduction" is not real. The consumer price index reflects housing prices as well. Most of the increase in housing prices does not actually reflect an expenditure by households. Therefore, in terms of real purchasing power, there is no real reduction.

[Plotzger] Why not address the matter directly and say: Let us reduce wages. Here is the burden. We will reduce everyone's wages and incomes by ten percent.

[Bruno] Why reduce? Give the market freedom to determine wages. Why? There are areas where real wages will decline, and there are areas where wages will increase. Now, where are they likely to decline and where are they likely to increase relatively? Immigrants coming to Israel in the fifties were non-professional workers, which caused a reduction in the wages of these workers and a relative increase in the wages of professional workers. Now the opposite is happening. Among immigrants, there are many professionals, and a relative decline in their wages is therefore required. Regarding the average wage, in our estimations, real wages need to drop somewhat, perhaps by 2 or 3 percent, after which they will rise quickly.

[Plotzger] Why this yo-yo?

[Bruno] Because we are beginning from a high point of labor costs, due to excessive wage increases in the past. Since 1985, real average wages in the economy have exceeded productivity by 15 percent. This fact, as well as the need to absorb thousands of workers in employment, must cause a temporary decline in wages. Wages will begin to rise within two to three years.

[Plotzger] If the wages of professionals must drop, why did you adhere to the minimum wage?

[Bruno] [On the contrary,] there are areas in which the current minimum wage precludes the survival of branches that the economy should continue operating for a time, such as the textiles branches or branches in the food industry. In the longer term, I believe that the economy will not be based on factories or on branches in which you need workers [who are paid] at the minimum wage. However, in the meantime, it is prohibited to relinquish these branches, and they must be allowed to absorb workers at a lower wage.

In my view, the minimum wage and unemployment insurance in the construction and sanitation branches, or even in textiles and food branches, preclude the possibility of employing additional workers in those branches. Therefore, there is no contradiction between these two matters. What is needed is a more flexible system that will permit a low wage in a number of places for some period of time.

[Plotzger] You stated that the public is showing no signs of willingness to bear the burden.

[Bruno] The strong forces in the economy are attempting to act against the trend toward a temporary reduction in wages. If there are strikes by large committees, whom do they represent? The high [end of the] wage scale. Such strikes are moving against the trend that would allow immigrants to become integrated in the economy with fewer shocks. They reflect a lack of willingness on the part of a certain public to bear a real burden.

[Plotzger] Why not close Israel permanently to workers from the territories? Would that not solve a large part of the employment problem in one fell swoop?

[Bruno] In practice, Israel is becoming closed to workers from the territories, because of a preference for Jewish workers, who are more regular and less uncertain. Until this year, there was almost no alternative to employing residents of the territories. Now, the immigrants present an alternative. This issue also has a political aspect: Israel is responsible for what happens in the territories as long as it holds them, and there is the question of how the absence of economic activity among residents of the territories affects hostile terrorist activity itself. But that is not my department.

[Plotzger] What about the reduction of public services?

[Bruno] Different types of "public services" need to be distinguished. When you reduce the government's share in health expenditures, those who can afford health services will pay for them with their own money. Those who cannot afford them are harmed. I am absolutely in favor of privatization in the area of health. Whoever can afford to purchase health services can do so himself. However, the state must nonetheless supply some minimum to those who cannot afford health services. The moment one discusses a drastic decline in the level of health services, the existing Israeli population is harmed, especially those who cannot afford health services. You would thus be saying: I will harm veteran Israelis and perhaps encourage a decline [in health services] to absorb new [immigrants]. You would gain nothing.

Defense expenditures are a different matter. It is currently difficult to speak about a need for a cut in defense expenditures. It could be said, rightly, that events in the Persian Gulf do not permit such a cut. There is even discussion now of a certain increase in defense expenditures. Let us believe that the crisis in the gulf will end. It will take a month, two months, a half year, or a year. We are now talking about the absorption of a million immigrants over a five-year period. It is thus necessary to think in multi-year terms. In these terms, we must not increase defense expenditures. If you do not increase defense expenditures, and if product indeed rises, the percentage of defense expenditures in product would be smaller, and you would obtain a dividend in the government's budget.

[Plotzger] Do you still believe that it is possible to import \$30 billion from abroad in the next five years?

[Bruno] It certainly poses a difficulty. However, it should be viewed in the appropriate proportion and perspective. If the planned investments are not carried out, capital will not have to be imported. If investments are made that require the import of capital financing, product will increase at a rate of 8-10 percent annually in the business sector in the next five years. Such an increase will facilitate the mobilization of capital.

The assumption that it will be possible to mobilize [capital from abroad] has two parts to it, political feasibility and economic feasibility:

Political feasibility: I do not believe that it is possible to mobilize large sums in the American economy if the U.S. Government does not signal to financial markets that it believes in what Israel is doing, and that it is therefore "worthwhile for you to give as well." Without that, it is difficult for me to see that there would indeed be financing. In my view, it is also reasonable to assume that it would be difficult to mobilize money as long as political uncertainty exists.

Economic feasibility: Let us assume that the political feasibility is appropriate and that the economy is on a course of more rapid growth. In my opinion, that would facilitate the mobilization of capital abroad, provided that the immigrants are convinced that the Israeli Government knows how to manage its economic affairs properly, which, to my regret, is certainly not necessarily being proven by the government's present behavior.

[Plotzger] What if you cannot import \$30 billion, but only \$10 billion or \$15 billion?

[Bruno] In that case, there are three possibilities: The immigrants would not come, because there would be no apartments or work; many would leave; or there would be a need to return to a completely different production system and framework of life. The product level would be lower, and production would not be of the kind where you have an advantage. You would need to employ Russian workers at a low level of production and in the services.

[Plotzger] Would engineers be refueling cars at gas stations?

[Bruno] Who would have a car then? How many cars would there be in an economy that employs another million workers without investments? The economy would be set back 40 years regarding its technology level and living standard. That is possible. It is certainly possible.

[Plotzger] You stated earlier that there is no evidence that the government is implementing its plan.

[Bruno] I am very dissatisfied with what is happening in several areas. I will enumerate the main ones:

The labor market: This is a central issue in my opinion. It was decided to reduce the cost of labor, with the understanding that counter-financing would be contained in the budget. Without a valued-added tax on fruit and vegetables, there is no financing to reduce national insurance. Without a reduction in this tax, it is difficult to reduce labor costs, and without such a reduction, the immigrants will not be absorbed into the labor market. Another issue is unemployment compensation. It was decided to change the form of payment. Now, where is it. In the best case, I would say that I do not know. Why? Because of two reasons: Even if the secretary general of the Histadrut [labor federation] agrees [to such a change] in his negotiations with the finance minister, you do not know what will happen in the Knesset, which still has to receive the economic plan. We know that many Knesset members are declaring themselves opposed to it. The immediate matters that have been fully implemented are those that are the responsibility of the Bank of Israel.

Guarantees for investors: We wanted the government to guarantee half of the volume of investment. Now, investments will be provided with a full state guarantee in an uncontrolled manner. This is an example of a proposal gone bad which is likely to be damaging in the sense that it will create white elephants. We have a rich history of ten years of a crisis in which growth was 3-4 percent despite great investments, which shows that investment alone does not produce growth.

Housing: The data show that there is still a supply of land for construction, against which there is no longer a demand [for land] on the part of contractors. If one looks at the plan to build 45,000 housing units this year, there is land for only half of them. Contractors maintain that land is too expensive, and the housing minister said, in the ministerial absorption affairs committee, that [land] prices should be reduced by 50 percent. It is correct that prices should be lowered, but not through an artificial price reduction. An initiated price reduction only allows the contractor to enjoy the remaining 50 percent. The market should be flooded with land. Then prices would drop.

[Plotzger] Why do they not do that?

[Bruno] I estimate that the Israel Land Administration is acting as a private land seller, whose main consideration is maximum profit. That means that it needs to show a large treasury. This is precisely the consideration according to which a governmental ministry should not proceed. The administration should not act to bring in maximum profit, but according to what is best for everyone.

Exposure: The original idea was that, as of 1 January, there will be no more import licenses, no quotas, and a shift to different customs according to need, with a very important qualification, namely the prior announcement that the process will end in the elimination of customs within five years. According to what I hear: (a) there is a

great fear that import licenses will not be abolished on 1 January, at least for a portion of the products; and (b) the decrease in customs will be dissolved for products whose licenses will be abolished.

[Plotzger] Why does the plan not contain a serious attempt to lower inflation?

[Bruno] Were it not for immigration, it would be clear, at least to me, that one of the most important things that would have to be done in the macro area would be to make an organized effort to lower inflation by another degree. However, we cannot allow this at present. Do not misunderstand me. That does not mean that efforts should not be spared to prevent an increase in inflation in the framework of the economic plan. That is possible.

[Plotzger] In the meantime, has the inflation rate increased?

[Bruno] In recent months, there has been a month-to-month increase in prices that was higher than in the previous year. This increase could continue for another month. That still does not mean, in my opinion, that inflation has risen. An increase in inflation depends on whether the linkage mechanisms will roll prices toward wages and [wages] back toward prices. To prevent that, it is necessary to treat the cost-of-living increment agreement. I think that it would be desirable for the Histadrut to permit a one-time delinkage [of wages] from essential appreciations of fuel and apartment prices and an increase in the added-value tax, i.e., a substantial restriction of the cost-of-living increment agreement. That will prevent these one-time price increases from being translated into a higher inflation rate.

If that does not happen, inflation and unemployment would certainly be in danger of increasing further. In addition, the government must restrain increases of prices under its control, and must avoid a repeat of the fuel affair, when it increased the price of gasoline as a result of an increase in the price of oil. On that unfestive occasion, the government also increased its tax receipts.

A combination of all of these developments, including making the labor market more flexible and maintaining the budget framework, will prevent an increase in inflation.

Bank Le'umi Chairman on Jobs, Inflation, Moda'i
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p 9B

[Interview with chairman of the board of directors of Bank Le'umi L'yisra'el [National Bank of Israel] Moshe Zanbar by Dov Goldstein; place and date not given]

[Text] Moshe Zanbar advocates an orderly doctrine: "To make the Israeli economy thrive and to create jobs for hundreds of thousands of new immigrants, it is better to implement a plan (even if absolute confidence in the correctness of the plan is lacking) than to argue over and

decide on plans without actually implementing a good plan or an incorrect plan. That is the current situation. There are plans. There are even decisions. Only actions are lacking."

[Goldstein] Is Finance Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i perhaps not focusing as he should? Does he perhaps not have the necessary backing of the government and the prime minister?

[Zanbar] The finance minister must have comprehensive political support backed by a large party, or he must enjoy the prime minister's full, strong, unshakable support, of which all government ministers must be aware. In the absence of such conditions, the executive power of the finance minister is necessarily damaged. In this regard, Moda'i has difficulties, although he is capable of carrying out the weighty tasks imposed on him in terms of his personal ability to comprehend and execute.

[Goldstein] What is the upshot of the finance minister's lack of support?

[Zanbar] The danger is that the government could lose (and the finance minister will not be blamed) an opportunity to increase Israel's Jewish population with all of the economic, security, social, and other implications [that such an increase entails]. The gravity of losing such an opportunity cannot be overstated.

I share the fear that is settling in the hearts of many, and am willing to be harnessed together with others, to lessen the fear and restore hope to the heart of all of us, so that it will be possible to contend with this great challenge and to succeed.

[Goldstein] Those who dare to say aloud what afflicts others in their heart of hearts—are they really right when they say that a small, poor country compelled to allocate large amounts to secure its existence in a region frequently swept by the danger of war, is unable to absorb a 25-percent increase in its Jewish population? Could the great United States conceivably absorb 60 million new immigrants in a few years?

[Zanbar] Let us put aside the United States for a moment and discuss Israel. In 1948, the state was established in the midst of a storm of war. At the time, there were 650,000 Jews in the state. Within three and a half years, albeit under difficult conditions, 700,000 Jews were absorbed in Israel, which is a 110-percent increase in the Jewish population. Currently, 3.7 million Jews must absorb 900,000 Jews within about three and a half years, which is an increase of less than 25 percent. Would that be impossible compared to what was possible in the past?

All measures of economic strength have changed since the first years: National per capita income in current prices is about four times greater than it was then, and the gross national product has increased ten times. It is possible! One must only believe that it is possible, instead of arguing.

Only a short time ago, it was publicized that governmental economists had prepared a contingency plan for what to do in another two years when the economy [is thought to] collapse due to the accumulating burden imposed by the absorption of immigration, the burden on security, and social tensions. I responded then, and I want to reiterate: This and similar plans must be filed away quickly. It is necessary to prepare and implement plans that induce entrepreneurs to invest in the state, so that jobs can be created for hundreds of thousands of workers, now and in the coming years. We can now realize Zionism, which has changed suddenly from a dream into a reality.

I assume that complete agreement exists up to this point. There is only debate regarding how this is to be accomplished—how does one create hundreds of thousands of jobs? Who would do it—the government, the business sector? How could entrepreneurs be convinced to invest their money in Israel?

Pardon me, I am not at all certain whether complete agreement actually exists. There is verbal agreement. However, each day, we all realize that there is apparently no real agreement regarding the actual implementation of plans. Someone claims that gains can be achieved only according to his way. Someone else refutes that claim entirely, because only he has the true solution. The result is that they talk much but implement virtually nothing.

All of the plans speak of the necessary objectives, of the need to create 550,000 jobs in three to four years, 450,000 in the business sector and 100,000 in the governmental sector. The objectives are correct, but there is no chance of achieving them through the government's declared policy.

In May 1990, the Bank of Israel published a booklet entitled "Economic Policy in the Immigration Period." That plan was based on a forecast of 300,000 immigrants in the next three years. However, it is now clear that 800-900,000 immigrants will arrive. During 1990 alone, close to 200,000 will apparently come. A plan to cope with the absorption of 300,000, even if it is a good plan, would not succeed in absorbing 900,000. It is impossible! The needs are different now, the dimensions are different, and the means must be different.

[Goldstein] The reader and myself are now certain that you will outline in detail the measures that need to be taken.

[Zanbar] Absolutely. An emergency awareness is needed. In my language, that means that whoever was thinking of medicine for the economy's malaise must recognize the urgency of the matter. There must be an end to discussion and debate. The ground is burning. If there are no solutions, and if solutions are not implemented, the problem will disappear, because immigration will cease. Immigrants will not come and those who have already come will leave in the coming years. If we do not absorb

a quarter of a million immigrants, we will not have a problem absorbing a million.

[Goldstein] Are there already signs that the immigrants from the Soviet Union are seeking ways to leave Israel?

[Zanbar] I do not know, but there certainly will be. It is almost an unknown fact that, in the past five years (1985-89), 70,000 immigrants arrived and 65,000 citizens left. The increase was 5,000 alone. The economic situation, not the security situation, caused them to flee. At the time, the government was struggling with inflation of 20 percent per month. It has succeeded in the struggle. The continuation of the same policy has created severe unemployment and large emigration from Israel. The current and future economic policy must create many jobs to contend with unemployment.

[Goldstein] Even at the cost of bringing back commercial inflation?

[Zanbar] No, but even if we concede our ambition to lower inflation from a double-digit to a single-digit number, the main thing now is to create jobs and to absorb the immigrants.

[Goldstein] It is no longer possible to put off your response to the question: How are hundreds of thousands of jobs to be created?

[Zanbar] There are two ways: either the public sector or by the private sector will create them. If the government creates them, it will need to return to the method employed in the state's first decade. The collapse of centralized regimes in East Europe and failures in the public sectors of Western Europe and Israel substantiate the assumption that it is much more efficient and safe in the long term to assign the task [of creating jobs] to the business sector. No business element will establish a new factory or expand an existing one if it cannot assume, with a high degree of probability, that its investment will produce suitable yields. Without an improvement in profitability, there will be no investments. The government's role is to ensure a suitable level of profitability for investors. If it fails to do so, the result will be most serious: The government will do nothing, claiming that the business sector should, whereas the business sector will do nothing, because the conditions for achieving the required profitability will not have been guaranteed, which is precisely the situation at present.

[Goldstein] Is suitable profitability currently lacking in the business sector?

[Zanbar] Profitability has improved due to the increase in demand stemming from the population increase. However, that is not enough to convince private entrepreneurs to risk new investments. The new markets will be abroad. Competition and risk are much greater abroad than in the Israeli market. Profitability must be so high as to convince the entrepreneur to assume all of the risks. Any parsimony in this regard entails a very

great danger: Immigration to Israel will decline and emigration from Israel will increase.

[Goldstein] What should be given to entrepreneurs to convince them to invest in Israel?

[Zanbar] Three things should be outlined: profitability, a reduction of the risk of loss, and a suitable cash flow. The plans designated as the "Nisim Plan" and the "Sharon Plan" reduce the risk borne by the investor by providing for governmental guarantees of two thirds of an investor's investment (in other words, if an investor incurs losses, he would lose no more than one third of his investment). These plans even promise the investor a cash flow from the banks. However, regarding profitability, there is no improvement. The opposite holds: There is a declared policy of not adjusting the exchange rate to price increases in Israel, i.e., a policy to prevent devaluations. No entrepreneur will invest in a factory whose product is intended for export under the conditions of a economic policy whose centerpiece and essence is the prevention of devaluations.

[Goldstein] However, devaluations renew the danger of inflation.

[Zanbar] True, such a danger exists. However, there are means to counter it: A reduction in demand in the economy by means of an improvement in savings terms, so that the Israeli citizen will consume less and save more; a strict wage policy; and the sale of government assets. After all, the danger posed by new jobs not being created would be far greater than the danger posed by us failing to lower inflation under 10 percent or preventing it from increasing by several percentage points. A wise policy distinguishes between the primary and the secondary, and there is nothing more important now than the creation of hundreds of thousands of new jobs.

External Loans To Finance Immigration

91AE0185A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Business Supplement)
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[Article by David Lipqin]

[Text] International meetings are known to be an ideal place to examine new subjects. The heads of several Israeli banks proceeded accordingly at the annual conference of the International Monetary Fund [IMF], which was held several weeks ago. The Chairman of Bank Le'umi, Moshe Zanbar, the Chairman of Bank Hapo'alim, Professor Eytan Bergles, and the Chairman of Bank Discount, Yosef Chahnovor held discussions with directors of well-known banks for the purpose of probing.

Israeli bankers thought that their foreign colleagues were aware of the expected Israeli storming of the international banking system to mobilize large loans to finance the absorption of immigration. After exchanging pleasantries, several of the foreign bankers surprised their Israeli colleagues when they clarified to them that they

had heard nothing about Israeli intentions. Given that Gulf affairs have been their main concern as of late, they were unable to provide pertinent responses regarding the chances of Israeli requests to obtain large loans.

In the meantime, Finance Ministry leaders have presented bank heads with the dimensions of the loans that will have to be mobilized abroad to absorb immigration. It emerges that the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Israel expect Israeli banks to be the conduit through which they will succeed in mobilizing about \$20 billion in the next four years for immigration absorption purposes, i.e., half of the amount that is needed.

With this information, chairman of Bank Hapo'alim's administration 'Amiram Sivan, went to hold discussions with large banks in Europe and the United States to examine their degree of willingness to make large loans available to Israel. The answers he received were not encouraging.

Sivan concludes that foreign banks are currently unwilling to hold discussions regarding financial frameworks. In particular, they are unwilling to provide financial loans to the Israeli Government. They are willing to provide credit to Israel only for essential operational matters. In other words, Sivan explained, short-term or even medium-term credit frameworks could be established if an industry requires certain equipment, or if raw materials have to be imported. That would be the way to increase foreign currency sources for the use of the economy.

Sivan assumes that if we manage to achieve a 9 percent annual GNP growth rate and thus require \$2-3 billion in investments, there would be no difficulty in mobilizing this sum. However, this sum represents only a small portion of what is needed by the economy, which is facing the absorption of hundreds of thousands of immigrants. The situation is different regarding the mobilization of long-term financial loans. It is currently impossible to mobilize the billions of dollars needed by the economy, mainly because banks are refraining from giving large loans to countries due to the events of the Persian Gulf crisis.

Moreover, Sivan adds, when the Persian Gulf crisis is over, we will discover that banks in the world will want to secure governmental guarantees if larger amounts of credit are sought from them. The banks will not want to risk giving large loans without receiving large guarantees, inasmuch as they have learned the lessons of the tens of billions of dollars in loans given to South America, and lost when those countries' economies collapsed. Sivan does not think that the U.S. administration will display generosity by providing Israel with grants and allocations beyond what has already been provided to absorb immigration in Israel, unless an attainable political settlement appears on the horizon. The Americans would certainly be willing to help further to achieve a political objective. However, this is a political matter disputed in Israel.

It would also be possible to mobilize bank loans through a framework of guarantees. The U.S. Government provided \$400 million in loan guarantees. If the U.S. administration responds to another request, the framework of credits from U.S. banks could clearly be enlarged. However, it would, nonetheless, be far from responding to Israel's needs. In this connection, Sivan indicates that financial organizations in the world are well aware that the U.S. Government provides great assistance to Israel and that U.S. Government has recently employed the guarantees system. These facts determine how countries other than the United States treat Israel.

As long as the U.S. Administration does not come to Israel's aid, Israeli banks can mobilize credit only within the scope of their inclusive operations. However, the banks alone can mobilize only limited amounts through the credit lines which they establish with foreign banks.

The problem is serious, Sivan emphasizes. The original plan envisaged the absorption of a million immigrants within five years and the need to mobilize \$20 billion. In the meantime immigration has intensified and the rate of immigrants is increasing, which further aggravates the problem. Banking cannot do more than what it has already taken upon itself. Therefore, foreign currency must be a primary consideration in the economic plan. Sivan maintains that measures of greater sophistication could have been taken if planning had been more orderly.

He adds that, given world economic conditions, in which Germany is getting ready to mobilize substantial credits, and where international organizations are supplying large loans to the Soviet Union, it will be difficult to mobilize larger sums of money for Israel. He estimates that, without U.S. guarantees, there is no chance of mobilizing the billions of dollars that are needed.

When resources cannot be obtained abroad, savings become much more important. Sivan stresses the need to reconsider the policy in this important area, inasmuch as it is vital to encourage, not liquidate, savings.

Attorney Hayim Katzman, one of the heads of the Karmel Mortgages Bank, submitted ideas on how to mobilize capital in the international money market to Finance Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i.

Katzman, who spent last year in Miami and visited Israel briefly last week, thinks that, with correct handling and the use of appropriate techniques, Israel can attain a position from which it will be able to mobilize money at a reasonable price. The key question is: What rating will Israel be able to obtain? The lower the rating is, the lower the price of capital is.

Katzman indicates that, Standard and Poor, the well-known American rating company, gave Israel a BBB rating, which is on the verge of a negative rating. He maintains that if an effort is made to deal in the international capital market, despite the political risk, a

better rating could be obtained. Finland, for example, Katzman indicates, had an enemy such as the Soviet Union on its borders for years, but it nonetheless managed to obtain a high AAA rating. Israel, on the other hand, has for years been accustomed to traditional capital mobilization methods and has neglected to form a strategy for improving its credit rating. The irony in this regard is that Israel has scrupulously repaid its foreign debts for 40 years, never falling behind on its payments or requesting payment schedule changes.

Together with a large American investment company, Katzman has recommended how the Finance Ministry should proceed so that we can mobilize substantial credits abroad. He maintains that, by obtaining an appropriate rating, Israel can mobilize about \$3-4 billion per year on the international market.

[box on p 5]

Germany Poses Strong Competition

Israel will find itself facing a new reality in the international capital market when it seeks to mobilize billions of dollars abroad. Germany will also be actively seeking to mobilize loans in the international capital market. Bonn will need to invest hundreds of billions of marks in the economic rehabilitation of East Germany in the coming years. It is already clear that Germany will be competing for sources in international financing organizations.

London bankers estimate that Germany will be mobilizing more than a billion marks in credit per working day in 1991. It is clear that German credit mobilization activity on this scale will generate high interest rates contrary to forecasts made in early 1990, which predicted a decline in interest rates. All of these developments will occur at a time when the United States, Britain, and France will be interested in weakening pressures on the credit market to produce a drop in interest rates to prevent the recession from deepening.

Germany has been known for its large balance-of-payments surplus. A post-unification reestimation determines that the governmental deficit alone in 1991 will total 140 to 150 billion marks, i.e., close to 5 percent of the GNP, following the implementation of economizing measures, including cuts and savings totalling about 30 billion marks.

The "Bundesbank," Germany's central bank, has estimated that about 100 billion marks will be injected into East Germany in 1991, which is about 6,000 marks per person, in addition to income from unemployment grants and health and pension payments.

Profits of Major Banks Drop in 1990

91AE0185B Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 4 Dec 90
p 1B

[Article by David Lipqin]

[Text] The recession in Israel has not only hurt the banks' profits. The crisis affecting the illiquid assets

market in the United States and Britain has also contributed to the drop in profits, although the banks have reduced allocations for potentially nonperforming loans, as shown by data from the banks for the first nine months of 1990.

The surprising development regarding competition between banks is that Bank Hapo'alim has now managed to capture first place in terms of net profit, surpassing Bank Le'umi by 3.2 million shekels, compared to last year's gap of about 40 million shekels in favor of Bank Le'umi.

The net profit of the five major banking groups for January-September totalled 314.2 million shekels, an 8.9 percent drop compared to last year. This drop occurred even though the banks managed to reduce allocations for doubtful debts by 30.7 percent to 843 million shekels, compared to 1.21 billion shekels last year. In addition, Bank Discount and Bank Beynle'umi recorded a drop in profits.

The change in profit levels altered the bank's rankings in terms of proceeds of net profit on capital. Bank Beynle'umi remained ahead with 7.1 percent, Bank Hapo'alim was second with 6.2 percent, Bank Mizrahi was third with 5.7 percent, Bank Le'umi was fourth with 5.3 percent, and Bank Discount was fifth with 3.7 percent.

Previous years have witnessed surprises in the fourth quarter of the year, because the banks have had to make unexpected allocations for potentially non-performing loans, which changed their profit margin.

Bankers are assuring that they made the required allocations during the year, so that allocations for debts will not have to be increased substantially.

Electoral Power of New Immigrants

TA0301171A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Jan 91 p 2

[Text] Professor Wolf Moskowitz from the Hebrew University estimates that "the new immigrants from the USSR can become an electoral power which will break the political deadlock between the Likud and the Alignment in the next elections." These are the findings of initial research conducted on immigrant absorption in Israel, published recently by the Institute for Jewish Affairs in London.

The research, entitled "Israel and Immigrant Absorption," adopts a critical approach to what is happening in the sphere of immigrant absorption. Among other things, the research presents a hypothesis regarding the electoral weight of the immigrants. The researcher notes that any failure in the absorption of immigrants will result in a wave of protest.

According to him, the Alignment hopes that the well-educated immigrants will adopt a liberal approach,

whereas the Likud is sure that the immigrants will vote for the Right. There is no doubt that the religious parties will be hurt in the next elections because the immigrants have a secular attitude.

From a historical perspective, Professor Moskowitz compares the human quality of this immigration with the immigration from Germany in the 1930's, which assisted in the establishment of the infrastructure of the future state.

Moskowitz, who emigrated from the USSR in the 1970's, states that the motive for immigration is the concern of Jews that the internal and economic situation in the USSR will worsen. In his opinion, there are in the USSR about 175,000 Jews in addition to the 350,000 who present themselves as Jews through false documentation.

"The exodus of the 1990's," as he terms this immigration, is characterized by a large number of elderly and a majority of women who make up 53 percent Families which arrive in Israel on the average of 2.8 members, in comparison with Israeli families which number 3.6 members.

The immigrants are not motivated by Zionist ideology like those of the previous aliyah. This fact will help them be absorbed and integrated into Israeli society better and more quickly than their predecessors, because they do not have "romantic dreams" but, rather, a strong desire to preserve Jewish tradition.

The immigrants, according to the researcher, have a strong desire to work. In contrast to Israeli society, where more than 32 percent of the women are housewives, among the Soviet immigrants only 1.5 percent of the women are housewives.

More than 30 percent of the immigrants are professionals, but they have the ability to undergo retraining. According to official statistics, less than 1 percent of the immigrants live in the territories, but if immigration reaches two million, a larger proportion will settle there.

KUWAIT

Opposition Intellectual Discusses Crisis

91AE0094A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
6 Nov 90 pp 24-26

[Interview with opposition leader Dr. Ahmad al-Raba'i, by Salih al-Azzaz: "Iraqi Regime and Nothing Else Is Reason for Foreign Presence in Region," Riyadh, date not given; first paragraph is AL-MAJALLAH introduction]

[Text] Dr. Ahmad al-Raba'i is a professor of philosophy at the University of Kuwait. He is one of the writers of the newspaper AL-WATAN who have made their presence known in recent years. More importantly, he is considered the engineer of the Kuwaiti opposition and

one of its energetic leaders. AL-MAJALLAH interviewed Dr. al-Raba'i in intervals between sessions of the People's Congress held in Jeddah. He revealed the new thinking or new political mentality of the Kuwaiti opposition. What al-Raba'i says is part of the thinking of the majority of the opposition, which agreed a few days ago on a popular petition. This was followed a few days later by a position against the recent invaders in which the Kuwaiti government and the Kuwaiti street took pride. The text of the interview with al-Raba'i follows.

[Al-'Azzaz] We want to open the pages of history to read the crisis. Why did it erupt in this form? Is it the fate of the nation, or is it its history? What do you think?

[Al-Raba'i] First, I think we must begin with the axiom that the psychological explanation of history is something that must be handled with caution. Talking about history as a connected chain is also something that requires a great deal of caution. Talking about a rooted Arab character, sometimes tied to tribal roots and to the idea of war in our Arab history, is a dangerous proposition. The psycho-historical analysis of a social phenomenon should not be applied to all ages and all times, so that we portray the Arabs as nothing but a group of people who have fought each other throughout their history, as if by fate. I think such an analysis is greatly lacking in precision. It is also wrong to talk about the European mind as by nature an advanced, organized mind—one that was, is, and will remain an organized, European mind. The precise, organized Europe that deals with the latest technological inventions was in certain periods many mutually antagonistic nations, linked only by war and tribal or religious conflicts. I think what is happening now is linked to the kind of economic and social development the Arabs have experienced in modern times. We face frustrated nations. They had many schemes for revival—Islamic, nationalist, leftist, or rightist (name them whatever you want)—but the schemes upon which the modern Arab revival movement began have reached a dead end. So there is a feeling of frustration that now affects people's psychology. This is also connected to another very serious matter: we are still a nation that consumes what others produce; we are not part of contemporary productive human civilization. This creates in us a great lack of self-confidence. Issues are raised without regard to rationality. Sometimes we behave on the basis of psychological reactions to our backward reality. When one compares this backwardness with the contemporary progress of other nations, we are a frustrated and troubled nation. Although we are a big nation with enormous resources faced with a small enemy, we have never succeeded in defeating or even curbing this small enemy. This small enemy, Israel, remains superior to us despite our enormous resources. Take education as an example. We have many universities that graduate large numbers of students every year. But the question remains: what is the final product of these universities or of the educational system? Are we producing intellectuals, or at least people worried about what is happening to human civilization?

In short, we are living without strategic thinking. We are always tied to action and reaction. This is something that continues to dominate us up to the present. We have no strategic horizon in thinking about the future. So we wait for the crises, and when they occur, we deal with them by reaction. We run after history; we do not make it. We listen to the news; we do not make it. We are in love with short and medium waves. Others produce news so that the devices they have produced can be used and so that we can listen to this news. This situation creates an unnatural, unstable psychological state in Arab individuals in this period. In short, we must acknowledge that we are living outside history because history now is possessed by those who possess strategic vision and planning for the future and by those who possess technology, progress, and science. At the same time, no one has prevented us from acquiring technology or from progressing. Rather, we have invented a lie for ourselves—"imperialism"—that is preventing us from progressing. This is something that I think needs to be reconsidered. Imperialism can prevent the weak and the hesitant from progressing, but it has never prevented individuals from being creative or pioneers in any field. It has prevented no businessman in any Arab country from building an advanced school at his own expense. It has not prevented the establishment of a new university. So our crisis is of our own making, and we should be honest with ourselves about it. We live in a state of uneasiness because we always deal with the other and forget ourselves. We always look for an enemy. Sometimes we fabricate this enemy in order to project our mistakes onto him. We try to create many enemies for ourselves, so as not to be faced with the truth. The truth is that we are frustrated, afraid, and hesitant. The time has come to raise this question and discuss our crisis—the economic and social crisis as something connected to the intellectual crisis.

[Al-'Azzaz] But how will this be done?

[Al-Raba'i] I believe that the most important part of the problem lies in the need to deal with man as a supreme value. When the Koran looks at man specifically, it does not single out Muslims or believers. Rather it says: "We have honored the Children of Adam" [Koran, 17:70]. Man is God's greatest creation in this universe. Until now, we have not been dealing with man as a supreme value, but as merchandise or as livestock. If we treated him as a value, if we trusted him and allowed him to pour forth his abilities and creativity, we would create a great deal. In the Gulf crisis now a lot has been said about how we cannot defend ourselves and how we are weak. This talk also needs to be reexamined. The crisis has proved that we have thousands—tens of thousands—of young people ready to make sacrifices. But we have not created the right climate for taking advantage of all these abilities, solidifying them, and making them a force able to defend itself. Our problem now is that we are peoples who are experiencing danger, but who are not trained. There is no confidence in the peoples in the Gulf, the Arabian peninsula, and the Arab world. I

believe that dealing with man is the right approach to developing strength and ability. Respect for the human being and considering him a value are two important elements, because the man whose rights and freedoms are respected can create and develop. But the frustrated and persecuted human being is inactive and ineffective: his existence as such is a negative addition. The world's enlightenment movements began with human rights. When we give man his freedom and respect, we can enter the other world.

Scenarios and Goals

[Al-'Azzaz] Many scenarios have been proposed concerning the goals, causes, and roots of the crisis. What do you yourself say?

[Al-Raba'i] I am against the conspiracy theory in all its forms and against saying that there is a conspiracy in everything. Conspiracy exists, but it is effective against the weak, the simple, and the stupid. One cannot conspire against the strong and self-confident. An aspect related to other interests, those of other international powers in the region, may have entered into the current conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. But I believe the crisis is Arab, related to the kind of government in some Arab countries, particularly Iraq. The core of the issue is absolute one-man rule that makes decisions without regard to their consequences. Absolute one-man rule does not listen to others. It acts unrestrictedly at a time when there are no longer any heroes, conquerors, and great men. Even Gorbachev and Bush, as leaders of the two greatest countries, do not behave as if they were heroes in this world. The advanced countries are countries of institutions, not of individuals. The age of Bismarck and of unity by force has ended. Hitler and Napoleon lived in ages that have ended. Now we face civilized societies. A simple example: the American president makes his only appearances during this crisis while playing golf or fishing. Some simple people in the Arab world ask in amazement about this phenomenon and whether it means lack of interest. The answer, quite simply, is that the American president is not the one who makes the American decision. While on vacation and engaging in his private hobbies, he can sit half an hour with representatives of institutions such as the Pentagon, Congress, the National Security Council, receive all the confidential reports, and then make the appropriate decision in light of official information and reports. But in the Arab world, some nations, especially Iraq, are still the prisoners of absolute one-man rule. The individual strongman acts without taking account of the nature of the world now. I therefore believe that Iraq made two big mistakes which are the heart of its current problem. It took no account of the international consensus, despite the Gorbachev phenomenon, and despite the existence of a new world that does permit altering geography. Being outside history, and being an absolute government, the Iraqi leadership could not study this phenomenon rationally, just as it did not study the phenomenon of the domestic Kuwaiti consensus. It believed that it could make the Kuwaiti domestic front disappear by

raising a few baseless slogans. So I believe that absolute one-man government is a great danger to the Arab world. I am not exaggerating when I say that if Saddam Husayn goes, another Saddam Husayn will come. If the mentality of governance in some Arab countries does not change, one strong-man government will be followed by another strong-man government. We must change to government by institutions. People must be given the right to express their opinions. When that happens, I do not think a crisis so great will be able to erupt. This, and nothing else, is the heart of the crisis.

[Al-'Azzaz] Many cards have fallen. Faces have been uncovered. Slogans have been shaken. Values have changed. People in various places have been shaken. What do you think about the surprising positions that have been taken by some political currents and by some thinkers and leaders?

[Al-Raba'i] The Kuwait crisis has uncovered an important proposition that was clear, but that many people overlooked—namely, that it is not enough to hold up a placard or set up shop as a rightist, leftist, or nationalist in order to represent Arabness or Islam. The Kuwait crisis has drawn a clear line between opportunism and a principled position. I believe that if we really appeal to principles, the use of force is inadmissible. This is a basic principle. My being the stronger does not justify my invading my neighbor or imposing unity by force, because that contradicts basic principles. As a general rule or principle, one may not occupy the territory of others. The issue of injustice is one: I may not keep silent about the injustice done to one people and defend another people from injustice. I think that whoever keeps silent about the injustice being done to the Kuwaiti people, while defending the Palestinian people from injustice, is a hypocrite and is not starting from principles. In issues of truth and falsehood there is no halfway position. There is no person with half a conscience. There can be a person with half a kidney or half a lung. We cannot say that such and such a leader is excellent or less bad because he killed only one person, while the other one is evil because he killed a million. Murder is murder. If we used this as a rule in our political dealings or in our daily life, basing our positions on it, the crisis would be solved. Therefore, I say that the Kuwait crisis has uncovered the dividing line between being an opportunist and being a person of principles. The crisis has proved that some Islamic currents represent principles. They therefore took the stand one would assume they would take. There are also some nationalistic currents that took the principled stand on the issue. The converse is also true: there are opportunistic currents in both the nationalistic and the Islamic tendency. I believe this is an excellent test that has been revealed by the Kuwait crisis. It is a historic period of turning. As a certain philosopher says, "When the train of history rounds a dangerous bend, many fall from it. For a great, dangerous turning point can be borne only by great people. Small people and dwarfs cannot endure in important historical periods." The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait is a

guiding test in this area. As the poet says, "Thank God for tribulations, for by them I have known my enemy from my friend." The Kuwait issue has revealed the difference between opportunism and principled positions. The ordinary Arab must not be deceived by slogans and placards. The age of "long live" and "down with" has ended. Ended is the age of holding up placards so that people can run panting after them. The problem is that we are dealing with opportunistic and unprincipled leaders who can shift from position to position. I think this is the fundamental problem with which we must deal seriously.

I want to distinguish between pretended leaders and historic ones. Historic leaders lead people, and are not led. The theory that "the masses are right" is wrong. We must be wary of the theory that "the masses are the makers of history." The historic leader is the one who says no in the face of the masses, when he consciously and rationally believes that what is happening is a mistake. For example, the Palestinian street is frustrated for many reasons. The Palestinian people have been evicted, their rights have been violated for 40 years, and they have been living in tents. Some ordinary Palestinian gets up and says, "Let's turn things upside down in the Arab world: we may come out with something. Certainly, the situation will be no worse than it is now!" I can accept such talk from an ordinary, uneducated person, but not from a Palestinian political leader who has spent over 40 years in the struggle. I cannot accept that anyone should hold up "anti-imperialism" to me as an isolated slogan. There are historic leaders; and then there are leaders who were in their homes or dens and have suddenly come out and become leaders in the Jordanian street and elsewhere merely by raising the deceptive slogan that they are against the foreign presence, without linking this presence to its causes and justifications. Who is the cause of this foreign presence? It is the Iraqi regime, and nothing else. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait is the cause of the foreign presence. So the friends of Iraq who raise the slogan of the foreign presence ought to address their words to Iraq and ask it to withdraw from Kuwait. When Iraq withdraws from Kuwait, they will then have the right to talk about the foreign presence. For us to jump over what has really happened and talk about the foreign presence, forgetting all these antecedents—that I believe is hypocrisy. While such hypocrisy and ignorance can be accepted from an ordinary citizen, we do not accept them from any leader.

Future of Relations

[Al-'Azzaz] Based on the framework from which you have been speaking about the crisis, how do you think Kuwait will shape its relations with the Arab world in the future?

[Al-Raba'i] I think that our relation to the Arab world—as people of principles—should not be shaken. Our principles must be firm. Jerusalem must remain in all our hearts, despite the sadness in the hearts of Kuwaitis toward the Palestinian leaders. We must distinguish

between hypocritical or venal Palestinian leaders and the oppressed Palestinian people. This is a matter of principle on which we cannot accept bargaining. Furthermore, we must not lose confidence in ourselves. Some people are raising a slogan that implies that the Arabs have abandoned Kuwait. This is untrue. The majority of the Arabs are on the side of Kuwait. Also, Kuwait or the Gulf region cannot live outside the Arab world. We must agree that this is a matter of principle. There is no possibility for Kuwait or the Gulf to live outside the Arab national framework. If there is a crisis, it is the absence of a unified Arab national security system or the absence of Arab coordination as a minimum. The idea of Arab unity, Arab solidarity, and a united Arab position must not be shaken in the depth of our hearts. But we must be cautious in our dealing with others. I think the approach to the question can be summarized in a proposition that is relevant not only to the Kuwaitis, but also to the Gulf Arabs in general. It can be summarized in a single proposition: we have given to the undeserving and deprived the deserving. Billions were given to Arab leaders. It would have been better had half of this money been allocated to the Arab peoples—had schools, hospitals, and universities been built for these truly needy peoples, instead of pouring the money into the pockets of persons who sent it to their private accounts and then lectured us about patriotism and fairness regarding "the sated Gulf" and "the poor countries of the north." Take Yemen as an example: I think the reason for hesitation in the Yemeni position toward the crisis has been the pressure of the ordinary Yemeni street. When a Yemeni citizen finds himself being treated in a hospital built by a Gulf state and studying at a university built by a Gulf state, he realizes what Arab relations mean. I think the reason for the confusion in the Yemeni position is that there is a street that the Yemeni leaders are taking into account. I am certain that if what was paid to Jordan or some other countries had been paid to these peoples, or if half or a quarter of what was paid to the PLO leadership been paid to the Palestinian people, we should now be all right in this matter. I think this is a great lesson. When we pay money, we must realize first of all that we are not paying it as charity, but as a duty. We must persist in this duty, but we must direct this money to those who deserve it. I think this is a great lesson we have learned from this crisis.

[Al-'Azzaz] At the level of the GCC countries, what do you think are the changes that must be taken into account after this crisis?

[Al-Raba'i] I think the first point in this subject is that the issue of Gulf unity or of Gulf relations is still a theoretical question that we raise at conferences or in discussions in closed rooms. The tragedy of the Kuwaiti people has proved that this people has support and backing from the countries of the Gulf. One need only imagine what would have happened had the Kuwaiti people been expelled in the absence of these Gulf countries: one would have to picture the matter as a great tragedy. But the truth is that when the Kuwaiti people

were expelled in their homeland, they betook themselves to the Gulf countries and felt that the change was slight. The ethical and humanitarian position that the Gulf countries took proved that the Gulf world is well. We must take the question of Gulf unity seriously this time. We must rid ourselves of any hesitation on our part regarding Gulf unity. This crisis has confirmed that the Gulf people are one and that any fear of Gulf unity is unjustified and unacceptable. I now believe that every Gulf citizen has learned from the lesson of Kuwait. The Kuwaiti people have paid a tremendous price, but the lesson has been one for the Gulf and not just for Kuwait. So I think we must reexamine our vision of the future of the Gulf region. On the other hand—and I hope they will understand the question as it really is—the Gulf countries must not be afraid of the other view. The other view in a community is a force for the community and for the political system, not the opposite. The Kuwait experience has proved that the existence of other directions within society, sometimes disagreeing with the regime on some questions, is not a weakness, but a strength. The image of Kuwait in international meetings now is that it is a civilized country and that people who disagreed only a short time ago on many issues have become one force. I believe that the existence of differing opinions in a society is a great strength for the political system, provided that all the directions are committed to a true political game, rejecting violence and bigotry, accepting dialogue, and agreeing on basic principles. The other thing is that we are now in a world of large blocs. There is no place for Kuwait, or Qatar, or any other country alone. If we unite with all our countries, we shall at least constitute an entity capable of defending itself. The world today accepts only the big. The United States of Europe will be proclaimed in 1992. There is a unification scheme in Southeast Asia and the unification of the two Germanies. So I think the time has come for all of us in the Gulf region to work together as a single political bloc. There will be difficulties, but I think that the existence of a joint Leadership Council for these countries makes it possible for the rulers of the Gulf region to turn into members of this council. There would be a unified administration of international relations, oil, and foreign relations. There would be a unified bank and a single currency. Afterwards, let every regime continue to have its particular form. We have many examples in the world today. Or let us originate a new system in the world, preserving special characteristics if there are special characteristics, while holding fast to common characteristics. We should not be afraid of these questions, because there are many examples and experiments that have gone before us in this area. We must establish for ourselves a definite system with a certain flavor, odor, and music for each region, but with full harmony between all these elements. Much is possible, if the subject is opened to discussion. I think the time has come for us to lessen the gap in our society between political decisionmakers and the overwhelming majority—particularly between political decisionmakers and intellectuals. We are all in one boat. The question is no longer a political luxury or a political dispute; it is a

question of survival. I therefore think the time has come to hold a conference of Gulf intellectuals. The problem of Kuwait and the problems of the Gulf should be raised. This group of intellectuals should be given freedom to debate in closed sessions at which economic and political issues and all other related questions would be raised. The conclusions of such a conference would then be presented to a Gulf summit, with the goal of translating the ideas and studies into reality following agreement on them. Unification of our reality and of our foreign policy will lead to our being respected in today's world, which does not accept the small. I think time is not on our side.

LIBYA

Foreign Liaison's al-Bishari on Relations With West

91A40073A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
24 Oct 90 p 38

[Article by Rifat al-Najjar: "Ibrahim al-Bishari Reaffirms His Country's Constant Policy; Libya's New Foreign Minister to AL-MAJALLAH: We Reject Radicalism and Violence in Arab Action; We Have No Objection To Establishing Relations With United States"]

[Text] The conference of the nine Arab and European countries for security and cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea was the first task of Ibrahim al-Bishari, the new secretary of the Libyan People's Foreign Liaison Bureau (foreign minister). During the conference, invited to meet by Italian Foreign Minister (Di Michelis), AL-MAJALLAH interviewed Libyan Minister al-Bishari and asked him several questions on the topics of the hour, the first of which concerns, of course, his assessment of the conference he is attending and the resolutions the conferees have adopted.

On the first issue, al-Bishari said: "This is the first conference at the foreign minister level between the Arabs and the westerners overlooking the Mediterranean Sea. The idea was originally launched by Italy and was then embraced by Spain and Italy. Its purpose is to create a framework of economic cooperation and political consultation between the four Mediterranean countries and the countries of the Maghreb Union with the objective of transforming this area into a peace and cooperation region. This is an acceptable model between north and south. As for the outcome, I believe that it is good, considering the number of programs that have been agreed upon, such as the programs on food security, labor emigration, indebtedness, and the creation of joint multilateral financial institutions, including a development bank for the Arab and European countries overlooking the Mediterranean Sea. Generally, the conference is a good beginning. We have agreed to hold it annually. It will convene in Algiers next year. The conference chairmanship will be alternated."

On the crisis of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Libyan minister said that Libya's position is clear and that Colonel Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi has offered a peaceful initiative to solve the crisis—an initiative which incorporates several points, highlights the Libyan position, and calls first for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and replacing [Iraqi forces] with UN forces, in addition to the withdrawal of foreign forces and, if necessary, replacing these forces with Arab and Islamic forces.

As to whether Iraq has gone too far in its refusal to withdraw from Kuwait, the Libyan foreign minister asserted that it is important to hold dialogue with Iraq to convince it to withdraw from Kuwait and that the Arabs favor the use of diplomatic means in solving their problems.

Constant Policy

As to whether his selection for the post of secretary general of the People's Foreign Liaison Bureau confirms the occurrence of change or renewal in Libya's foreign policy, al-Bishari said that Libya's policy is constant and emanates from a number of firm principles that seek to serve the Arab causes and the third world causes.

Regarding Libya's future foreign policy, the minister asserted that he will work to entrench everything leading to unity in the Arab homeland, strengthening the Arab Maghreb Union, and bolstering and developing ties with Egypt. He said that a special ministry has been established to achieve integration with Egypt, adding that the same integration will be achieved with Sudan while taking into consideration development of relations with neighboring countries, Mediterranean countries, and Islamic states.

Presenting a reflection of what may be considered his political program as Libya's foreign minister, Ibrahim al-Bishari went on to add: "Our objective will also be to bolster whatever is likely to give a good impression of the Arabs, such as seeking to solve the Arab problems peacefully and through dialogue. We support the Palestinian people's intifadah [uprising] which is given priority in our efforts." He further added: "Efforts must also be made to eliminate radicalism or violence from Arab action because the methods of radicalism and violence and the use of old means in solving disputes are very detrimental. Libya is a democratic country which has a people's authority, congresses, committees, and unions. It distances itself from violence and calls openly for openness in all actions and for renouncing radicalism and underground action. This is why we want dialogue to be the path to understanding among us as Arabs and understanding between us and others."

Relations With West

Regarding Libya's relations with European countries and the United States, al-Bishari said: "Efforts are actually under way to develop our relations with the EEC. As for the United States, we have no objection to establishing

relations with it within the framework of mutual respect and nonintervention in our national and pan-Arab options."

Regarding Libya's connection with terrorism and with what the west alleges in this regard, al-Bishari reaffirmed that Libya is opposed to terrorism, the hijacking of aircraft, and aggression against the innocent, that it supports the peoples' struggle, and that it is not responsible for the methods employed by others. He added that never in the past nor at present has Libya been involved in any terrorist operation and that such involvement is no more than rumors disseminated by the Zionists.

The Libyan minister went on to tell AL-MAJALLAH: "A number of western officials have emphasized to me that they are convinced that Libya has no connection with terrorism but that Zionist agencies involve Libya's name to cover crimes they perpetrate."

League's Return

Regarding the division on the issue of the Arab League's return to Cairo, al-Bishari noted that the accord is Arab, it is tantamount to a final decision, and the disagreement is on procedure, not on the principle.

Regarding Arab conflicts, Libya's foreign minister expressed the belief that relations are normally between peoples and that under no circumstances should these relations be influenced by governmental conflicts. He also expressed the belief that Libya is for all the Arabs and that any Arab can enter it without a passport. He added: "We have opened our borders to the Arabs."

Concluding the interview, the minister said: "We have an ambitious plan in Libya to resettle one million Egyptian citizens and one million citizens from the Arab Maghreb countries to create a true bond between the Arab countries."

MOROCCO

University Department Head Sees Research Difficulties

91AA0118A Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 25 Nov 90
pp 4, 8

[Interview with Dr. Driss Ben Ali, head of Economics Department in Rabat Faculty of Legal and Economic Sciences, by Moustapha Razrazi; date and place not given; first paragraph is AL-'ALAM introduction]

[Text] Dr. Driss Ben Ali is a professor and head of the Economics Department in the Rabat Faculty of Legal, Economic, and Social Sciences. His economic studies have earned international and Arab renown, especially in political economy. The publication of his book, "Le Maroc precapitaliste," influenced a number of writers after him in political economy and sociology to study the economic and social structures of 19th-century Morocco and the intellectual legacy left by French economic

scholars and economists concerning the region. This week's interview was with Dr. Ben Ali. [Razrazi] Dr. Driss Ben Ali needs no introduction regarding his scholarly and intellectual contributions, especially to Moroccan economic thought. But it would not be out of place for you to tell us more about yourself. [Ben Ali] It is hard for a person to talk about himself. I will stick to speaking about my education. My primary and secondary education were at Moulay Youssef in Rabat. I continued my university education in Rabat, and completed it afterwards at Grenoble in France, where I received the advanced studies diploma and the state doctorate at Grenoble University. [Razrazi] One of Dr. Ben Ali's first and most important publications, which created a great stir in Morocco and the Arab world, especially in economic and sociological circles, was "Le Maroc precapitaliste." Now that a long time has passed since its publication, how do you assess the results and themes of this study? [Ben Ali] This study is, as you said, old. One naturally does not want to go back to an old study, because one cannot keep repeating the same conclusions one reached more than 10 years ago. Indeed, a scholar prefers to forget what he wrote in the past. Be that as it may—I think that at first I was not prepared to complete this study, because my education did not qualify me for it. I began my education in accounting and quantitative economics. It was only as a result of urging that I became interested in socioeconomic problems. During the sixties many intellectuals kept asking why a country like Morocco was so backward. I had two options: either to repeat what others were saying in the majority of books—the country was backward, the purchasing power of the population was weak, the population was high, etc.—things that everyone knew. Although this approach might give a picture of the current phenomena of underdevelopment, it would not show us the causes and roots of the backwardness. On the other hand, we could take the discussion to more remote levels. That was when I discovered that the search for deep answers to problems like these inevitably plunges us into historical research. So I did research in colonial sociology. There were two attitudes toward the subject. One viewed it as racist sociology, which there was accordingly no reason to study. Everything was then being done in the name of nationalism, and in its name certain subjects were embargoed. The second attitude exaggeratedly glorified this kind of sociology and presented it as a unique knowledge of the problems of the present. My position at the time was for neither the first nor the second attitude. I started from the idea that if the colonialists had been able to rule Morocco and impose certain laws on it, they must undoubtedly have known Morocco. What happened to Morocco was that it was the last country to be colonized; when it was colonized, colonialism had developed its methods. Thus, the colonization of Morocco was more anthropological than military or economic.

A kind of anthropological raid or invasion of Morocco took place during the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. This made colonialism in

Morocco more advanced than in other countries. Lyautey applied a number of methods considered to be in the vanguard of colonialism without changing the social framework and structures of Morocco, but at the same time he introduced new methods that enabled French colonialism to leave major impressions on the society. Whatever we may say about them, they were greater than the impressions left on other neighboring countries, even though colonialism in those countries lasted longer than in Morocco.

This is an indication that colonial sociology had great effectiveness. It did not start from preconceived ideas, but from a real understanding of the society. It then used this understanding in purely colonial ways and for purely colonial ends. [Razrazi] Starting from the ideas of the same study, I notice that many scholars of economics and sociology are now in the process of discarding a number of concepts and tools that until recently were considered constants in analysis—for example, "mode of production" and "social formation." Economic research once used to be characterized by comprehensiveness, quite the opposite of what we see today, when studies have come to have a penchant for particulars and to be devoid of the old concepts. Can this be traced to new directions in economic research, such as "economic microscopy," or is it a result of a general transformation in economics and economic research? [Ben Ali] I think you are right to point out the disappearance of the kind of generalizing economic studies that used to raise certain problems that are no longer a subject of discussion today. Why? The problems that interested students during the fifties and sixties no longer command the same importance and position, because the reality that once surrounded us has now altered. Also, economic discourse itself has seen a remarkable change, and with it economic concepts have seen basic adjustments and changes.

Today we have moved away from the generalizations that served research during a particular period and revealed an important part of the economic reality of our societies. Today necessity demands that one examine the depth of things by going out into the field to comprehend and precisely define many things and phenomena that used escape our notice. General research can no longer present anything valuable for the goals that science has come to pursue. Necessity therefore requires that one return to the field, question the reality, and carry out experiments and studies that investigate the reality with all its details. The current logic of research demands a return to quantitative economics, instead throwing it onto the trash heap, as was the case in the past. It has now become necessary to curb the influence of ideology on scientific research. While it may be impossible to eliminate a logic of normative judgment, at least it is necessary to trim this logic so that scientific research can achieve its goals outside of every influence that distorts its precise results.

I believe that for a long time in the past many Moroccan economists did nothing, but what could be called confusion and polemics. Those analyses and debates were like a fashion that infected everyone—like a cold that spread with great rapidity among us. People began talking about things like those we have mentioned—"center and periphery," "modes of production," "economic and social formation," and "independence." Everyone began to repeat these themes and talk about them. Everyone would put forward a conceptual and theoretical structure or system that he would try to adapt to the reality of the facts. Perhaps this situation was one of the factors that led to a change in the course of economic scientific research. If we were to survey what Moroccan economists wrote about the Moroccan economy, we would find nothing important, because there is no clear foundation in their treatment of the issues with which they deal. It is enough that you be in the front ranks, that you be well known, that others talk about you, and that you satisfy these others. These are the rules of recognition. Basically, they are political attitudes, not the attitudes or behavior of a man of science. A politician is someone who seeks to be liked by others; he makes adjustments so as to gain or control the interest of admirers.

However, a man of science is preoccupied in his depths by scientific research and exploring reality with his scientific perspective that targets no other values than the scientific reality of things. Unfortunately, in Morocco we find that a man's scientific value starts and is created from his political value and from his ability to dominate, talk, offer promises, and quarrel or from his ability to appear on television. These are all things unrelated to science. In this context, we find a number of personalities well-known at the public level, but with no existence in the scientific field, whom we nevertheless find have obtained grants or awards concerning problems about which they are completely ignorant and have not the slightest scientific knowledge. Science needs men with special characteristics: simplicity, competence, patience, and the honesty that forces repeated contact with reality with the aim of understanding and comprehending it. Economics will gain a great deal when researchers come to be in constant contact with the field and absorb themselves with the facts in order to reach the deepest realities and essences. There is no longer room for the game of "the minor technocrat," who spends all his time between his office and the university, has no knowledge of reality, yet dares to talk and theorize about this reality. When we examine the names of those who developed the economic sciences, we do not find that they were office holders, but rather theoreticians like Smith, Ricardo, Stuart Mill, and Keynes. So one must beware of confusing a number of interpenetrating issues here. [Razrazi] How would you assess the contribution of the University of Morocco to promoting scientific research? Has it been able to prepare a suitable soil for the creation and practice of scientific movement, or has it remained limited to the task of graduating holders of diplomas? [Ben Ali] I think that the University of Morocco began its activity in a direction that was

instructional, rather than scientific and research-related; this because Morocco in the postindependence period needed cadres and persons able to stimulate the economic and managerial machine. The university was considered the place that would provide such cadres. The university was in fact able to provide many technocrats, some highly skilled at operating the machine. However, scientific research stayed at the end of the line at the University of Morocco. If we want to compare the university's coverage and sponsorship of scientific research, we find it insignificant in comparison with other activities. An important number of people through their own individual efforts were able to produce quality scientific output, but they remain a very limited group in comparison with the size of the population and its needs. Two causes may possibly have retarded this function: the need for cadres, and the politicians who intruded and interfered in the area of science. Naturally, we cannot dismiss the factor of insufficient resources: scientific research cannot be produced without abundant resources and a suitable material ground, just as one cannot carry on war without equipment and military plans. The University of Morocco still does not have available the minimum amount of equipment needed for scientific research. For example, if we were to consider the condition of the social and anthropological sciences in Morocco, we would conclude that the equipment needed to carry on scientific research in these fields is simply nonexistent.

Scientific research in Morocco is therefore still an embryo or completely nonexistent—if we want to present the facts without wishful thinking. Only individual, private efforts are competing in the scientific field.

We have no organized research in the real sense in the university. Another factor may also be playing its part in creating this situation: the French legacy, which left us a split between the university and active practical or professional life. The universities in France have now witnessed a development and have become an effective presence in active life, contributing through this presence to organization, participation, and production. We in Morocco, on the other hand, have preserved the traditional structures of the university system. The universities are in one corner, and the technocrats are in another behind their desks. Each of the sides plays in the other's field. Each believes that it, not the other side, possesses the truth.

The technocrats try to marginalize the academics. The academics react to their marginalization by producing critical discourse that heaps all blame and scorn on the other side.

I think the time has come to change this situation in a society that has become or wants to become modern. This society must effect a reconciliation between its different sectors. The university must go forward beside management for the purpose of promoting the growth and progress of the society. Deep down, Moroccan

management remains obsessed with the colonial complex. Whenever there is an application for carrying on some research, everyone's eyes focus on the fact that there is a "foreigner" in the management, and the university remains isolated with its academic interests and preoccupations. Indeed, all departments and agencies, even foreign ones, work with the university and call on it to cooperate, except Moroccan management. [Razrazi] I asked Professor Ben Ali to return to one of the problems that is currently being proposed for Moroccan economic research. The subject has to do with the privatization plan, about which there has been a great deal of discussion recently. To what extent does this plan fit the pressing needs of Moroccan economic reality? Will the economic structures in Morocco aid in its realization? [Ben Ali] We should explain that privatization is a measure and method within other measures. One turns to it within a comprehensive reform plan in the context of a reshaping whose goals are defined by the makers of privatization. I mean that privatization is not merely a measure to which one turns in order to reduce the government's budget. I will explain: the Moroccan government is experiencing a tremendous deficit whose effects on the public sector became apparent long ago. This deficit is estimated at about 400 billion dirhams and has become a burden on the budget of the government, which is also suffering from the burden of foreign indebtedness that has reached a tremendous amount, exceeding 100 percent. At an initial stage, under the pressure of international organizations, the government thought that it would rid itself of the public sector in the hope of lightening the burden of the government budget. In this sense, privatization at first meant to Moroccan officials merely the transformation of public property into private property. Afterwards, privatization took on another dimension inspired by the thinking of the World Bank. Privatization became not merely a simple, particular tool for reducing the burden of the government's budget, but a systematic, clear reform directed toward strengthening market mechanisms in the Moroccan economy. The IMF's basic point of departure was that the Moroccan economy is not a purely liberal economy, but rather a mixed economy in which the government frequently intervenes in petrified forms. This severe governmental interference in the economy was considered the cause of the Moroccan economy's crisis and deficit. Therefore it is necessary to get rid of state interference in the economy. The Moroccan economy should again be made profitable by revitalizing the mechanisms of the market, so that prices can play the role of an indicator of economic growth. Thus, privatization is a basic element.

However, what these people forget is that privatization is not merely transferring public ownership to private ownership. In order to realize privatization in its comprehensive, reformist sense, there must be competition. Therefore, when we talk about privatization, we should not talk about converting state property to private property; that is not at all what privatization means. That would be merely transferring property without reforming

the economic market, and it would be better for the property to remain public instead of passing to private individuals.

The second thing about the subject of privatization relates to the possibility of achieving privatization in a different way—i.e., by rationalizing the management of publicly owned companies without their necessarily being subjected to privatization.

When we talk about privatization in Morocco, we should not downplay the yield of government-owned companies. On the contrary, a study by the Canadian firm Laflan informs us that of 157 government-owned economic establishments, only 23 are suffering from a deficit—just the opposite of what the advocates of privatization imply. The public sector is not as bad as they try to present it to us, and not weak as they claim. A large part of it is very profitable, especially if we do not limit ourselves to the monetary criterion alone, but also consider other economic and social criteria. All the hoopla surrounding the subject of privatization comes from overinflating matters that we can restore to their correct perspective.

If the public sector is suffering from a deficit today, it is because in the end it has given privileges to the capitalist bourgeoisie in Morocco. This is the main problem. The prices applied in the public sector reflect an attitude that aims at helping the private sector and preferring it above the other sector. This has been expressed from the beginning.

Before we condemn or denounce the public sector, we must make the public sector as well carry on its activity in the market with the same privileges that are granted to the private sector. Then it will be seen to yield more than the other sector. We can present the region of northern France as an example. It is a region most of whose establishments belong to the government, yet it is the most developed and profitable region in France, because it in turn has been subject to the law of the market and to rational management of the economy.

By this example we simply want to make it clear that the prevailing confusion derives from considerations that are not purely economic. When we compare the halo with which privatization has been surrounded and the government's proposal, which will transfer to the private sector only 15 percent of government-owned establishments—an insignificant proportion, because it stands against a total of about \$3 billion—we find that the government is calling for making a mountain out of a molehill. Perhaps the adage, "The mountain that hides a mouse," applies to us. [Razrazi] One of the most important world theories in international economics is the North-South dichotomy. What is your view of this analysis that contrasts the North with the South? How do you assess the future of the Maghribi Arab region as part of the South during the coming years in which the project of a united Europe will be completed? [Ben Ali] I think the North-South problem is now taking a new direction

in light of events in the Gulf. After the melting of the Eastern countries and the end of the cold war, everyone is talking about a new international order that will appear with new foundations and a new strength of leadership. Although the United States is one of the leaders, other leaders have come to exist on the economic side. In the Pacific area there is Japan, the center of leadership for the entire Asian region. There is Europe, which now has a leader in Germany. Then there is North America, with its leader the United States. But besides all this, there are the countries of the Third World. We must review history, which confirms that whenever there are crises or changes, they are accompanied by a rearrangement of the cards. The rearranging of the cards on the international level today will leave some people lucky and others unlucky. Some countries will benefit from the situation; others will be threatened with strangulation. For example, one major evaluation says that Africa will be one of the first regions threatened with isolation and marginalization. On the other hand, we find countries like Latin America making important efforts toward progress and development by establishing democratic systems—countries like Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and even Mexico, although the latter has not achieved as much as the others. If we try to talk about the effects of recent international changes on our Arab Maghrebi region and the Arab world generally, we notice that the Gulf crisis has begun to reflect a change in relations between the North and the South. We therefore find many people talking about the struggle of North against South. The cold war has ended; the East-West division has ended. If we review all the reports and all the literature, we notice that the North is afraid of a democratic outburst in the South that would threaten the industrialized countries. Also, the foundations on which the East and Arab Gulf depend and are based economically—oil wealth in view of the fact that oil is still a basic element in the world economy—explain all the movements now under way in the Gulf.

Perhaps what disturbs the United States now is that Iraq may through its invasion of Kuwait become a strong country with important resources whereby it controls more than 20 percent of the world's oil production and petroleum reserve. Naturally, this will give Iraq material and military strength. The military aspect is what raises the anxiety of Israel in particular, and this explains the activity of the Israeli lobby in the United States in recent days to exert pressure on the United States to strike and destroy Iraq.

In general, it seems that the direction of the conflict and opposition is between an advanced and profiting North and a South that is industrially undeveloped but demographically advanced. This is what makes us feel that the North is in the process of arranging its strategies against the South. In one way this is something that repeated manifestations across the Western Mediterranean region have reflected, such as the Marseilles conference and the Tangier conference. These manifestations have aimed at reordering and restructuring the Western Mediterranean. Why? Because there is the 1993 plan for a rebuilt

Europe. This has created fears on the part of a number of countries of Europe, especially France, which fears that German hegemony may cause France to lose its former rank. France is therefore now turning toward the Western Mediterranean region to guarantee a balance that would create pressure against a growth of German power. France wants to bring the Western Mediterranean region to Europe as a gift. So the cards are being rearranged and strategies are being redrawn regarding the region. The recent political events that the region has witnessed should perhaps be explained on the basis of these changes. Inasmuch as the countries of the Arab Maghrib are intended in these arrangements, they are being asked to make changes. It is no accident that we are hearing about changes in the institutions of these countries, about democratization, human rights, and all the things that issue from the same background.

Europe's point of departure is that the possibility of attaching the Arab Maghrebi countries to the Western Mediterranean group depends on realizing these changes in the economic and political institutions of these countries. These changes would create a rapprochement with the European pattern of economic and political life. On this basis the changes will become an insistence. North-South relations and links, especially with the Southern Mediterranean region, will become a means to guarantee balances with the growing role of Germany and to control southern migration toward the North. We therefore find a number of political movements and tendencies expressing this desire. When we consider the Le Pen phenomenon, it is an expression of the most negative form of what the Europeans are thinking about—namely, rejection of migrants coming from the South. The Europeans are now talking about certain reforms in the economic establishment and about decentralized distribution of certain industries in the direction of these southern countries. The Europeans are calling on these countries to make constitutional, economic, and political reforms, especially since a number of them are still in the line of danger. [Razrazi] The changes in Eastern Europe have given rise to the expectation "that this bloc, including the Soviet Union, will melt into Europe and become normal countries. Will it be easy in a short time to normalize these countries which for a long period were considered distinct from Western Europe? [Ben Ali] I think it is no longer possible to talk about the specialness of the East as opposed to the West. We now find that Germany with its two halves has become West Germany economically and politically. Hungary has started down the same road; in fact, it has been open for some time to reforms of a liberal character, bearing in mind that the Hungarians and Czechs have always had attitudes more inclined to the liberal West. Even from a historical perspective, the two have been among Central Europe's most industrialized countries and the two most forward in making reforms of a liberal nature. What we can say in this regard is that there is a process of fusion embracing all the regions of Europe on a Western liberal basis. One still has to talk about such economically backward countries as Romania and Bulgaria, both of which face a long

and difficult transition period before they catch up with Europe on the same path the other countries are traveling. I speak particularly about Romania, where the process of transition toward Western Europe may take a long time.

When we look at the Soviet Union, we do not find it capable—as it once was—of maintaining the role of leader or model. All these countries are called upon to change their structures. They are called upon to become convinced that there is a single great force: the Western model. We therefore find these countries moving toward transformation into countries with a market-linked economy and Western-style democracy, restructured therefore on the Western model. Of course, there remains the case of the Soviet Union, where the changes toward a market economy and the liberal experiment appear difficult. It is experiencing a period of *perestroika*, a period of disturbance and uncertainty, because its structures are involved with what relates to the nationalities problem, the weight of the army, and the customs and values that have been acquired from past experiences. There have been more than 70 years of socialism, and this means that it is difficult to get rid of the inherited ideological legacy. But the important point is that the Soviet Union is no longer a great power or a model, because it itself is looking for a model, which it is finding in the West. [Razrazi] As for the Soviet Union, don't you share my belief that Gorbachev, despite the noise that has surrounded him, is an ordinary man in what he is doing? Were he not a Soviet, he wouldn't be a phenomenon. [Ben Ali] True, it is because it is in the Soviet Union. But I don't know whether without Gorbachev the fall of the Berlin Wall would have been possible. Would the Iron Curtain have disappeared without the existence of Gorbachev?

It is natural for Gorbachev to become a world hero or legendary figure in some people's minds, and an enemy to be fought in the minds of others, since he has in fact created a position for himself in international strategy and economy. Furthermore, the economy of his country used to represent the primary enemy for the capitalist West, but now everyone talks about the victory of the West in the cold war. One should point out that in his own country Gorbachev does not enjoy the same popularity that he does abroad. Indeed, there are people in the Soviet Union who consider him responsible for shelving the socialist heritage. There are those who consider him a CIA cadre! But to return to what is reasonable and logical: Gorbachev has contributed greatly to making *perestroika* succeed, but he has acquired international renown because he has brought about reforms in the Soviet Union; had the same reforms come about in a small country, they would have remained ordinary. Did Gorbachev have a choice in what he did, or was he forced to do it? Were his choices correct, or has he brought the Soviet Union into a maze with no way out? All these things we shall learn from what history reveals. [Razrazi] There have been shining Arab names in Western and Moroccan socioeconomic research, names

that during the seventies were inseparable from the name of Driss Ben Ali—for example, Samir Amin, Paul Bascoun, and Aziz Belal. How do you now evaluate the contributions of these names? [Ben Ali] I must first single out Paul Bascoun and Samir Amin. Samir Amin is an economist who has tried to formulate a comprehensive view of the world economy. What has given Samir Amin his brilliance is his ability to extend thinking about the Third World, giving it new directions, especially the categories of perimeter and center. Samir Amin has successfully uncovered a number of aspects of the reality of the Third World. His observations have been exact. Today, however, we rarely speak about Samir Amin, because things have changed. The world has seen new developments that have made the theory of independence and center/periphery matters rarely taken up. For many people they have become useless vestiges. On the other hand, academics and scholars continue to grant his status as a scholar and the value of his theory on a number of issues on which his approaches were of value, rather than treating a scholarly theory as mere fashion that one jettisons as soon as a new approach appears or when a few features of reality change—especially since the reality of the Third World is complex and manifold. It requires that one arm oneself with all the tools of science and that one renew these tools.

One can talk about Paul Bascoun, who set out from a different approach. Bascoun set out from fieldwork. His work at first did not attract researchers, particularly the younger ones, who preferred general, comprehensive approaches and who therefore preferred Samir Amin to Bascoun, for example. But Bascoun is a basic authority for understanding Morocco, because he devoted himself to an exact and deep study of Moroccan society. Although we disagree with him about certain viewpoints or certain conclusions, Bascoun is one of the few who profoundly understood Morocco. His project was an extension of colonial sociology, but in its positive direction. He used to go out into the field to examine the reality in its small details. He therefore did not enjoy a flashy reputation in his day. He wasn't a star. Had he remained alive, he might have become one. That is the nature of things: Raymond Aron wasn't a star in his lifetime and became famous only after his death. On the other hand, there are "stars" who get academic positions and intellectual prizes without having any knowledge of things. Bascoun was one of Morocco's great researchers. History and sociology remain indebted to him for the knowledge and research he offered.

Aziz Belal, however, is still here, especially in the field of Moroccan economics to which he contributed his pioneering works, especially his book, "*L'Investissement au Maroc*." Even if it has now become one of the classical economic works devoted to Morocco, it is still indispensable to anyone who wants to understand the Moroccan economy. I know of no economic work that has been able to bypass the work of Aziz Belal. His book remains a basic reference because of the precise knowledge of reality it provides. Also, Belal was obsessed with his

university work in which he represented the values of an academic model of which there is no longer any vestige. What distinguished Belal was his love of scientific research, of teaching, and of his scientific interests that always accompanied him. He possessed the values of a man of learning—modesty, scientific honesty, and scientific sincerity—without all the outward signs of "stardom." What we must remember about Belal is that he was a man of learning first. Research and the university protected him from all other lights and other calls. Aziz Belal therefore was not a star.

SAUDI ARABIA

Soviet Trade Minister on Investment Opportunities

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[Dispatch from Jeddah by Hani Naqshbandi: "Soviet Minister of Foreign Economic Relations: Our Commercial Relations With Saudi Arabia Are Starting From Scratch. It Is Better for the Saudis To Invest in Our Market Than for Us To Invest in Theirs"]

[Text] Konstantin Katusev, Soviet minister of foreign economic relations, visited Saudi Arabia in an effort to bolster the Soviet-Saudi relations resumed two months earlier. It was the first visit to Saudi Arabia by a Soviet economic official in more than 70 years.

The visit is significant not because of its timing which follows the establishment of relations and coincides with the Gulf crisis created by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Rather, the significance of the visit stems from the nature of its objectives and the meetings that took place with King Fahd, guardian of the two holy mosques, and other Saudi officials.

The Soviet minister discussed topics ranging from joint ventures to the exchange of dialogue through reciprocal visits.

AL-MAJALLAH had an exclusive interview with the Soviet minister on the highlights of his discussions with Saudi officials and his future expectations for the Saudi market within the framework of probable links with the Soviet market.

[Naqshbandi] Did you reach any specific trade or economic agreements during your visits with the guardian of the two holy mosques, King Fahd, and other Saudi officials?

[Katuchev] We discussed a wide range of issues dealing with economic and commercial cooperation. However, when it comes to direct commercial relations, we are forced to start from scratch since none existed before, and transactions between Soviet and Saudi markets were frequently handled by middlemen. We noticed that the Saudi market had some Soviet goods. Soviet markets also carry certain Saudi goods and products procured

through intermediaries. In 1988, for instance, we bought more than 200,000 tons of Saudi wheat through a West German company.

[Naqshbandi] What is your projection for the volume of trade between the two countries as a consequence of establishing diplomatic relations and bolstering trade ties?

[Katuchev] The volume of trade will probably amount to some 10 million rubles, or \$15 million, by year-end. It would be possible, however, to expand trade and economic cooperation between the two countries further. In all my meetings, including those with the guardian of the two holy mosques, King Fahd, I found resolve and determination to develop trade and economic ties as a foundation for political relations between the two countries. The Soviet Union and its leaders, with the blessing of president Gorbachev, are equally resolved and determined to develop these ties.

[Naqshbandi] How about agreements and resolutions—did the two countries reach any such economic accords?

[Katuchev] We reached agreement with the Saudis on the legal framework for trade relations by signing a protocol for trade cooperation and installing Soviet commercial representation at the Soviet embassy. This is the best possible form to represent trade activity

We also agreed to exchange trade delegations and formally presented the Saudis with a copy of the document detailing how we envision commitments by both parties. These, in essence, involve promoting trade and cooperation and according each other most-favored-nation treatment.

[Naqshbandi] How do you envision the optimum practical application for trade relations between the two parties?

[Katuchev] We wish to develop trade and also to cooperate in major economic projects. The best means for developing trade relations is to accomplish full and total balance between the two parties in that respect. The competitiveness of our proposals, and those of the other party, will depend on the volume of movement from one side to another and vice versa.

[Naqshbandi] What are possible or desirable investment opportunities either in the Soviet Union or in the Saudi market itself?

[Katuchev] Our focus is to participate in major projects in Saudi Arabia and to welcome Saudi capital within the Saudi Union. Such capital, for which we will guarantee the appropriate investment climate, could enter into joint ventures with Soviet partners, finance the importation of certain Saudi industrial products, or be used for stock acquisition within the Soviet Union. In general, we welcome all Saudi investments regardless of their commercial form but we focus on the petroleum industry—oil exploration and extraction—and petrochemicals. We also emphasize military industries which are currently

being turned over to the civilian sector now that the cold war is dissipating. Investment opportunities also exist in tourism and related industries as well as in the food sector. In summary, many investment opportunities exist that could help bolster our trade and economic relations.

[Naqshbandi] Which market offers wider investment opportunities—the Saudi or Soviet market?

[Katuchev] Saudi firms will fare better in the Soviet market than Soviet institutions in the Saudi market because the former is quite extensive and replete with untapped investment opportunities. Saudi market activity, by contrast, has attracted foreign and global firms to invest and compete.

[Naqshbandi] In general, how do you envision investment in the Soviet Union after perestroika, and what guarantees do you offer investors there?

[Katuchev] Glasnost and perestroika no doubt offer considerable guarantees for the safety of investments in the Soviet commercial market. In addition, a number of laws guarantee the optimum performance of foreign investments in a climate of certainty. We have already concluded tens of agreements with foreign countries, governments, and private individuals, after assuring them of optimum investment guarantees.

[Naqshbandi] How do you view the Saudi economic market?

[Katuchev] It was difficult to fully evaluate the capacity of the Saudi market during my recent visit. However, we learned in meetings with representatives of trade groups that the market needs certain goods and products such as electronics and raw materials that can be supplied by the Soviet market. Expanding the volume of Saudi purchases from the Soviet Union would give us the financial means to reciprocate by importing certain Soviet needs that are plentiful in Saudi markets, such as Saudi petrochemicals of high quality and modern technology for the extraction of lead-free gasoline with available capacities and capabilities, which are needed and of top priority in the Soviet Union.

[Naqshbandi] How has the current crisis affected economic conditions in the Soviet Union and countries of the Gulf region in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait?

[Katuchev] The Iraqi invasion and the resultant crisis in the Gulf have greatly and negatively impacted the Soviet economy and caused us losses estimated at between \$8 and \$10 million.

A war, should it come to that, would have an indeterminable and serious negative impact on the Gulf region.

BANGLADESH

Unusual Solidarity Against Ershad Viewed

91AS0264A Dhaka SANGBAD in Bengali
19 Nov 90 p 4

[Article by Matiur Rahman: "The Opposition Parties' Goal Is for Quick Success, the Government's Firm Policy"]

[Text] The countrywide antigovernment movement revived on 10 October. That day, the day of the sit-in in Dhaka, the movement spread rapidly as police resorted to using tear gas, beating, and shooting, in which five people were killed. Since then the movement has swept the country through protest rallies, public meetings, detentions, and general strikes. Programs of one kind or another are being observed every day. A general nationwide strike has been announced for the next two days (Tuesday and Wednesday). Just about every opposition party and alliance of parties are involved in this movement, which demands the resignation of the Ershad government and holding of free elections under a neutral caretaker government. It is progressing mainly through synchronous programs of three alliances—the eight-party, the seven-party, and the five-party coalitions. Other parties and coalitions are following their lead. Alongside the political parties, an all-party students union, a labor-employee unity council, and various professional and cultural groups have joined the movement. A large "platform" such as the one forged in 1987 has thus been created.

The opposition leadership aims to achieve its goal of toppling the government by early December. The reason: In January, the government plans to create an election atmosphere in the country through the union council vote. The government may also come up with its own program for a presidential election. That would leave few options for the opposition. For that reason, the planners of the current movement have assumed a do-or-die attitude.

However, the main opposition alliances still have differences over their principal objectives such as ousting the government through constitutional means and deciding on the structure of the future government. Alliance leaders are regularly discussing the issues. They hope to reach an agreement on them any day. Maybe because of their past experience nobody is now talking about a common program for the main parties or coalitions. No effort has been made to arrange a meeting between the leaders, Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, as was done in 1987. Although a liaison is being maintained between the three alliances, it has not reached the 1987 level. However, the all-party students union has given the movement a new dimension that was absent in 1987.

Since the new movement started in October, the government has adopted several repressive measures to put it down. All schools, colleges, and universities in Dhaka were shut down for a month. Yet the government is

unable to stop opposition activities. It has been leary about the spontaneous public participation in opposition programs. They [the government] are said to realize that the majority of people do not support them. But then they argue that the opposition does not enjoy active public support either. Government leaders want the situation to stay as it is. For that reason they had been deliberately trying to avoid tensions or a major clash. Now that strategy has come under attack. Some ministers are saying that the movement should have been stopped at the beginning. Sources close to the government say the government is dominated by hardliners. While President Hussein Mohammad Ershad was in Tokyo, heated speeches were made and even some destructive actions were taken. Even those known as "moderates" in the government appear to have become restive. Especially, they were enraged when students detained the ministers and lawmakers after labeling them "public enemies." Many openly propose a countermeasure against every challenge. Yet it is certain that fear and uncertainty have struck many in the ruling party. Fear and uncertainty reportedly have increased after last Wednesday's National Party meeting in Motijheel. When President Ershad returned from Tokyo (on Wednesday), the Cabinet met in an emergency session from 2300 hours to 0200 hours. In that meeting, some ministers reportedly expressed great distress over the situation. On Saturday, the government made an all-out effort to foil the students' siege program. A special effort will be made to activate National Party units in Dhaka and other districts to counter opposition activities. Prior to the general strike, ministers are rushing to the districts to participate in meetings and establish mass contact. On 26 November, the National Party will hold a big public meeting in Dhaka featuring President Ershad. It is clear that the government wants to activate the National Party to face the opposition movement. It remains to be seen where all these programs are going to end. It is one thing to hold rallies in support of the government; it is a different thing to set loose armed hooligans to foil opposition strikes. That could create resentment among the public and even in the administration.

In this hopeless situation, many people are discussing the possibility of declaring a state of emergency, as was done in 1987, to resist the opposition movement. However, the government has dismissed the idea. But who can predict the immediate future? On the other hand, President Ershad himself has ruled out a change in government through unconstitutional means. Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina has warned against a recurrence of martial law. She said that would not be desirable. In the November 1987 movement, a faction in the government contemplated imposing martial law. That did not happen. It is noteworthy that such contemplation is sometimes noticed both inside and outside the government circle. As in the past, such a measure cannot be helpful for the opposition. Any desperate action would only invite a political disaster.

The movement of November-December 1987 failed to achieve the opposition's one-point demand, namely the

resignation of President Ershad. The opposition leadership had thought the fall of the government was inevitable. Their notion has proved wrong. Neither did the movement achieve a partial success because it did not have room for such an outcome. On the contrary, the government dissolved the "better-than-nothing" 1986 Parliament elected with the support of a segment of the opposition. It used the opportunity to create a new Parliament through a sham election and has since been adopting one reactionary measure after another.

A political deadlock prevails in the country since the one-point movement of November-December 1987. A government hangs on without public support. It wants to prolong its rule through every means. But the public does not support or trust the government that came to power because of the coup and the elections without voter participation. That is why the opposition parties want the government to resign. They want to establish a democratic system through an election held under a nonparty government. The problem is that even after waging several movements they have failed to make the government resign. Eight years of bloody struggle could not achieve that objective. On different occasions the government resorted to different tactics to wiggle out of crises. At times it barely managed to survive the crises.

Why has the opposition movement failed to attain its goal? It is a difficult question. Why does this impasse continue? The question involves not only the outcome of the last movement. How it is answered will determine the fate of the present movement. Apparently, even though opposition programs are attaining different degrees of success, they have been unable to draw spontaneous public involvement. Even the level of mass upsurge created in 1983-84 could not be mustered in 1987. Later the movement slackened even further. This time the movement has progressed to an extent, but it has not enlisted enough support of the different strata of society to overcome government resistance. It is not clear whether the democratic leadership is aware of this aspect of the opposition movement. The eight-party coalition has launched a mass contact program in the districts. One cannot be sure about the success of this brief effort. On the other hand, the leaders of the three-party alliance are found absorbed in discussions among themselves. But the situation has reached a critical stage.

In the past years, the antigovernment campaign had ups and downs. The main opposition political parties and coalitions occasionally differed over their political programs and goals; in fact on many occasions their differences were vital. Often, those differences sparked public debate. The government and other interested groups used them to their advantage. That has left an influence on the public.

Sometimes some people think that certain events can be created to produce a mass resurgence and revolution. Yet the many incidents of the past years have not

produced that hoped-for revolution. The 1987-88 movement created about 50 martyrs. Numerous strikes have not led to upheavals. In fact, even the effects of general strikes have become less severe. In the short run, destruction, arson, etc., do not create a favorable public reaction. The government takes full advantage of them. Sometimes even they [the government] abet such incidents. A lot of reasons related to politics have produced a sense of detachment among the people. Sometimes it seems that the majority of people are watching it all from the sidelines. The government pins its hopes on that. It is keen to maintain that sense of detachment among the people. But the opposition's victory can be achieved only by changing this state of mind and driving the people down to processions, meetings, and the movement. We learned that lesson from the 1969 revolution. Just recently, the mass movement in neighboring Nepal has taught us the same lesson. A gathering of 200,000 to 250,000 people in a small city like Kathmandu forced the king to accept all popular demands. There is no alternative to creating such a situation.

The government that was once cornered by the 1987 movement is again facing a resurgence. It already has become nervous. The pressure will be mounting in the coming days. The government may try various measures to preserve itself, but everybody knows that it has only itself to blame for the paralysis that has overtaken the country. Naturally, it is the government which needs to take steps to defuse the crisis. It is not enough just to announce vague slogans: "We are ready to talk with the opposition." Or "Everything will be done to ensure free and fair elections."

INDIA

Article Sees Social Reform as Paramount to Job Reservations

91AS0126A Calcutta DESH in Bengali
20 Oct 90 pp 39-42

[Article by Goutam Roy: "Why the Movement Against Reservations?"]

[Text] The antireservation movement has plunged the country into turmoil. Of course, the country here means the vast expanse north of the Vindya Mountains known as Aryavarta. For whatever reason, the movement did not catch on in south India, i.e., in the "Cow Belt" and the areas outside the sway of the Hindustani culture. One reason, undoubtedly, is the legacy of the traditional movement against Brahmanism waged by the Dravidian south.

The immediate cause of the north Indian movement has been, as everybody knows, the National Front government's reservation policy, which sets aside 27 percent of the government jobs for the socially and educationally backward classes. On this subject, the present government has only implemented the recommendations made by the Vindeshwari Mandal Commission, appointed by

the former Congress government. Yet, almost all of the country's political parties, including the Congress, are now engaged in the anti-reservation movement. The resistance is sometimes fierce and overt. Other times, it is covert and indirect.

The Backward Classes, the purported beneficiaries of the reservations, make up 52 percent of the country's total population. Yet, the proposal would reserve 27 percent of the jobs for them. Meanwhile, the National Front government has retreated from its position in the face of the strong movement launched by higher-caste students from schools, colleges, and universities. Education has been excluded from the purview of these reforms. Because of the resistance from several state governments, state government jobs have also been left out of the quota system. Finally, the prime minister has announced that quotas would not apply to the armed forces; space research; and atomic, scientific, and technological research. Perhaps, this gradual backtracking of the government has emboldened the agitators. As a result, there is no sign of a letup in the movement, even after a month and a half.

The movement has led to the burning of buses, trains, and other government properties. Railroads have been damaged; schools and colleges closed. Of late, suicides by burning kerosene-soaked bodies have been attempted in the style once adopted by south India's Dravidian militants. Thus, the Backward Class movement against Brahmanism, caste-centered religion, and caste segregation has created unrest among Caste Hindus. It is not difficult to understand the fury against the Backward Classes that makes young students burn themselves to death! Caste Hindus are really desperate. They fear that these quotas may end the age-old privileges that have ensured their domination of Hindu society.

That fear has always troubled Caste Hindus. The concept of maintaining caste balance underpins the Code of Manu propounded by Brahmanism. That was a neat arrangement to make sure that the lower castes do not stray from the vocations assigned them by the top caste, the Brahmins; that they [the lower castes] do not get the idea of meddling in the professions of the Caste Hindus. Yet, sometimes those religious prescriptions have failed to suppress lower-caste aspirations. Society's internal tensions, pulls, and dynamism have tended to overcome caste barriers. But then, the lower castes had to pay dearly to make amends for their transgressions to higher-caste leadership. The Sudras had to pay with their heads for their audacity to read the Vedas. Where is that Ayodhya today? Where is the battlefield of the Kurus? Today's false gods, the corrupt Caste Hindus, are not even the caricatures of Ram Chandra, the ideal for mortals. They have no trace of the sense of justice that once characterized higher-caste leadership. Yet in his protest against quotas, the angry southern Brahman in priestly robes makes a big show of polishing shoes in the Calcutta street and then the story and picture of that scene gets splashed on the front pages of the next morning's newspapers, leaving one to conclude that

Caste Hindus could think of shoe polishing as the only appropriate calling for the lower castes. The vanity and meanness reflected in that "protest" are not the attributes of Ram Chandra.

This protest is not an isolated event. An understanding of its symbolic meaning would reveal the antiquota mentality and the significance of the movement. Apparently, a lot can be—and has been—said against the quota system. The most important argument is that if quotas continue to increase, a day will come when there will be no unreserved jobs. That reasoning is misleading. Anyone with the basic knowledge of arithmetic would realize that reserving 27 percent of the jobs for 52 percent of the population is no cause for alarm. Then there are those who say that reservations do not equally benefit all in the castes for which they are meant, that they only make a vested interest of the better off among them. First, it refers to limitations at the level of policy implementation. Even if true, it is not enough to challenge the relevance of quotas from the factual or policy standpoints. Secondly, the social and political system of this country is such that implementation of any government policy—however well-thought-out and well-meaning—is bound to be distorted. Has the public sector been able to curb the dominance of monopoly capital? Are the rights of the marginal farmers or sharecroppers secure as a result of the abolition of the zamindari system [landlord system] or introduction of the tenancy-rights laws? Yet, does anybody oppose the public sector or abolition of zamindari?

Some who oppose quotas say economic backwardness—rather than caste labels—should be the criterion for the reservations. Very good. But in Indian society, social backwardness is the root cause of economic plight. In a society in which honorable and well-paying jobs are denied to the lower castes, where opportunities for upward mobility are few for the lower castes, where the majority of those below the poverty line are considered a "subhuman caste," there a lone Jagjivan Ram or two Yadhav chief ministers do not nullify social backwardness. To argue that it does is to elevate the exception to the level of the rule.

Those doing this are talking about justice for classes rather than castes. That is good, too. They have all along viewed castes in terms of vote banks. They have dismissed Marxism as an elitist, alien doctrine that does not fit into the caste-ridden Indian society. Why have they suddenly become adherents of classes rather than castes? Is that because they themselves belong to higher castes? The Marxists are different. They always have shut their eyes to the realities of caste differences and caste politics. They have parroted the theory of class conflict to prescribe class struggle as the panacea for the evils of caste segregation. Are they not being naive to hope that the bourgeois-landlord government, through administrative measures, will eliminate class inequalities by adopting quotas on the basis of economic backwardness?

Even though Vishwanath Pratap Singh calls leftists his "natural allies," his government does not accept the Marxist agenda to remove the economic inequities between classes. Others have said the reservation policy is actually a political gimmick of the minority National Front government, especially of its prime minister, and that it has been adopted with an eye on the next elections. That does not prove or disprove anything. Any government policy or decision is an instrument for the ruling party to realize certain political objectives. All governments are party governments. While making policies, all governments aim to win the support of new social groups. Political considerations prompted the governments of Rajiv Gandhi, Indira Gandhi, and Jawaharlal Nehru into making each of their decisions and policies. Why should Vishwanath Pratap be different?

Then comes the question of merit. The higher castes take it for granted that lower-caste people are less intelligent, so giving them government jobs would downgrade society and administration. It implies that all higher-caste people are brilliant, that lower-caste callings do not require the use of brains, that office clerks are the repositories of all intelligence! Is the Indian bureaucracy, packed with higher-caste opportunists, very gifted? Or, compared to their counterparts in other countries, are they less worthless, less corrupt, less depraved? What is the proof that an official of a multinational company, medical representative, or salesman is more intelligent than a carpenter, weaver, fisherman, peasant, or cobbler? The former could be more efficient, better educated, and less bucolic. He owes these qualities to his environment, family fortunes, the tradition of his cultural domination, his urban life, and his proximity to the seats of power. Because of their tradition of privileges, higher-caste people start off centuries ahead of lower-caste folks in the race for career development. Without the safety valve of reservations, how can the Backward Classes stay on in that unequal race? This inequality can be removed somewhat only through gradual, comprehensive, and thorough education. For this reason, it is necessary to provide for compulsory, universal, primary and higher education among the backward people. Yet the National Front government has abolished quotas in the field of education. They doubtless have retreated under pressure. But if a little push can make them wilt, then why all this hullabaloo about fighting for the national cause? In fact, the National Front government favors the status quo as well. It is perhaps unrealistic to expect it to bring about any basic, far-reaching reforms.

In this context, let us discuss the political compulsions that might have figured into the National Front government's decision to push quotas for the socially backward. The Janata Dal, the principal partner in this government, draws its support from the rural Ohir, Jat, Kurmi, Yadav, and other farming subcastes. Although some of them have gained a measure of economic strength, they are deprived of political clout. They yearn to take part in the administration of the country. That yearning is reflected in the ambition of Charan Singh and Devi Lal.

On the one hand, they want to curb the influence of the urban elites. On the other, they wish to suppress the lower-caste Harijans and Dalits. They began to believe that their share in political power had been overdue. When the Janata Dal came to power, they saw an opportunity to realize what they believed to be their due. They saw the National Front government as an instrument to redress the social humiliation and injustice they had suffered at the hands of the higher-caste landowners. In the rural economy, these intermediary castes were, during the past few years, able to raise the prices of their produce through unilateral pressure. Now, they covet higher education, honorable land, high-paying government jobs, and administrative positions.

The problem is that although the new reservation policy applies to these middle-level social strata, the antiquota movement and its fallout have pitted Hindu opinion against the Scheduled Castes and subcastes, i.e., the Harijans, aborigines, and Dalits. The Caste Hindus' traditional hatred for the Harijans and aborigines is reviving, or being revived. Yet, in Indian society caste cleavage remains so ingrained that the Backward Classes, which are as despised and mistreated by Caste Hindus as the Scheduled Castes, are unable to feel solidarity with the latter. If they did, the 22 percent Scheduled Caste people would have joined hands with the 52 percent belonging to the Backward Classes and launched a countermovement. In fact, the Backward Classes consider themselves more advanced than the Scheduled Castes. In Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Gujarat they would not let Scheduled Caste people tread the vicinity of polling booths. They are engaged in a two-front struggle. But the Caste Hindus have to fight on one front only. They make no distinction between the Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes. The anti-reservation movement has let loose vanity and penchant for birth-privileges and triggered a chorus of disdain for the lower castes. It ignores the distinction between touchables and Untouchables, Harijans, and Backwards.

Opposition to quotas is as old as quotas themselves. Everybody knows that "Harijan-lover" [Mohandas K.] Gandhi embarked on a fast until death when he feared that [B.R.] Ambedkar's movement for a communal award would threaten the Hindu majority. Ambedkar had protested bitterly that Gandhi never announced a fast when the Harijans had been persecuted, but was resorting to it [fasting] when only a few seats were to be reserved for those social outcasts. He [Ambedkar] warned the Harijans to take note of those sly cheaters. Ambedkar was checkmated by Gandhi. He could not prevail over Gandhi, who had turned into a "Mahatma" [great soul]. After Ambedkar was blackmailed, the quota provision was inserted into the Constitution to placate him. Four decades later, the fate of that provision is shown by the hundreds of empty reserved spots in educational institutions and government offices. Even today, campaigns have to be launched to try to fill those vacancies by publicizing them in the mass media. The

question of quotas for the Backward Classes came later, in January 1953, when the Kaka Kalelkar Commission was appointed. Few cabinet ministers or bureaucrats have so far read Kalelkar's recommendations. One can imagine how sincere the political leaders were about the subject. In 1978, when Vindeshwari Mandal was asked to look into the desirability of quotas for the Backward Classes, the backward and intermediate classes by then had felt the urgency to establish themselves through the Janata Dal. Mandal was the first to accept the caste identity derived from birth as the criterion to measure backwardness. However, he also used percentage of illiteracy, average amount of land holdings, and availability of drinking water, etc., as other yardsticks of backwardness. It was the Mandal Commission which determined that 52 percent of the population lies in the gray area between the advanced caste Hindus and lowly Harijans. While the commission was still preparing its recommendations, the government changed and the Congress government threw those recommendations into the waste basket. Still, the issue could not be completely suppressed.

As several states planned to implement similar recommendations, they faced violent resistance. In 1978, widespread rioting started when the Bihar chief minister, Karpuri Thakur, set about reserving 26 percent of the seats as recommended by the Mungeri Lal Commission. As a result, hundreds of Harijans and people of Backward Classes were slaughtered, the Karpuri Thakur lost his job. In 1981, Gujarat was the scene of terrible antireservation riots in which thousands of lower-caste people lost their lives. The 100-day violence was one-sided. Prior to Legislative Assembly elections, the Madhav Singh Solanki government had introduced reservations as recommended by the Rane Commission. In Madhya Pradesh, too, the Arjun Singh government had implemented parts of the Ramji Mahajan Commission recommendation on the eve of the Lok Sabha elections. All these measures were prompted by political considerations, and they sparked violent protests from the higher castes.

Today, when Caste Hindus, i.e., only 17 percent of the population represented by Hindi-Belt students, have launched a violent movement because 18,000 government jobs have been reserved for 450 million backward people, many people are placing the entire blame on Vishwanath Pratap Singh. It is said, just when society had begun to experience upward mobility, when caste contours had begun to fade, and when abolition of quotas for the Scheduled Castes was about to be considered, V.P. Singh ruined it all. As a result, society's internal dynamism is said to have come to a halt, pushing the country several decades backwards. Needless to say, this reaction comes from upper-caste intellectuals. In fact, caste cleavage, instead of diminishing, has seized the decaying society as an inexorable force, and the anti-reservation movement is a glaring testimony to it. It is complained that quotas have created new animosity between the higher and lower castes. In

reality, this animosity was already there, though as a social undercurrent. The higher-caste high officials expressed it as indirect slights and taunts about their lower-caste colleagues, as they did about their Muslim co-workers. If they [lower-caste Hindus, or Muslims] were nearby, they [higher-caste Hindus] would whisper to one another. If they came face to face, silence prevailed, only to give way to boisterous taunts once they [lower-caste ones] disappeared. Because there was bitterness, distrust, and disrespect, an excuse has thrown it all out into the open—into the light—having overcome all inhibitions, all barriers to self-expression. From that angle, the anti-reservation movement is a mirror before today's Hindu society. It is such a mirror that it removes the mask and vividly reflects the face. In it, the conscientious among the higher castes can see their faces without makeup on them, as they did earlier during the anti-Sikh riots. The moment they were provided with the irrelevant (or essential?) fact that Indira Gandhi's killer was a Sikh, Caste Hindus used it as a pretext to try to turn India into a Hindu state (as though slaying was the slayer's only religion). Today, the movement launched by the autonomy-loving people of the Kashmir Valley has been labeled fundamentalist secessionism and an excuse has been created to constitutionally deprive Kashmiris of their basic right to life so they are left to the mercy of the armed forces. Caste Hindus believe they have been handed such an excuse by the reservation policy of Vishwanath Pratap Singh, who is eager to put his chips into the vote bank of the Backward Classes.

The vestiges of caste distinctions—like many other social ills—cannot be fully removed until the adoption of comprehensive land reforms, industrialization of agriculture, bringing about an industrial revolution and employment of landless peasants in the industrial sector. But then, must a representative, responsible, and welfare-seeking government sit tight until that heavenly kingdom has been created? Its sense of responsibility must make it adopt some intermediary arrangements to provide relief. The quota system is such an arrangement. It is one thing to ask questions about its implementation and offer advice to help remove obstacles so it can be carried through. It is an entirely different thing to challenge its principle or factual relevance. Such questions can be raised only by those who want to maintain eternal dominance over unearned inheritance, illegitimate power, and ill-gotten wealth by harping on their unproved superiority and untested merit.

Congress (I) Seen as Weak and Desperate

91AS0362B New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 8 Dec 90
p 6

[Article by Harishankar Vyas: "Rajiv's Political Hopelessness"]

[Text] At the time when Rajiv Gandhi decided to support Chander Shekhar, he might not have imagined that his party would be liable to the incidents in Uttar Pradesh. In addition, he had to defend the Mulayam

Singh government and share the blame for its doings. Regional parties would get impatient and would start to complain. He also had to bear people like Sanjay Singh, Menaka Gandhi, V.C. Shukla, and Ashok Sen as cabinet members. He also had to suffer Sharad Pawar's national role. These all were still minor things! The serious problem facing his party now is whether it should worry about the feelings of the majority or it should play the politics of the minority votes? How can he endorse the government, stay out of its shadows, and maintain his own appeal simultaneously? How can he avoid being involved in the Hindu card of the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and the mosque-temple issue of V.P. Singh?

The Congress party is really in a very bad position. It has been on the defensive for the last month. Congress spokesmen in Delhi are issuing clarifying statements, but the state leaders are quiet. Rajiv Gandhi has stopped his trips out of Delhi. Lal Karishan Advani has visited Southern India, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar. Mr. V.P. Singh is visiting one region after another. However, Rajiv Gandhi still does not go out. The situation for the Congress party in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, two states from where 150 MP's [Members of Parliament] were elected, has been so bad for the last month, that Rajiv Gandhi would never be able to bear the barrage of questions should he dare to get out there. The direct impact of the failure of the experiment of a non-Congress government at the Center was that the voters began to think that the Congress can at least give some consistency to the government. This idea of Congress versus consistency is becoming weaker by the day for two reasons. The first is the rising strength of controversial issues such as the Ram Janambhumi-Babri masjid issue and the Mandal issue. The second reason is the cooperation between the Chander Shekhar government and the Congress party.

The Congress high command had endorsed the government at the capital, hoping to buy time for the temple-mosque and Mandal issues to cool off. They hoped to hold new elections as soon as emotions cooled. We do not know whether the Congress considers itself capable of controlling these emotions or if it thinks that it will take six to eight months for them to calm down. Rajiv Gandhi and his advisors are still pitting their hopes on this misconception. There is one realistic concept in this assumption: the party cannot win elections now. The Congress could not have won the elections even when the V.P. Singh government fell. Therefore, it was imperative to establish an interim arrangement for six to eight months. The basic idea behind this strategy is that the Congress would be in a position to take the initiative and Rajiv Gandhi would be able to control the future.

However, the future is not in Rajiv Gandhi's control. There is a danger that a situation could develop in which the Congress president is not in control. Instead, he might end up a helpless leader. The political situation and direction—as well as developments at the center—after the Chander Shekhar government was established, all show that the Congress party is becoming helpless.

The longer the tenure of this government, the more helpless the Congress will become. Rajiv Gandhi will become more forlorn, and he will be forced to accept all of the decisions made by the prime minister. He has already been forced to accept Mulayam Singh and to bear Sharad Pawar's role at the national level. The Congress president should meet with his working committee for two full days, and analyze the Ram Janambhumi issue, and propose a decision through the Supreme Court. However, the Chander Shekhar government can ignore this proposal, telling them that the issue has been sent to the office of strategic planning. The Congress, of course, will have to accept that. Narain Dutt Tiwari had strongly demanded all those conditions for the approval of Mulayam Singh; however, Mulayam Singh thumbed his nose with the approval in his hand. The Congress party's acceptance of all this is an indication of its helplessness.

The biggest problem facing the Congress party is its inability to take a stand on the mosque-temple issue. The two forces that are challenging the Congress on this issue have already decided on their strategies. V.P. Singh has decided to play on the politics of the Muslim and backward class votes. His only worry is the support of the minority and the backward classes. He is not worried about any other support. The BJP, on the other hand, has decided to unite the Hindus over the Ram Janambhumi issue. It would not be wrong to say that these are the top two issues in the minds of the voters, at least in western and northern India. Just like the BJP, the common Hindu is thinking, "How long can we bear the politics of placating just for Muslim votes?" The Muslims are fully convinced that V.P. Singh has lost his seat of power for them. He sacrificed his government in order to save Babri masjid. This means that the majority of the Muslims consider V.P. Singh to be their true leader. V.P. Singh could not get the same support from the backward classes as he did from the Muslims. However, in the two states (Bihar and Uttar Pradesh) where V.P. Singh had focused his election strategy, the majority of backward caste votes in Bihar and proportionally a little less in Uttar Pradesh are greatly influenced by V.P. Singh's slogans for social justice. Very few low caste people in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have separated themselves either because of Rama's temple or Mulayam Singh Yadav's staying away. In these states, the Congress party does not have even the smallest percentage of support from the lower castes.

The Congress party has become helpless, because of this frank political strategy adopted by the Janata Dal and the BJP. V.P. Singh's strong hold on the Muslim population deters any political efforts focused on the minorities. The Congress party knows well that the minorities will not trust it until the next elections. At least the Muslims in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar will not change their side. Minority votes in other states may go to the Congress party instead of to the BJP; however, these votes are not large enough to influence election results significantly. The Congress party cannot raise the slogan

of supporting Rama's temple either. Regardless of how pro-Rama Congress may become, now it will be the BJP who will get the credit. It does not matter who builds the temple now, the BJP will still get the credit. In addition to this credit issue, it is feared that the traditional categorization of votes under Muslims, scheduled castes, and Brahmins will not change now.

Against this background, the only hope the Congress party now has is that time will help the temple-mosque and Mandal issues to heal. The people at that time might recognize the fact that only the Congress party is capable of providing a stable government. It will also benefit from the opposition's internal strife. The Muslims will also put their stamp of approval on the Congress party when they see it winning. However, we have to keep in mind that, as time passes, the sole investment the Congress party has—the promise of a stable government—is moving into the background. What kind of trust does the Congress party offer on the issues that concern the voters most? A Hindu does not get assurances that this party is capable of taking care of the Kashmir valley and curbing the terrorists in Punjab. Will they get Rama's temple and will the practice of placating the minorities stop? Will mistakes like Shah Bano be repeated? As for inflation and corruption, the Rajiv government's recent record does not inspire confidence. Instead, the Bofors deal is being brought up again, and the new government is fully expected to fail in controlling inflation. Because of these situations, the Congress party can not take an offensive role. The Congress party leaders are not able to go to the people and have them raise slogans in their support. In a situation in which you have put the king in the palace yourself and you are also occupying a seat in the royal court, you cannot afford to go to the people and discuss the affairs of the palace. The former king is already in the streets, and the people are focusing on the new king and his courtiers.

Imagine that elections are held by next December and that the temple-mosque issue, as well as the Mandal issue, are still alive. How confident would the Congress party be in these elections, if the law and order situation in the country has worsened and the national issues are more aggravated (these are expected, since little can be expected from such a put-together government), the Bofors deal is more exposed, and inflation is the same? It will have no confidence at all! The other alternative for the Congress party would be to join the Chander Shekhar government and to forget the elections until 1994. This is not realistic. What kind of leadership will Rajiv project at that time? A partnership in power usually is fatal after a year-long ineffective experiment. On this assumption, the Congress party is expecting the Janata Dal to merge with it. This would mean that the Congress party would have to provide election tickets for the 60 Janata Dal legislators and run for elections in cooperation with such leaders as Mulayam Singh Yadav in Uttar Pradesh, Om Prakash Chautala in Haryana, and Subrhanayam. The longer the new government experiment continues at the Center, the more the Congress party will be forced to

share the blame or credit with the Janata Dal. The Congress party could have fought the elections in November, when the V.P. Singh government had fallen by pointing fingers all around. Election can be fought in April, if it keeps its distance from the party in power. However, participating cooperatively in elections a year later would be considered helplessness on the part of the Congress party. One year is a long time, and if this government is successful the Congress party will be hurt. If this government is unsuccessful, the Congress party will still be hurt. It is almost impossible for this government to succeed. After looking at the cabinet members and the situation as well as the minority character of this government, we should not have any false illusions about this government's success. We might see some actions from the government for a while, but these will be without any results. The Congress party has started to realize this fact and it has begun to feel that helping this government could prove suicidal. This explains why Vasant Sathe has begun to announce that either elections should be held soon or a joint government should be established. However, Rajiv Gandhi cannot do anything. The situation has made him helpless.

Temple-Mosque: Immediate Resolution Urged

91P40095Z Madras ANANDA VIKATAN in Tamil
16 Dec 90 p 14

[Editorial: "Needed: Immediate Resolution!"]

[Text] Fortunately, a person loitering with the intention of blowing up the Babari Mosque in Ayodhya has been arrested. At the same time, an attempt to destroy another mosque in Faizabad with a bomb has also been foiled by the police.

As it is considered improper for politics to enter religion, the instance of terrorist-politics entering religion leads to concern. Is it practical to provide police or military protection to the myriad of worship houses in the country?

It is imperative that the higher echelons of the government immediately investigate how to forestall these types of incidents. Otherwise, religious fanatics will start acting in the thoughtless and retaliatory manner of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." It is not hard to imagine how such a cruel, continuing saga would end.

As the first step, the Central Government must realize that it can no longer procrastinate in the matter of the Ram Janma Bhoomi as in other matters. It must sit to discuss this issue well and promptly with religious and political party leaders, and come to an immediate and decisive settlement of it.

Such a decision may result in temporary agitation. If the government persists, it will subside. Procrastination in dealing with the problem will result in long-term adverse consequences for the nation.

IRAN

Freed POWs Indoctrinated on Reasons for Montazeri's Ouster

91AS0108H Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 29 Aug 90 p 11

[Text] Note: Our colleagues in KEYHAN have come up with a good idea, they have prepared and published a special 100-page letter, with 50,000 copies for circulation, entitled: "Azadegan" [freed POWs] and have put the same at the disposal of the Headquarters for the Freed POWs. These publications are ready, free of charge, for all the freed POWs who return to the Islamic nation.

The content of this special letter consists of certain materials which are necessary for the freed POWs to know. This information makes them aware of the important events which took place in the Islamic nation during the 10 years of their absence from the country. These include: Selections from the instructions of the imam; the imam's will; one of the gnostic and profound letters of the imam; excerpts from the speeches and messages of Ayatollah Khamene'i, the leader of the Islamic revolution; some passages from the president and his other messages, together with gleanings from other responsible officials; a daily calendar of the important events of the imposed war; the adventure of Mehdi Hashemi; the ouster of Mr. Montazeri from the position of successorship; plus a few articles and poems on the occasion of the return of the freed POWs. From among all the aforesaid subjects, we have chosen the article entitled: "The Reasons for Mr. Montazeri's Ouster From the Position of Successorship by Imam Khomeyni," which will appear below.

The dismissal of Mr. Montazeri from his position of successorship can be considered one of the most important events of 1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990]. This was an event which in reality had caused the imam to express his worries from time to time about Montazeri's selection for the position by the Assembly of Experts as of the beginning of 1362 [21 March 1983-20 March 1984]. Finally, as a result of his inability to carry the heavy burden of responsibility and following the improper use of influence and peddling of power incited by his close associates, and most unfortunately his lack of sufficient attention to the continual advice and exhortations of imam Khomeyni with regard to purging his circle of consociates from certain impostor and charlatan elements such as Mehdi Hashemi and his cronies, the time came when his excellency the imam, despite his inner feelings, just for the sake of religion and observance of the interests of the system and that of Islam, was obliged to agree to his dismissal from the position of successorship.

Here, we should not forget the fact that today the glorious history of the Islamic revolution, more than

ever before, confirms the invaluable peculiarities of the late great leader of the Islamic revolution, Imam Khomeyni.

A brief look at the profound perception of Imam Khomeyni, with regard to the current and future issues of the time, in various dimensions: from the socio-political events to the mere recognition of personalities, individuals, and political trends compels both friends and foes to admit the divine inspiration of the leader of the revolution during the fateful years of struggle against the satanic elements [pro-Americans] before the advent of the revolution and his crusade against Eastern and Western arrogance, during and after the victory of the revolution.

His precise recognition of the deviated political trends before the advent of the revolution, despite confirmation of those events by some of the friends of the revolution, the occurrence of great revolution-induced events, and his firm conviction and profound perception of future contingencies regarding the fall of the shah and the victory of the revolution, his foresight concerning the downfall of Carter, his precision with regard to the victory of Iranian perseverance in the imposed war, which is proven in all actuality today—despite the extensive aggression of the Ba'hist regime of Iraq on the borders of the Islamic Republic; his prediction regarding the hypocrite mini-groups which have become so despised and miserable that even Saddam is not ready to accept them any more; his prospective on the events in the Eastern bloc and expansion of Islam in the Muslim countries and even the prediction of Iraqi invasion on other states of the Gulf region, are all valuable documents for the annals of leadership and theocratic rule of Islam, which should be preserved forever in the treasure trove of history.

Today, we should not forget that the prominence of this nation throughout the world and the eminence of the world Muslims in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and other Islamic nations are all due to the divine inspiration of Imam Khomeyni. Now, all of the offsprings of this divine presence are on the way to cleanse the world of Islam from the filth of arrogance and its agents.

This is perhaps a very concise or limited description of the personality of a man, which the pen seems inadequate to express its universality or comprehensiveness.

But, with regard to the ouster of Mr. Montazeri, the noteworthy point is the expression of anxiety or in reality the foresight of the imam concerning the weaknesses of Mr. Montazeri after his selection to the position of successorship in 1362.

After the selection of Montazeri, in a message to the Assembly of Experts, Imam Khomeyni pointed out a few important issues, which had caused him to worry and thereby had shown the way for avoiding such weaknesses.

In one part of this message, Imam Khomeyni stated: You should know that more than anybody else, the criminals and decadent individuals have pinned their hopes on you [Mr. Montazeri] and such warped personalities [wearing an Islamic and revolutionary mask] among your circle of associates could cause disaster and, by one deviated act, lead the entire system of government on a devious path and with your own hand slap the face of Islam and the Islamic Republic.

In continuation, His Excellency the Imam, while pointing out the necessity for the presence of decent individuals among his [Montazeri's] circle of associates, stated:

You should know that in the selection of one's associates and sometimes in making hasty decisions one can make an error. The proper thing to do is to confess to the error or mistake [which is quite human]; while insistence and uncalled for explanations are nothing but satanic deficiency. Wherever necessary, with regard to the important affairs, one should consult with the experts and use caution.

Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Haj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni, in a report, explains the roots of the resignation or in reality the dismissal of Mr. Montazeri, and writes: It seems as if the imam could read the events of five years into the future, and he had pointed out the center of danger five years beforehand.

From the viewpoint of Imam Khomeyni, the most important issue pertaining to Mr. Montazeri was his association with some individuals who did not enjoy a good reputation, as was evidenced by various documents and other pertinent records.

From among these individuals, one can pinpoint Mr. Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi, who, by his own admission, before the advent of the revolution, in addition to taking part in the murder of Hojjat ol-Eslam Shamsabadi, had also maintained relations with SAVAK [the shah's secret police]. Similarly, during the early years of the revolution, while forming a band composed to his followers, he had committed acts of murder, forged some government documents, relayed erroneous reports to Mr. Montazeri concerning the state of the nation, plus many other issues.

In fact, following an increase in the unlawful measures taken by Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi and the discovery of certain instances of his evil deeds such as the murder of innocent people, abuse of governmental facilities, forging documents, connection with foreigners—which had particularly come about as a result of the dissolution of the Freedom Movement Corps Unit, and his close relationship with Mr. Montazeri and the undesirable influence which he could bring to bear upon the personality of the successor of the leader of the revolution, prompted Imam Khomeyni to instruct the judicial authorities to investigate his dossier and, based on

existing evidence and documents, Mr. Montazeri was asked not to interfere in the judicial affairs pertaining to Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi.

For this purpose, His Excellency the imam, in a letter to Mr. Montazeri, advised him to keep his distance from Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi and expressed hope that after accepting the facts, Ayatollah Montazeri will be able to make himself closer to the interests of Islam. According to Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri, at first the imam had intended to point out certain problems to Mr. Montazeri in person; however, later on he had preferred to publish his views in the format of a letter. There is no doubt that this letter is a valuable document in the history of the Islamic revolution and the annals of Islamic leadership as well.

In the aforementioned letter, the imam, on a friendly basis, advised Mr. Montazeri to stay away from interfering in the judicial investigation pertaining to the accusations leveled against Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi and to cooperate in this regard with the Ministry of Information or at least remain silent for that matter.

At the end of the letter, His Excellency the imam decisively mentioned that investigation of the implicated murder was most certain.

Naturally, an Islamic nation expects that the exhortations and the advice of our dear imam should have been heeded and no authority should have done otherwise. Is it not a fact that throughout the years, the orders and guidance of His Excellency, the imam, savior of the revolution from fateful events, have not been destiny making? Could anybody ever imagine that Mr. Montazeri would go ahead and answered the imam in a negative manner by bringing up certain issues contrary to the views of the imam.

In response to the imam's compassionate and friendly letter, which had no intention other than to safeguard the holiness and dignity of the position of the successorship, Mr. Montazeri, while confirming a corrupt and guilty individual such as Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi, went on to say that his protege was a wise, prudent, and pious person. Thereafter, he had questioned the integrity of several responsible officials of the Islamic Republic and stated that Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi, with all his crimes and deviations, was preferred over the rest of them.

In his letter, Mr. Montazeri writes: I know all his characteristics. He is a man devoted to Islam and the revolution. He is a talented and intelligent individual, who speaks and writes very well. By far, he is better than the head of the Guard Corps and the minister of information, and he is no less pious or responsible than both. The only thing that he is not, is a yesman or a bootlicker.

The influence of Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi on Mr. Montazeri was such that it prohibited the latter from seeing many important facts. Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi has made ample confessions regarding his criminal acts. Careful

investigation of these confessions indicate that the deliberate acts of Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi in fact signify his non-acceptance of the interests of the Islamic system and opposition to these interests as well. It is quite unfortunate that Mr. Montazeri calls all the responsible authorities of the Islamic Republic who have together with the imam of the nation a great share in the administration of the country, and who pride themselves in listening to the orders of the imam, as bootlickers or yesmen. While at the same time he calls Mehdi Hashemi with all his criminal records a prudent, sagacious, and pious man! In reality, Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi, through his frequent contacts with Mr. Montazeri and presentation of erroneous reports against the system and its officials, influenced Mr. Montazeri's thinking so much so that he became a loud-speaker against the interests of the system and the responsible officials. This opposition was carried out so far that Mr. Montazeri questioned the imprisonment or execution of those individuals who had murdered personalities such as Beheshti and Raja'i. Here, he reasons that by resorting to imprisonment one cannot resolve the problem of the hypocrites!

Indeed, isn't the incarceration of the hypocrite, whose crimes have been quite clear to the Islamic nation and even to the POWs of yesterday and the freed POWs of today, the least bit of a measure in reducing the effect of his crimes? Should this type of individual be left free so that he can go on and commit more crimes?

Montazeri's mind, which had become influenced by his association with impure and corrupted cronies, by every passing day put more distance between him and Imam Khomeini, and all the brotherly and sympathetic efforts of the Old Father of the revolution, the Great Khomeini, could not save him to retain his position of succession. For instance, if we make a simple comparison between some viewpoints of Ayatollah Montazeri and those of the imam, we will notice the depth of the distance which was brought about as a result of Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi's influence.

For example, with regard to the issue of the imposed war and its results, Ayatollah Montazeri stated: "Our enemies who imposed this war, came out victorious. How much force we lost in Iran! How many young lives were destroyed—each and every life which was priceless, and how many of our cities were demolished! These are the things which we should investigate and see where we made a mistake."

In this regard, the imam says: "Until the day that our nation felt it had the ability and obligation to carry on the war, it did so. Blessed are those who did not have a doubt until the last moment. When the time came that the acceptance of a communique was deemed expedient for the survival of the revolution, then again the nation performed its duty."

In another statement, with regard to the self-sacrifices of the Islamic warriors at the war fronts, despite various

difficulties and problems, Mr. Montazeri said: "We made a great many mistakes in the war."

In this regard, His Excellency the imam said: "Not even for a moment are we sorry or remorseful for what we did."

Concerning the method of approach and dealing with the hypocrites and other smaller opposition groups who have done nothing other than opposing the very idealism of the holy system of the Islamic Republic through their military, political, and publicity propaganda, Mr. Montazeri said: "One of our wishes pertained to the preservation of freedom; we should not try to defile or stigmatize any one who says something against the system. Filling up the prisons will not cure the malaise. One cannot imprison an erroneous thought."

Have we imprisoned the thoughts? Have all the hypocrites and other anti-revolution criminals been imprisoned for their thoughts? Didn't the small opposition groups use their freedom to plot against the revolution? Does the Islamic Republic try to disgrace or discredit innocent individuals?

In recent years, Mr. Montazeri's viewpoints have been precisely aligned with those of the opposition. In answer to some ambiguous and doubtful statements, Imam Khomeini stated: "Certain people who are influenced by others, on many occasions have said that they repeat the words of some very simple-minded people. Those individuals who defend the hypocrites and the liberals, have no place among our dear and martyr nation. If some ignorant and deceived servants of foreigners, who have been acting as the loud-speaker for others, do not desist from doing so, the people will banish them without the slightest of forgiveness."

In another instance, Mr. Montazeri considered the resistance of Islamic Iran against the enemy as stubbornness or obstinacy, and indicated that the internal and external intercessions are proper methods for fighting the imposed war. In this regard, Mr. Montazeri goes on to say: "We have been obstinate in many instances, where we did not listen to the wise words and advice of some people on the radio, television, or in various periodicals, both domestic and foreign, who tried to intercede in the war."

In response, Imam Khomeini stated: "Just for the satisfaction of a few self-seeking liberals, we must not deal with our viewpoints and beliefs in such a way that our dear nation feels the Islamic Republic has abandoned its fundamental principles."

The important thing here is that Mr. Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi, both in his confessions and in his last letter to Mr. Montazeri, explicitly pointed out to his endeavor in making a pessimist out of Mr. Montazeri. In his last letter to Mr. Montazeri, Mr. Mehdi Hashemi discussed his purpose for instilling doubt, ambiguity, and misinformation in the responsible officials of the system. He asks his forgiveness for his diabolical temptations.

In addition, the association of other liberal elements such as members of the Freedom Movement and individuals like Sahabi, Dr. Peyman, plus other suspicious elements and Seyyed Mehdi with Mr. Montazeri, had a significant role in his viewpoint regarding many Islamic military issues. A detailed discussion of these subjects are reflected in many pamphlets and books written for the purpose. However, even after the arrest of Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi and divulgence of his criminal acts and those of his accompanying band, Mr. Montazeri's action took on a more extensive dimension in opposing the system.

All the advice and counseling by the imam in an effort to save the sanctity of Mr. Montazeri's position for a period of two years came to naught. Finally, in response to his religious obligation and to save the system of government, Imam Khomeyni took action to dismiss Mr. Montazeri as the successor of the leader of the revolution.

In this regard, Hojjat ol-Eslam Ansari, a close associate and member of the Imam's office, said: "You can be assured that the imam's decision for accepting the resignation of Mr. Montazeri as the successor of the leader of the revolution was not reached in a day. The Imam had sent many messages, intermediaries, and leaders to Mr. Montazeri. On several occasions, the imam had sent Mr. Ahmad Khomeyni. In personal meetings, the imam had offered friendly advice to Mr. Montazeri, which nobody ever knew. For a long time, I didn't even know that the imam used to send different groups to Mr. Montazeri to tell him that Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi was going to create some problem for him, and that Mehdi Hashemi was the one who was going to divert his attention from the right path of the system and thus render him [Mr. Montazeri] very weak."

In an address to the cabinet and the representatives of the Islamic Consultative Majles, with regard to the ouster of Mr. Montazeri, the imam explicitly confirms the matter and writes:

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

My dear sons and daughters, representatives of the Islamic Consultative Majles and the esteemed cabinet ministers, I've heard that many of you are not aware of the facts with regard to Mr. Montazeri's situation. It is enough to say that your old father has been making every effort in the messages and announcements, for over two years to no avail. On the other hand, my religious obligations made it necessary for me to make the right decision for the preservation of Islam and the system. Therefore, it is with a grieving heart that I put aside all my personal attachments for the sake of Islam and the system of government. I hope that time will make the matter quite clear for my brothers and sisters. Anybody at any position, in case of infringement or contravention, will be introduced to the people.

Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeyni

Finally, in the month of Farvardin of 1368 [21 March-20 April 1989], following the imam's request, Mr. Montazeri announced his resignation. While accepting Mr. Montazeri's resignation, in answer to his letter, Imam Khomeyni also expresses his opposition for the selection of the former by the Assembly of Experts and once again points out the necessity for purging the circle of his associates.

Sale of Lead-Free Gasoline Begins

91AS0305L London KEYHAN in Persian 6 Dec 90 p 2

[Text] From Saturday of this week (24 November) in 13 gasoline stations in Tehran, the sale of lead-free gasoline began. The price of lead-free gasoline with a coupon is 30 rials per liter and 60 rials at the open market price.

Engineer Fathinezhad, the general manager of the national distribution and oil products company, announced that this type of gasoline has been purchased from abroad. He did not reveal the name of the country selling the lead-free gasoline.

The import of lead-free gasoline indicates the level of technical backwardness of the National Iranian Oil Company in the years since the revolution.

PAKISTAN

Kidnappings, Ransom Demands Said Common

Lawlessness, Unsafe Streets

91AS0120A Karachi JANG in Urdu 18 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by Tajir Iqbal entitled, "Who Is Committing These Acts?"]

[Text] Caretaker Prime Minister Jatoi has said that if a few of the individuals involved in kidnapping for ransom were hanged by their feet, the rest would fall in line. Similar statements have been made in the past by former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Junejo and countless chief ministers of Sindh. Jam Sadiq Ali has now said that he knows that Malik Assad Sikander is carrying out the kidnappings. "but since he is hiding out in Bilaval House it is not possible to undertake any kind of action because our daughter lives in Bilaval House and I would not raid my daughter's home." The people are asking who Malik Sikander is and I tell them that he must be a jinn or a demon. If Asif Zardari, the husband of the daughter, Benazir Bhutto, and the owner of Bilaval House could be arrested in connection with a kidnapping incident, who then is this Malik Sikander who cannot be arrested? After all, what could be dearer to a daughter than her husband?

Last night, I visited a friend whom I had not seen for a long time. The road that I used to take several years ago to my friend's house was now blocked by a large locked iron gate, such as those one sees in front of prisons. I blew the horn and then got out of my car to find the

gatekeeper or sentry. The garbage and dried leaves which had collected on the other side of the gate showed that it had not been opened for a long time. I went to another lane. That was also closed with a similar locked gate. I wondered if all the houses here had now become "jails." There had to be some sort of sentry around. I asked a couple of people and was told that one could get into the area by one lane only, which was also guarded by a gate, but one could enter by obtaining permission. I got there and saw three or four sentries armed with rifles on the other side of the gate. They told me to wait, which is probably what all guests and sometimes the residents also have to go through if they drive a new car or if the sentries are new. After some time, the sentries told me that the phone was out of order but that I could leave the car outside and walk in on foot. My friend's house was at the end of the lane at a distance of about 300 feet. A long time ago, Mr. Insha wrote, "May I be sacrificed for your lanes, my country. If city dwellers will not let us in, we will go live in the forest." One can enter and leave at will forests, wildernesses, ruins, and the temporary dwelling areas of poor people, but the rich have shut off all entrances to their posh localities and have imprisoned themselves as well. When I returned from my friend's house, the sentries had changed. I had to identify myself all over again and got out with difficulty. I remembered the club in London where one can enter without charge but has to pay a fee when leaving.

The rich have closed their lanes with gates and imprisoned themselves and are forced to have three or four guards around them wherever they go. According to statistics, up to this month, 7,546 individuals have been abducted, some from Sindh and the rest from Karachi. Recently, those abducted included a retired admiral, a retired judge's son-in-law, the only son of the governor of the state bank, and several other respected individuals and their children. None have as yet been found. Have they no parents? The husband of a former prime minister can be arrested for the abduction of a Bokhari and 15 million rupees ransom. What about these daily kidnappings for two or three of which, if not for each, 15 million rupees ransom has been paid? How many Bokharis have paid heavy ransoms so far, but have kept quiet because they knew that if they complained, not only would no arrests be made but they might be abducted again as punishment for talking. If these abductions can be stopped with the arrest of a Sikander the great, then it would be worth sacrificing the love of a daughter in order to earn the prayers and gratitude of all the parents, sons, and daughters of the city. Otherwise, the people would believe that identifying Sikander as the abductor was mere political talk. The residents of the defense housing society must have considered themselves safe because of the word defense in their name and have not built any iron gates.

The recent rise in the number of abductions in the area has spread fear among the people. According to a newspaper report, a merchant was abducted on 13 October, in spite of the presence of more than 20 mobile police cars

in the defense area. In a meeting yesterday, residents of the defense housing society discussed building gates. The residents of other large areas are already behind such bars. Nowhere else in the world have I seen people, for whatever reason, become so anxious as to convert their areas and lanes into jails by building iron gates. Whenever I pass Sohrab Koth, I remember that it was here, in order to stop illegal encroachments and because of wrong planning, that disturbances started in Karachi. So many governments, rulers, governors, and chief ministers have come and gone, but this city, it seems, was destined for ruin. For a time corpses were being removed. Now, it is the living who are disappearing. When loved ones die, the survivors mourn for a period of time and then come to terms with reality; but when the elders of families and the beloved children of mothers are abducted, no one sleeps, eats, or drinks until they return, and the lives of the family members become living hells.

Seeing and hearing about these experiences disturbs others as well and robs them of their peace of mind. In the past, murder and robbery ruled the day. Now it is plunder, kidnappings, and fear. Cultural life has ended in this city of lights. The only activities left are election slogans being shouted or kidnappings. The peace-loving people are disgusted. They would like peace, justice, and dignity. Politicians enjoy respect under all conditions; whether they win or lose they come out on top. The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] started the custom of appointing defeated politicians as ministers and governors. As for the poor, their problems will not be solved. Industrial workers and the rich who are not in politics are also being abducted and ultimately they will be forced to leave the country. A few weeks ago, I said in my column that the army should be immediately given special powers to deal at least with Karachi. It is surprising that although we have such a large army, individuals are abducted for months at a time. No one does anything about this state of affairs. Are we being punished for our sins? Hazrat-e Abu Bakr Siddiq [the first of the four major caliphs] said that God's anger descends upon the nation that becomes shameless (and nothing can deflect God's anger); and surely this anger descends upon the Muslims. It is said that there was a holy man in the time of Hajaj bin Yusuf whose prayers were always answered. One day Hajaj begged the holy man to pray for him. The man lifted up his hands and said, "Oh God! grant death to this man."

Hajaj was surprised to hear this and complained to the man about his strange prayers. The holy man said, "These prayers are the most beneficial for you and the Muslims because the sooner death comes the fewer sins will be committed." It is now my prayer that either God should grant us all death or give our rulers and the bureaucrats the ability to govern better. Prime ministers and chief ministers change, but bureaucracy remains the same. Law and order depends on them. The greatest change bureaucrats may experience is to be transferred from one district to the next and back to the first again. Bureaucrats know everything. Then why have criminals

in the city been left free to operate for so many years? Why has the administration remained a silent spectator? When will the continuous abductions for ransom cease? There was a time when those returning from foreign countries would choose to work and live in Karachi, even though they belonged to other provinces. Even if these individuals did not settle in Karachi, they would spend some time in that city and spend some of their overseas earnings there before moving on. Now they buy direct tickets to Islamabad. If they have to break journey in Karachi, they appear worried. People from other parts of the country, especially Lahore, who came to Karachi would envy the roads, the lights, and the atmosphere. Now, the residents of Sindh go to Islamabad and Lahore to see what law and order look like and feel at peace there. In addition to robberies and kidnappings, the other day someone started fires in two of the city's largest markets. Several files of plots have been stolen from KDA [Karachi Development Authority]. Someone suddenly appears and forcibly steals a car. Robberies are committed in broad daylight. Shops or offices are forcibly entered and their money is stolen. Prominent individuals and innocent children are kidnapped. No one is arrested. Nothing is ever uncovered about the crimes, and I have become convinced that jinns and demons are responsible for all these incidents. According to newspaper reports, an American survey team has placed 50 percent of the blame for the abductions in Karachi on the administration. This strengthens my belief that jinns and demons have set up camp in Karachi and the administration cannot touch them. Rather, the administration is in league with them. A woman was tired of her husband's drinking and decided to scare him and thus teach him a lesson. One night she covered herself with a white sheet and waited in the graveyard through which her husband passed on his way home from the bar. When she saw her husband drunkenly lurching by, she screamed in a frightful voice, "Stop! I am a demon!" The husband stretched out his hand and said, "Let me shake your hand; I am married to your sister."

Law and Order Promises Criticized

91AS0120B Karachi JANG in Urdu 18 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by M. M. Hasan entitled, "Promises About the Future"]

[Text] In a speech during his recent tour of Karachi, the caretaker prime minister said that his government wanted to make law and order a certainty in Karachi and was trying to bring this about. It is the government's motto to give every individual a sense of security; but at the same time, the caretaker prime minister acknowledged that the situation had deteriorated over the last 15 days and incidents of abductions for ransom had increased. He also mentioned the possibility that the recent fires in Mahboob Market and Liaquat Abad might have been the work of subversives. He noted that some criminals were running for office hoping in this way to

avoid being called to account. He warned such individuals that, after the elections, they would not be able to escape the clutches of the law.

It appears from the prime minister's statements that the recent decrease in incidents of murder and plunder in Karachi and the increase in kidnappings for ransom are attributable to the fact that individuals who were formerly engaged in murder and plunder are running for office and they need large amounts in ransom to buy votes and spend money on related matters. The caretaker government must surely know the facts. The question is, why are these criminals being treated with tolerance and why is any action being withheld until the end of the elections? What prevents action being taken against these criminals under the general laws of the country? God forbid, if these individuals should be elected, their power would increase and so would their activities; but it would be more difficult then to take any action against them.

Mr. Jatoi has made many optimistic promises to the people of Karachi if he should be reelected. For example, that this city which has grown so fast and has received so little attention would be given more money for reconstruction and progress; the city's roads would be repaired and new roads built; that the plans which have been drawn up for the supply of water to Karachi would be put into effect; transportation would be improved; a garden similar to the Shalimar gardens would be planted around Quaide Azam's tomb; efforts would be made to end unemployment and measures would be taken to provide workers with housing, medical aid, free education for their children, and pensions. But all these are promises for the future and these can be fulfilled only if Jatoi is reelected to office. Now that Jatoi is in control of affairs, the people of Karachi will be justified in ascertaining his future performance by the success of his government in getting rid of criminals and restoring to this sad city its lost peace and vitality.

Promises made during an election usually prove to be hollow. In the past, many alluring promises were made to the people which proved to be false. The people were promised food, clothing, and shelter, but it turned out that those who already had plenty of these things accumulated even more, whereas the poor people remained hungry, naked, and homeless as before.

A certain class of people believes that politicians who deceive the people, are dishonest, or commit other crimes should not be legally prosecuted but should be left to their devices because the people themselves will demand accountability better than anyone else. If the people judge a candidate for office to be a criminal, they will not vote for him and he will lose the election and suffer punishment for his actions.

This is strange logic. An ordinary thief is brought to justice and imprisoned, but these wise men do not want

any action taken against those who loot the national treasury. Defeat in the elections is considered punishment enough.

Experience shows that such individuals seldom suffer defeat in the elections. Because of their ill-gotten wealth they often prove successful.

A British intellectual observed that the wrong kind of people always gain office because they would not be in office if they were not the wrong kind of people. One cannot say this about British politics, but this statement is true when applied to most of our politicians.

It is our view that the only way to deal with dishonest politicians is not to forgive them and not to allow them to pretend that they face public accountability. These politicians should be tried in regular courts and should be shown no mercy.

We are being punished because of our own tolerance. The wrong kind of people are often elected to national and provincial assemblies, and they have plundered the country, such that it is now reduced to penury.

There is only one remedy for the ills of the country and that is to bring forward, in place of the corrupt elements most of whom are feudal landlords and large landowners, ordinary people of character and competence. But the costs of running for office are now so high that an ordinary man cannot afford the expense. Thus, there is no choice but to hold elections on the basis of proportional representation.

It is very surprising that although the formula of proportional representation is included in the constitutions of many political parties, including the PPP [Pakistan People's Party], no serious attention has been paid to it so far.

Now that political activity is still proceeding on the old lines and political candidates are making alluring promises, the residents of Karachi will bless Mr. Jatoi, from the bottom of their hearts, if he pays attention to the present rather than to the future and restores law and order to this unfortunate city.

Editorial Views Dependence on American Aid

91AS0265A Dhaka BANGLAR BANI in Bengali
16 Nov 90 p 4

[Editorial: "Topic: Pakistan-U.S. Relations"]

[Text] Pakistan is having problems with its big brother of 40 years, the United States. In fact, the Pakistani army's relations with the United States have begun to sour. The bitterness over Pakistan's nuclear program began right before the Pakistani general elections. The United States announced the postponement of its military and economic aid to Pakistan. The Pakistani authorities expressed their resentment over this. The Bush administration stopped the promised aid soon after members

of the U.S. Congress voiced concern that Pakistan may have acquired nuclear devices or the capability to do so.

The Islamabad authorities took this as a veiled expression of support for the dismissed prime minister, Benazir Bhutto. On the campaign trail, IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittihad—Islamic Democratic Alliance] leaders accused the United States of stopping the aid because of lobbying by Benazir Bhutto's mother, Nusrat Bhutto. The caretaker government was riled by a remark made by the U.S. ambassador. The envoy had expressed regret over the prosecution of Benazir Bhutto on corruption charges and maintained that leaders of previous governments should also be investigated. Pakistani authorities immediately denounced this as interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. Thus the old and sweet ties between the two countries began to unravel.

Meanwhile, it appears that the rupture in U.S.-Pakistan ties will be complete soon. The two sides reportedly have made up their minds for the separation. Pakistani President Ghulam Ishaq Khan is talking in a discordant tone. Pakistan, he said, can do without U.S. aid. The new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, is backing him up. They are the henchmen of Pakistan's most powerful force, the army.

Everybody knows that, since Pakistan's inception, the United States has close links to Pakistan's civilian and military bureaucracies. America's behind-the-scenes involvement in the ups and downs of Pakistani politics is an open secret. Because of its deference to the Pakistani army, the United States had reservations about Z.A. Bhutto's democratic government. The U.S. Administration faithfully supported the dictatorship of General Zia. Americans supplied huge amounts of money and arms into Pakistan in the context of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

But then Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika have changed the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf region as they have done in Eastern Europe. Maybe the end of the Cold War has reduced Pakistan's strategic importance as the number one U.S. ally in the area. Perhaps because of that reason the United States is now unwilling to take the blame of associating with Pakistan's military-backed administration. The United States had supported the democratization of Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto, and it did not take her dismissal lightly. Actually, the Bush administration has, in principle, decided to abandon the old U.S. policy of supporting military dictatorships.

The question is whether Pakistan's new civilian government, faced with a disastrous economic crisis, can carry on without the U.S. aid. Without U.S. blessings it is not possible to get assistance from the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. Maybe Pakistan is euphoric over a Japanese assurance of a hefty sum in aid. But will Japan be very generous without the American go-ahead? In that case, the current state of affairs between the two countries [the United States and Pakistan] would seem like a lovers' quarrel. Maybe it is just that.

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